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Eurasia Insight: The Union for the Democratic Revival of Georgia, a regional party headed by the Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze, has traditionally served as the wild card of Georgian politics. Perhaps more so than in any previous election in the post-Soviet era, the Revival bloc could figure prominently in the shaping of Georgia’s political agenda following the November 2 parliamentary vote. Technically, Revival is considered an opposition party -- primarily because relations between Ajaria, an autonomous republic within Georgia, and President Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration have been tense in recent years. However, Abashidze and Shevardnadze have found it politically expedient to cooperate in the past. Pre-election polls indicate that no political party will receive sufficient support to secure a parliamentary majority on its own. Provided that there’s a free and fair vote, the post-election period could feature lots of political deal-making. Many observers, however, are concerned about the possibilities of fraud, which could cause Georgian politics to take a violent turn. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Given the flagging popularity of the pro-presidential For a New Georgia bloc, Shevardnadze’s political survival could depend on his ability to forge a new arrangement with Abashidze, and thus gain Revival’s backing. Conversely, a decision by Abashidze to withhold his support for Shevardnadze’s For a New Georgia bloc could provide a significant boost to efforts by opposition parties to create a viable governing coalition. Ajaria sits along the Black Sea coast and has an estimated population of roughly 400,000. Abashidze has governed the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and has maintained tight control over the region’s political and economic life. In the Soviet tradition of democratic centralism, Abashidze and the candidates he supports usually garner over 90 percent of the vote in regional elections. Despite his authoritarian tendencies, most Ajarian residents appear relatively content with his rule. In comparison with the rest of Georgia, Ajaria can be considered a bastion of stability and prosperity. According to a recent poll, Revival stands to receive almost 9 percent of the overall vote in the parliamentary election, meaning that it would get near unanimous support in Ajaria. If the poll is accurate, Revival politicians would obtain an influential share of parliamentary seats. Abashidze has provided few clues as to his post-election preferences. At the moment, he is feuding with Shevardnadze and opposition leaders. The October 23 clash in the regional capital Batumi between Ajarian authorities and supporters of the opposition National Movement underscores the fact that Abashidze is determined to resist any effort by Tbilisi to weaken his own personal control over the autonomous republic. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Ajarian leaders have denounced the National Movement’s leader Mikheil Saakashvili, characterizing him as a provocateur who staged an "attempted coup" in Batumi. Abashidze is also on record as being no fan of Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze, one of the co-leaders of another prominent election bloc known as the Burjanadze-Democrats. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. In addition, the Ajarian leader accused the National Movement and the business-oriented New Rights Party of collaborating with the government in voting against a parliamentary measure in May that would have authorized the creation of Free Economic Zones (FEZ) in Georgia. Abashidze has long sought to secure FEZ status for Ajaria. Abashidze’s most vitriolic rhetoric in recent months has been reserved for Shevardnadze. For most of this year, Ajarian officials have bickered with Shevardnadze’s administration over budget allocations. Georgian officials have said Ajaria has been withholding payment to central government coffers of tax revenue collected in the autonomous republic. Abashidze, meanwhile, has complained that Tbilisi has not made appropriate allocations to keep the Ajarian infrastructure functioning. Abashidze also has been a strong opponent of the so-called Baker plan, a deal negotiated by former US secretary of state James Baker to promote a fair parliamentary election. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Shevardnadze initially embraced the Baker plan when it was first brokered in July, but later backed away from the framework agreement. Observers and opposition politicians said in July that Abashidze’s opposed the Baker plan because he feared that it would damage his ability to control the parliamentary vote in Ajaria, and thus threaten Revival’s ability to win enough electoral support to gain parliamentary seats. During a news conference in July, Abashidze accused the government of "doing its best to stay in power," and denigrated its capabilities. "One can compare them [Tbilisi government leaders] to eunuchs in a harem," said Abashidze, according to a Rustavi-2 television report. The price of Abashidze’s backing in the post-election period could very well be support for his plan to turn Ajaria into a FEZ. Many observers in Tbilisi believe Abashidze would utilize such status to enrich himself and his political allies, as well as reinforce Ajaria’s political autonomy. Politicians in Tbilisi, both within the administration and among the opposition, want to extend the central government’s control over Ajaria, and have thus resisted efforts to turn it into a FEZ. But such resistance may break down during what is expected to be a tumultuous post-election process to create a viable parliamentary majority, experts say. The origins of the current tension between Tbilisi and Batumi can be traced to the early 1990s, when Georgia was engulfed by separatist conflicts in the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Ajaria was the lone autonomous republic in Georgia that did not seek to break away from Tbilisi, and for that Georgian authorities granted Abashidze broad self-governing authority. Relations between Tbilisi and Batumi were relatively harmonious until the late 1990s, when the FEZ issue appeared on the country’s political agenda. As friction intensified in recent years, Abashidze skillfully cultivated strong ties with Russia, which maintains a military base in Batumi. Georgian officials want Moscow to close its bases in Georgia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. But Tbilisi would appear to need Abashidze’s consent to force the Russian military to leave the Batumi facility. Abashidze’s cordial relationship with Moscow helped him secure appointment in November 2001 as Shevardnadze’s personal representative to Russia. In that capacity, Abashidze was responsible for mediating disputes, especially concerning Abkhazia, that had stoked confrontation between Russia and Georgia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Abashidze’s dealings with Moscow ended up angering Tbilisi, however. Many in Tbilisi suspected Abashidze of double-dealing.
Editor’s Note: Jaba Devdariani is a Human Rights Officer with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and a longtime journalist in Georgia. |