EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Moscow Undecided Over Detente With Georgia

EURASIA INSIGHT

MOSCOW UNDECIDED OVER DETENTE WITH GEORGIA
Sergei Blagov 11/01/06

As Georgia’s foreign minister met his Russian counterpart in Moscow at a session of an economic alliance of Black Sea countries on November 1-2, the Kremlin appeared to be sending mixed signals on whether it was willing to normalize relations with Georgia.

The meeting was not intended as a venue for important bilateral discussions. The 12-member Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation prioritizes collaboration in energy, transportation and telecommunications, Andrei Kondakov, head of the economic cooperation department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said on the eve of the meeting. Notably, Russia is particularly interested in the Black Sea transport corridor, which would become part of Euro-Asian routes, he said on October 30.

However, at the request of the Georgian side, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov agreed to hold a separate meeting with his Georgian counterpart Gela Bezhuashvili, the Russian Foreign Ministry said. Settlements of Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts, as well as crisis of Russian-Georgian relations came as main issues at the meeting, it said. Bezhuashvili traveled to Moscow with Georgian Conflict Resolution Minister Merab Antadze.

Yet even before the meeting, scheduled for later in the day on November 1, there were indications that any breakthrough in bilateral relations remained a distant possibility. Notably, Russian news agencies cited Kremlin sources as saying that President Vladimir Putin had declined to meet Georgia’s foreign minister during his trip to Moscow.

Russian officials conceded that relations with Georgia are far from normal, but blame Tbilisi. Russia’s Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov announced on October 31 that the bilateral tensions came as a "result of the Georgian leadership’s policy." Commenting on Bezhuashvili’s trip to Moscow, Ivanov said that such interaction cannot solve these problems. The Georgian withdrawal of what Russia claims are military troops from the Upper Kodori Gorge, a strip of territory in the breakaway region of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia, or agreements for a peaceful resolution to Tbilisi’s disputes with the separatist governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could help to improve relations between Russia and Georgia, Ivanov said, Interfax reported.

Speaking with reporters in Baku on October 31 before flying to Moscow, Bezhuashvili noted that Georgia was ready for constructive dialogue.

"[W]e are ready to take into consideration Moscow’s interests in the Caucasus, but we do expect the same from the Russian side," he said, Georgian news outlets reported. "We are going to Moscow to see what Russia wants."

The meeting between Russian and Georgian top diplomats comes as an attempt to deal with the growing rift between Russia and Georgia. Although relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have long been strained over the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, bilateral ties plunged to new lows in September when Georgia detained four Russian officers and accused them of spying.

Russia responded by cutting its embassy staff in Tbilisi, suspending postal and travel links with Georgia, and shutting down casinos in Moscow allegedly owned by the Georgian mafia. The Russian law enforcement agencies also arrested Georgian individuals seen as leaders of the Georgian crime underworld in Russia. These measures came after earlier economic restrictions against Georgia that included a Russian ban on the import of Georgian mineral water and wine.

Although Moscow insists it does not target any specific ethnic group in its immigration policy, the Russian authorities have continued to deport hundreds of Georgian nationals, who were allegedly living in Russia without registration. On October 28, 48 deported Georgian nationals arrived in Tbilisi, while dozens of others still await deportation in Moscow.

Despite the variety of measures aimed at Georgia and Georgians, Moscow nonetheless insists that Tbilisi should take the first steps towards reconciliation. Tbilisi should confirm that "Georgia does not consider Russian as a hostile state," Konstantin Kosachev, head of the Russian State Duma’s foreign affairs committee, said on the eve of Bezhuashvili’s trip to Moscow, according to Russian news agency RIA Novosti. Kosachev also urged Tbilisi to guarantee that force would not be used in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts.

Meanwhile, Moscow remains reluctant to resend its ambassador to Tbilisi. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov said on October 27 that the return of Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko to Georgia was still some time off. "We don’t see any conditions that might foster his return to Georgia," he said, Interfax reported. On October 30, Kovalenko told the Russian news agency Interfax only that "[c]onsultations continue" about his return to the Georgian capital.

Most of the embassy staff and their family members, including Kovalenko, left Georgia on September 29 in a "partial evacuation" from Georgia in response to the arrest of four Russian military officers charged with espionage. Although the officers were released on October 2, the embassy staffers have yet to return.

One possible gesture towards Tbilisi has been made, however. On October 30, the Russian State Duma, the lower house of parliament, indicated it would not send official observers to the South Ossetian independence referendum and presidential election slated for November 12. "It was decided that an official delegation will not be sent to South Ossetia," Interfax quoted Igor Demin, spokesman for the United Russia party, parliament’s majority party, as saying.

However, even this minor gesture proved ambiguous. Demin also said that Duma deputies still could observe the vote as individuals because South Ossetians have Russian citizenship. Subsequently, some Duma deputies have indicated readiness to travel to South Ossetia to monitor the vote. On October 31, Konstantin Zatulin, member of the United Russia party, confirmed he was going to visit South Ossetia.

Furthermore, Russian media coverage has remained biased in favor of Georgia’s breakaway regions. On October 31, Russian state-run media outlets headlined the news about a violent incident in South Ossetia in which local authorities claimed that they had "eliminated" four terrorists allegedly sent by Georgia to stage provocations on the eve of the elections. Russian television channels featured pictures of the suspected slain terrorists, and their arms and explosives. Russian media generally supported South Ossetian claims that the terrorists were ethnic Chechens sent from Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, although Bezhuashvili’s denial of the incident was also mentioned.

Following the October 31 incident, South Ossetian de facto President Eduard Kokoity accused Georgia of "state terrorism" and ruled out any compromise with the Georgian government. The separatist leadership recently declined a Georgian offer for talks with President Mikheil Saakashvili at the Georgian ski resort of Bakuriani, located in a region with many ethnic Ossetians.

During a visit to Russia’s Kabardino-Balkaria republic in the North Caucasus, Kokoity described the conflict with Georgia as a political and not an ethnic feud. He also accused Tbilisi of trying to enforce "norms of Western democracy," incompatible with traditional Caucasian values, news outlets reported.

Kokoity’s trip to Russia’s North Caucasus, presumably aimed at drumming up support for his position toward Georgia, brought some immediate results. On October 31, the parliament of Russia’s North Ossetia officially asked the State Duma to recognize "the genocide against the Ossetian people in 1918-1920 and 1989-1992 by the Georgian military-political leadership." The move followed a similar appeal by the parliament of South Ossetia on October 12.

However, Moscow’s hard-line approach toward Georgia has not proven universally popular among Russian pundits. At an October 30 press conference in Tbilisi, Andrei Illarionov, President Putin’s former economic adviser and now a senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based Cato Institute, hailed Georgia’s economic reforms and improved business climate. He also dismissed the long-term significance of Russia’s sanctions against Georgia, arguing that the measures could benefit the South Caucasus state if it manages to diversify its foreign markets.

Illarionov dismissed a report by the Russian daily Kommersant that he has been allegedly invited to become Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s economic adviser.

Editor�s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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