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EURASIA INSIGHT

TURKMENISTAN: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE...
Arkady Dubnov 11/20/03
A commentary for the Turkmenistan Project

So what really happened in Ashgabat a year ago, on November 25, 2002? Did assassins try to carry out a coup d’etat, as claimed by official propaganda? Or did President Saparmurat Niyazov’s special services stage the event as a way of trapping exiles and insiders who might have fostered resistance to the regime? It is impossible to answer these questions until documents related to the case, now kept in total secrecy by authorities, become public. However, there is some information available that can allow us to draw some reasonable conclusions.

A year ago, a handful of Turkmen with varying degrees of association with Niyazov’s dictatorship concluded that the regime they had created would never evolve into a democracy and conspired to remove the dictator. Word of the operation leaked out to too many people, some of whom may have been double agents. As a result, state security agents learned were able to prepare counter-measures. Niyazov’s propaganda claimed there was an attempt to assassinate the president, and the special services fabricated evidence that shots had been fired at his motorcade.

According to eyewitness accounts, there was no shooting at the site. On the evening of November 25, Niyazov personally announced the news of the attempted coup on television. Several hours later, he gave further details of the coup plot and named its organizers. Just a few days later, an investigation was said to confirm his accusation. On January 24, those responsible for developing the counter-plot received the Order of Turkmenbashi for "exemplary conduct and guidance."

Obviously, nobody knows who the witnesses were in the "trial" against the "conspirators," since most likely there were none. Nobody even knows where the trial took place. On January 14, I had a conversation with Ambassador Halnazar Agakhanov, Niyazov’s envoy to Moscow, and he was unable to give me the specific date and location of the trial.

Two events described below, and chosen more or less at random, illustrate how anti-democratic Turkmenistan has become since the "coup." They also highlight how little the world cares about the suppression of democracy in Turkmenistan.

The National Council of Turkmenistan on February 5, 2003, adopted an act defining the term "parricide." According to the act, "a parricide" is a citizen of Turkmenistan who "questions the correctness of the policy of the President of the country, Sapamurat Niyazov." On October 23, in Vienna before the Standing Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, members of a Turkmen delegation used Orwellian rhetoric to describe efforts by humanitarian organizations and relatives to visit dissidents, characterizing such action as "attempts to interfere with internal affairs of a sovereign country." Citations of repression became opinions. "We do not admit that problems specified in the report�exist," said delegation members. "[Turkmenistan] will limit its relations with the international community and maintain only those with the United Nations."

A vicious cycle now exits in Turkmenistan in which legislation leads to repression, repression leads to condemnation, and condemnation is justified by legislation. This echoes the conditions that existed in the former Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviet experience, however, Turkmen authorities have been largely successful in keeping disputes with the outside world from filtering down to the general population. Thus, very few people in the country know how the rest of the world vilifies Niyazov.

Despite his contempt for international institutions, Niyazov tends to invoke the "UN-sanctioned status of neutrality" as a shield against outside pressure. Why is this still possible? The answer seems simple enough: apparently President Niyazov does not seem dangerous to the world yet.

The United Nations allows Ashgabat, which egregiously violates its obligations as a UN member, to refer to its "UN-recognized neutrality." And the OSCE allows Ashgabat to blackmail it with the threat of a walkout. With such impunity, Niyazov makes the world more dangerous and less morally consistent. In September, at the Commonwealth of Independent States Summit in Yalta, only Turkmenistan abstained from signing an agreement to control the proliferation of portable anti-aircraft ballistic complexes (PABC), which, if possessed by terrorists, threaten civil aviation everywhere. Today, all leading countries of the world are taking measures to control PABCs. Yet Turkmenistan is doing little and the government has made no effort to explain what became of the Soviet PABCs on its soil.

In April 1998, as a correspondent for Radio Liberty, I covered Niyazov’s visit to the United States. I saw him meet informally with the leaders of American and European organizations in New York. Niyazov anticipated a question and started talking about how somebody is ready to accuse him of "some personality cult." He said, "Not even close. What cult? In the USSR, we had a cult of [Lenin]. And where is that [Lenin] now? I have been in power only seven years, and I know exactly what will come after me, where my image on Turkmen currency and my monuments will go. But all that is necessary for my people right now, so that they believe in their own Turkmen leaders and values."

Niyazov’s audience smiled ironically in response. Since then, many things have changed, including Niyazov’s personality. Apparently he really believes in his mission as prophet of the people of Turkmenistan, and the permanence of his regime.

Editor�s Note: Arkadii Dubnov is a political commentator for the Russian newspaper Vremya Novostei (Time for the News). He has also been a correspondent for Radio Liberty

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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