EurasiaNet Recaps - Southern Afghan Governor Confronts Attacks, Seeks New Mandate

RECAPS

SOUTHERN AFGHAN GOVERNOR CONFRONTS ATTACKS, SEEKS NEW MANDATE
Abubaker Saddique 11/12/03
A EurasiaNet Q & A With Yusuf Pashtun

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A car bomb, exploding November 11 at United Nations offices in Kandahar, showcased the dilemma that Yusuf Pashtun faces. Pashtun has served as governor of this southern Afghanistan province since August, when President Hamid Karzai fired Gul Agha Shirzai, the warlord who had run it since the Taliban militia fell in late 2001. (Earlier, Pashtun had served as Shirzai’s spokesman.) Pashtun, an architect by training, is trying to build a model for provincial administration in a land unaccustomed to centralized democracy.

Progress has been hard to measure. Pashtun has warned western reporters that Taliban factionalists or members of al Qaeda may abandon the ambushes they have carried out for months in favor of "urban terrorism." He should know better than other officials what the Taliban may do: in late October, its former foreign minister left prison and reportedly settled in his Kandahar home. Pashtun spoke with EurasiaNet shortly after that release.

EurasiaNet: After you assumed the leadership in Kandahar, how are people reacting?
Pashtun: The change was smooth, nice and very well-received, but my problem is that people are expecting so much. They want me to achieve comprehensive reform of the administration and do away with corruption, which is not an easy job. Moreover, the delivery of justice is a major problem and I have to work hard to improve that.

EurasiaNet:What are your immediate priorities?
Pashtun: Security has been the number one item on my agenda ever since I took over. For the last six months, the Taliban has started sending small groups from across the border in Pakistan. They started to hit some soft targets, such as aid agencies. The basic idea was to scare off [relief workers] and stop the reconstruction, which will result in a lack of peace and security. They want to create a vicious circle.

My problem in Kandahar was also that of [the southern province of] Zabul. The previous governor there ignored the Taliban threat to the extent that they established a firm foothold in districts such as Dai Chopan. The first thing that I did was to start a military operation there � the first of its kind after [the American�led military campaign] in 2001.

Now, a new commander of the border forces has been appointed and he is tasked with building 40 border posts along the border with Pakistan and Iran in the four southern provinces of Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand and Nemroz. It’s not an easy job.

My understanding is that as we work on border controls and similar measures, Taliban and al Qaeda will resort to urban terrorism. This will be the second phase of the ongoing security challenge. My own analysis is that 50 percent of the insecurity has to be blamed on our own administration because we neglected these districts so much that no basic services were provided. This alienates people and creates fertile ground for any kind of terrorist activity.

EurasiaNet: There is an impression in the outside world that the Taliban represented ethnic Pashtuns and after their demise the group feels alienated and disgruntled. How do you look at this?
Pashtun: There were deliberate attempts by the outsiders to make the Taliban official representatives of the Pashtuns, which they were definitely not. Atrocities committed by the Taliban in non-Pashtun areas were done deliberately to create ethnic hatred. This might have forced the leadership of such groups to say that all Pashtuns are Taliban. We know that more than 40 percent of the leadership were non-Pashtuns but nobody was pointing this out.

After Kabul fell, the [former] Northern Alliance came to Kabul. This gave an upper hand to people from northern Afghanistan and it had a negative reaction from the Pashtuns. Consequently attempts to strike a balance met with resistance. But the perception that all is controlled by non-Pashtuns is not true. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

EurasiaNet: How do you see the drug problem?
Pashtun: My second major problem after security is drugs. I hope you are aware that poppy is not cultivated in Kandahar but it is planted in the surrounding provinces such as Helmand and Uruzgan. New areas of the country are being increasingly brought under the cultivation of the narcotic crop such as the central highlands of Hazarajat. [See related story]. Kandahar, of course, is a major transit route. This is affecting our security. In the long run I don’t need to stress the consequences that we will face.

EurasiaNet: What measures you would like to be adopted to tackle the drug problem?
Pashtun: I have two suggestions out of desperation. First: if the international Community- especially the recipient countries- make [heroin] legal, prices will go down so much that the Afghan farmers would not be attracted to poppy cultivation.

Secondly, our government should impose a 3,000 percent tax so this is made hugely unattractive to the Afghans. For this, we have to legalize it for a year or two. In other words, we have to devise a mechanism to discourage by merit the cultivation of this drug. I know this is very controversial, but in my experience this can be very practical.

EurasiaNet: How do you evaluate the pace of reconstruction in southern Afghanistan?
Pashtun: The pace of rebuilding is slow and enough is not happening. For the last several weeks we have gone without electric power because the turbines at the Kajaki generator [in Helmand] stopped because of over two decades’ worth of disrepair.

EurasiaNet: Can elections [scheduled for June 2004] be held on time?
Pashtun: Unfortunately, the way I see it, no. My personal opinion, which I expressed in the cabinet, is that our mandate runs until June 22. Not holding elections should not translate into prolonging our tenure. If we can’t hold elections, we should get some fresh mandate.

Editor�s Note: Abubaker Saddique is an independent journalist specializing in South Central Asian affairs.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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