EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Azerbiajani Ferry Disaster Raises Questions About Joint Flotilla

EURASIA INSIGHT

AZERBIAJANI FERRY DISASTER RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT JOINT FLOTILLA
Mevlut Katik 10/25/02
A EurasiaNet Commentary

Azerbaijan’s prosecutor-general announced on October 25 that he would investigate the sinking of a ferry off the coast three days earlier as a crime. Whether the Mercury-2 sank by unavoidable accident in strong winds or fell due to negligence or sabotage, the disaster raises questions about whether Caspian Sea countries need to pool their coast-guard efforts. In this context, Caspian states should revisit the idea of creating a joint flotilla to promote both security and disaster response.

The Mercury-2 sank in the Caspian on October 22 five hours after sending an SOS call, according to a report by Azerbaijan’s Turan news agency. The sinking left an oil slick 15 kilometers long. Search teams have rescued 13 of 56 passengers, with little hope of saving more.

The tragedy has helped highlight the Caspian states’ lack of disaster response capabilities. It also calls attention to the fact that the five littoral states � Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan � have yet to agree on a binding treaty concerning the sea’s borders. [For background see the EurasiaNet Business and Economics archives]. The lack of such a pact may be a contributing factor to the lack of disaster-response preparedness, as discord in sea boundary negotiations has inhibited multi-lateral cooperation in other spheres.

A joint naval force could have conceivably responded more promptly to the ferry’s SOS call or cast a wider net in searching for survivors. It could also prove useful in containing environmental damage by lifting sunken ships and helping to coordinate cleanup efforts. A joint force could also potentially boost regional security.

In August, Russia proposed the creation of a joint flotilla. However, other Caspian states have reacted coolly to the proposal. Iran, in particular, remains wary that Russia would dominate such a force. One model that the Caspian states could draw upon is the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group. This year-old joint command, known as BlackSeaFor, involves Bulgaria, Georgia, Rumania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. It is a peacetime, on-call task force dedicated primarily to humanitarian and rescue operations, officially available for international missions, and explicitly not directed against any state. Despite its peaceful mission, BlackSeaFor is likely to enhance member states’ confidence in their own security.

BlackSeaFor could easily serve as a model for the organizational and command structure of a possible CaspianSeaFor. By setting up an organizational structure that includes a naval commanders’ group and a chief of staff, BlackSeaFor has tried to depoliticize its management. This arrangement would better equip a joint force to conduct search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, de-mining, and goodwill visits without provoking mistrust. Units allocated to the force would be based in their respective home countries and join the force for appropriate tasks. If equipped with proper organization, a Caspian force could promote mutual trust and thus help reduce the chances for an arms race among Caspian states. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives].

Of course, sensitive issues would accompany any effort to create a joint flotilla. Smaller nations worry about Russian desires for hegemony, and Russia has at times encouraged such worries. (Russian officials have spoken of expanding its border patrol southward into Kazakhstan, for instance.) Russia and Turkey, while partners in BlackSeaFor, have separate geopolitical interests regarding the Caspian and its border states. The United States is keenly interested in developing the Caspian as a potential oil source and might want to monitor any patrol of the sea. Still, a disaster like that of the Azerbaijani ferry indicates that there may be humanitarian advantages to forming a joint patrol for the Caspian � and BlackSeaFor suggests a way that such humanitarian work can strengthen littoral states’ self-confidence.

Editor�s Note: Mevlut Katik is a London-based journalist and analyst. He is a former BBC correspondent and also worked for The Economist group. His work titled "Militarization of the Caspian and a Proposal for CaspianSeaFor" will come out in an edited volume later this year.

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