EURASIA INSIGHT
11/14/06
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Uzbek officials say they are surprised and disappointed that the European Union opted to prolong sanctions against Tashkent that were imposed in 2005 amid the fallout over the Andijan massacre.
EU officials announced November 13 that they were extending an arms embargo on Uzbekistan for another year. A travel ban for Uzbek officials will be in effect at least for another six months. At the same time, the EU announced the resumption of "technical meetings" with Uzbek leaders. In explaining the decision, a statement issued by the Council of the European Union said the bloc remained "profoundly concerned" about human rights conditions in Uzbekistan, and repeated a call for President Islam Karimov to respect "fundamental freedoms." The sanctions were originally implemented in late 2005 as punishment for Uzbekistans refusal to allow an independent investigation into the Andijan events of May 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The EUs move appeared to catch Uzbek officials off guard. "We are very surprised," an Uzbek government official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "We expected a better outcome. Everything seemed good."
In the days leading up to the EU announcement, Uzbek officials took steps to improve its rights image and clear the way for the lifting of EU sanctions. For one, Tashkent offered to engage Brussels in a "critical dialogue" on its rights record. As another goodwill gesture, officials released an opposition journalist, Ulugbek Haidarov, from prison. After his arrest in September on an extortion charge, Haidarov had been sentenced to a five-year jail term. The initial European response prompted Uzbek officials to believe that the sanctions would be lifted.
The EU decision seems to be an effort to strike a balance between geopolitical interests and democratic values. On the one hand, the EU didnt want to be seen as turning a blind eye to ongoing Uzbek right abuses. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At the same time, EU officials appear to feel a strong need for engagement with Tashkent on energy and security issues.
Ultimately, EU officials are said to be looking for ways to honorably lift the sanctions. An EU official, quoted by the Russian news agency Itar-Tass, explained that Brussels will seek to use "technical meetings" to promote the human rights improvements that can justify the lifting of sanctions. Such talks "will make it possible to step up the dialogue with Uzbekistan on human rights," said the EU official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The United States applauded the EU decision. "Respect and dignity for human rights is essential for the future prosperity of the Uzbek people, and a necessary element of successful democratic reform," said a US State Department statement. The statement added that any EU-Uzbek dialogue on human rights "must be results-oriented, with concrete and effective steps" toward improving Tashkents record.
Diplomatic moves by Germany, one of the most powerful EU members, seem to have undercut the EU sanctions somewhat. Shortly after the EU implemented the sanctions in late 2005, Germany ignored the travel ban for selected Uzbek officials by reportedly granting permission to Zakirjon Almatov, the notorious Uzbek interior minister, to receive medical treatment in Germany's Hannover. Earlier this month, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, visited Tashkent, publicly voicing a desire to see the sanctions lifted. In October, two separate German delegations visited Uzbekistan, marking the first EU contacts with Uzbek authorities in almost a year.
Local experts say Germanys diplomatic behavior is motivated by a desire to maintain a German military base outside the Uzbek city of Termez, on the border with Afghanistan. Given Germanys accomodationalist stance, it is not surprising that the Uzbek government has refrained from taking action to close the German base, and from shutting down German non-governmental organizations working in Uzbekistan. The lack of action toward Germany sharply contrasts with Uzbek moves against US interests, including the expulsion of US military forces from the Karshi-Khanabad air base, and the closure of virtually all American-affiliated NGOs in the country. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, Uzbek authorities took action in late October to confiscate a 50-percent share held by American gold mining concern, Newmont Mining Corp, in a local venture.
More broadly, the EUs interest in reducing its dependence on Russia as an energy supplier has increased Brussels interest in stabilizing Central Asia, and widening access to the regions abundant energy reserves. Thus, even as they prolong the sanctions against Uzbekistan, EU officials are eager to work with Tashkent on promoting regional calm. This eagerness to normalize relations was evident in the late October visit to Tashkent by Pierre Morel, the EUs special representative for Central Asia.
The prospect of normalized relations between the EU and Uzbekistan has Russia concerned. The Kremlin seized a geopolitical opportunity in the aftermath of Andijan to reestablish close relations with Karimovs government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Now, Moscow is intent on protecting its advantageous position in Tashkent. In late October, just prior to the arrival of the German foreign minister, Nikolai Bordyuzha, secretary general of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, visited Tashkent for consultations with top Uzbek leaders, apparently to hear reconfirmations of Uzbekistans continued loyalty to the Moscow-led security bloc.
Posted November 14, 2006 © Eurasianet
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