EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Georgia: Espionage Charges Brought Against Opposition Leaders, Conflict Continues

EURASIA INSIGHT

GEORGIA: ESPIONAGE CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST OPPOSITION LEADERS, CONFLICT CONTINUES
Molly Corso 11/09/07

One day after Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s proposal to hold early presidential elections, the standoff between government and opposition shows little sign of abating. With the proposed vote less than two months away, officials have accused two opposition leaders of espionage and plotting a coup. In addition, the government has opened an investigation of opposition financier Badri Patarkatsishvili for allegedly threatening to overthrow the government.

Saakashvili announced the early presidential vote, tentatively scheduled for January 5, as a way to ease tension following the imposition of a state of emergency on November 7. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. But charges brought against Labor Party leader Shalva Natelashvili and Freedom Party leader Konstantin Gamsakhurdia in connection with the opposition protests suggest that government concerns about "foreign forces" � a euphemism for Russia � remain unchanged. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Both men were charged on November 9 with espionage and attempting to overthrow the government, Interior Ministry spokesperson Shota Utiashvili confirmed. Gamsakhurdia’s brother, Tsotne, has also been charged on both counts. It is unlikely that criminal proceedings against two leading opposition leaders can help foster an atmosphere of compromise between Saakashvili’s administration and a 10-party opposition coalition.

Over the past day, Georgian Public Television, the only news broadcaster currently allowed to operate, has routinely featured alleged phone conversations and videotaped meetings involving all three of the accused and supposed representatives of Russian intelligence in Tbilisi.

None of the men has yet been brought in for questioning, Interior Ministry spokesperson Shota Utiashvili said, adding that Natelashvili and Konstantin Gamsakhurdia have "probably" fled the country. Both opposition leaders had earlier been reported missing by party representatives. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Representatives from both leaders’ parties, however, assured EurasiaNet on November 9 that the two remain in Georgia. Konstantin Gamsakhurdia is at home in Tbilisi, said Freedom Party spokesperson Natia Toidze; a Labor Party representative would not divulge Natelashvili’s exact whereabouts.

Officials’ lingering sense of unease was also reflected in parliament’s November 9 approval of Saakashvili’s declaration of a state of emergency, an order that restricts news broadcasts and bans public demonstrations until November 22.

Commenting on the vote, Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze noted that while Georgia’s political situation had improved since security forces moved to break up an opposition protest in central Tbilisi on November 7, a "threat to stability still exists."

Saakashvili’s November 8 proposal for early presidential elections has been hailed by government supporters as a chance to affirm the administration’s stand against such threats. Under the Georgian constitution, Saakashvili must resign at least 45 days before the election date, which must be approved by parliament. If the elections are indeed held on January 5, as proposed, the president will step down on November 22, leaving him with less than three weeks in office.

But Davit Usupashvili, a leader of the opposition Republican Party, told EurasiaNet that lifting the emergency measures is vital before the election takes place. The opposition, he added, needs to know what the government’s plans are before it can move forward with its own presidential election campaign.

Saakashvili supporters are quick to hold up the early election proposal as evidence of the president’s willingness to compromise. Usupashvili, meanwhile, argued that parliament’s approval of the state of emergency had sent "mixed messages," as it came after indications from the president that the order would be annulled. "It seems like the government is confused," Usupashvili said.

A representative of one non-governmental organization with close ties to the president, however, rejected that notion, terming Saakashvili’s decision for an early presidential vote as "logical" and a "compromise."

"The election will show whether there is support not just for the president � but also reform issues," said Liberty Institute Project Director Giorgi Meladze.

How efficiently the government or opposition can prepare for an election on such short notice remains unclear.

The early presidential election gives Saakashvili an unfair advantage, and thus would not provide an accurate gauge of his administration’s popular support, argued Dr Giorgi Khutsishvili, founder of the International Center for Conflict and Negotiation. "As always, this is the way out of the situation that suits him [Saakashvili]," Khutsishvili said in reference to the president’s proposal. "He has the advantage of using the whole [government] machine, which will work very intensively to prepare for January 5."

An investigation into opposition financier Badri Patarkatsishvili could help prevent the opposition coalition from gaining traction during the campaign. Interior ministry spokesperson Shota Utiashvili told EurasiaNet on November 9 that the London-based tycoon is wanted for questioning in association with a November 7 statement in which he pledged to "apply all my strength and resources to free Georgia from this fascist regime."

Georgia’s criminal code, Utiashvili elaborated, allows prosecution of individuals who have expressed the intention to overthrow the state. "The statement alone is not enough for the courts, but it is enough to start an investigation," he said.

Meanwhile, attempts at dialogue between government and the opposition remain fitfully stop-and-start. Georgian Orthodox Church Patriarch Ilia II is expected to act as a mediator between the two sides, but a date for a meeting has not yet been set. Opposition party representatives and Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze met separately with the patriarch on November 9.

On November 8, the United States, arguably Georgia’s closest ally, stated that it "welcomes" the early presidential vote and referendum, but characterized lifting the state of emergency and allowing unhampered news broadcasts as "necessary steps to restore the democratic conditions for the election and referendum."

Under the state of emergency, the government has restricted news broadcasts on all but Georgian Public Television and Radio. The pro-opposition Imedi television and radio stations and Kavkasia television, based in Tbilisi, remain closed.

The state of emergency has also prompted the country’s main cable television broadcaster, Ayety, to shut off broadcasts from Russian and other foreign news channels, including the BBC and CNN, the Media.ge site reported. A Batumi-based television station, Channel 25, has also been shut off at the request of police, the site said.

Newspapers have continued to publish, although one pro-opposition daily, Alia, announced Friday that it was shutting down operations to await government clarification of the media restrictions.

Special Forces units were removed from Tbilisi’s central streets November 9, and traffic moved normally, although schools throughout Georgia remained closed for a second day. Classes are expected to resume on November 12.

Editor�s Note: Molly Corso is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi.

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