EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - EU Accession: Opposition to Turkish Membership Remains Entrenched

EURASIA INSIGHT

EU ACCESSION: OPPOSITION TO TURKISH MEMBERSHIP REMAINS ENTRENCHED
Sarah Repucci 11/11/05
A EurasiaNet Commentary

Although European Union leaders decided to open accession talks with Turkey weeks ago, it remains clear that opposition to Ankara’s integration into Europe remains deeply entrenched.

In a November 9 report, the EU gave Turkey a mixed review on Ankara’s drive for membership. Accession talks, which formally opened on October 3, are expected to last a decade or more. The most recent EU Commission report characterized Turkey as a "functioning market economy," but stressed that the pace of reform had cooled in recent months. It cautioned Ankara on being slow to eliminate the use of torture, while expressing concern about conditions facing Turkey’s Kurdish minority.

While the report concentrates on legal points, perhaps the largest hurdle to Turkish membership exists in the minds of many EU citizens. The arguments of Turkey’s most vocal opponents are clear: Turkey’s population will flood into the current member states and overwhelm already overburdened labor markets. Turkey’s borders with volatile neighbors to its east and south will expose the EU to dangerous new threats. And the values of Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population will clash with those of Christian Europe. Anti-Turkey sentiment stands to gain strength especially in France, given the recent disturbances in cities across that nation by alienated Muslim youth.

Turkey’s supporters have responded unconvincingly by promising "future safeguards," an idea so elusive that it serves only to lend credence to critics’ fears. What Turkey’s supporters within the EU should be doing is fostering a substantive public debate on the issues. Such a debate could show EU citizens that Turkish accession would not send the EU on a downward socio-economic spiral, as many currently fear.

Turkey has made tremendous reform progress over the past few years, as the designation of "functioning market economy" attests to. Since Turkey became an official EU candidate in 1999, and especially since the current government was elected in 2002, the country has pushed ahead with reforms that few had previously thought possible. New and amended laws have stripped away much of the framework that had exposed Turkey’s people to rights abuses, weak democratic institutions, and economic uncertainty. Turkey has passed specific reforms requested by the EU, and its more significant steps have clustered around major EU evaluations of Turkish progress. Without the incentive of EU membership, the steps forward would almost certainly falter, and might well reverse.

Turkey’s population of 70 million is troubling because it is large and poor. Turks already emigrate to European countries looking for jobs, and EU membership is understood among both Turks and Europeans to mean increased worker mobility. Unemployment rates are high in Western Europe. Vulnerable workers as well as middle-class Europeans imagine waves of Turkey’s poor and uneducated looking for jobs in their countries.

The reality is quite the contrary. Although the economic gap between Turkey and its Western neighbors remains large, closer integration with the EU would accelerate investment and boost economic growth as reforms take effect and foreign investors gain confidence in the Turkish economy. Alternately, if Turks are discouraged and the reform movement wanes, the Turkish economy could continue to experience volatility, like the crash of 2001. Lacking EU encouragement, backsliding and instability could fuel increased Turkish emigration, precisely the scenario European policymakers want to avoid.

The EU should also keep in mind that a Turkey that feels excluded would have reason to seek friends elsewhere, many of whom are similarly out of EU favor. The ill effects of these relationships could then be brought closer to EU borders. Turkey won’t become the next rogue state, but it could adopt policies and practices that are undesirable to the EU.

Finally, the idea that Turkey’s Muslim population cannot be accommodated by the distinct culture and traditions of the EU is both misguided, given Europe’s existing immigrant population, and short-sighted. Welcoming a large Muslim country that might have influence over EU norms may seem objectionable, but jeopardizing this democratic example in a repressive region could have powerful negative effects originating both inside and outside Europe.

It is true that Turkey’s own actions do not always endear it to European observers. Most recently, the prosecution of author Orhan Pamuk has damaged Turkey’s image as a country with an improving freedom-of-speech environment. It is crucial for Turkey to press on with the necessary steps toward improved human rights and consolidated democracy.

Nevertheless, most resistance to Turkish membership stems from exaggeration and misinformation concerning Turkey’s flaws. It is easy to raise passions in Europe about lost jobs and threatened values, especially when the counter-arguments center on political considerations that are a remote concept for many EU citizens. Politicians who publicly support Turkey’s candidacy have yet to develop a convincing set of arguments that can persuade the skeptics.

Turkey will only continue to face hurdle after hurdle if the European population is never brought on board. The start of negotiations on October 3 was important, but it is only one piece of the EU’s commitment to Turkey. If Turkish membership is to become a reality, European politicians must do far more to explain to their constituents why Turkey can help solve the challenges they face, and benefit the region as a whole.

Editor�s Note: Sarah Repucci is a Senior Researcher at Freedom House. She is an analyst on southeastern Europe and Turkey.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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