PROVISIONAL AUTHORITIES IN GEORGIA GRAPPLE WITH CENTRIFUGAL POLITICAL FORCES
A EurasiaNet Photo Essay: 11/25/03
Photos by Steve Weinberg

As Georgia’s provisional leaders strive to establish firm control over the country’s government, the country again finds itself buffeted by centrifugal forces that raise fears about fresh separatist conflict. The tension between Tbilisi and the country’s autonomous republics stands to complicate already harried efforts to organize new presidential and parliamentary elections.

Opposition leaders, who assumed interim authority in Georgia following former president Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation, have moved swiftly to reestablish order in the capital Tbilisi, which had witnessed three weeks of anti-government protests following the disputed November 2 parliamentary vote. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"It is the absolute duty of all of us to maintain order," acting President Nino Burjanadze said in a November 24 television interview. Restoring a sense of normalcy is crucial, Burjanadze continued, if the opposition alliance that toppled Shevardnadze’s administration is "to preserve the success we have achieved in the struggle for the future of our country, for our democratic development."

While calm seems to have returned to Tbilisi, outside the capital the mood is anything but serene. Shevardnadze’s resignation appears to be stoking political passions that had been largely dormant in recent years. Much of the tension is concentrated in Georgia’s three autonomous republics – Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia. The leaders of the three regions have for years operated beyond the reach of central officials in Tbilisi. Indeed, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with the benefit of Russian support, are quasi-independent entities. Now, regional leaders are concerned that the opposition’s coming to power could eventually prompt an effort to restore Tbilisi’s authority over all of Georgia’s territory. Some members of the new leadership team in Tbilisi have mentioned in passing a desire to enhance Georgia’s territorial integrity.

Accordingly, as order returns to Tbilisi, Georgia’s three autonomous regions are going into crisis mode. All three have put their local security forces on high alert. Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba called on the provisional government in Tbilisi to "stick by its international legal commitments as regards conflict settlement," the Itar-Tass news agency reported. Peace talks to determine Abkhazia’s political status have long been stalemated. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

South Ossetian leaders appeared to raise the stakes in the separatism game, reaffirming a desire to formally leave Georgia and join the Russian Federation. According to a report by the Russian Polit.ru web site, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoita and Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze flew to Moscow for consultations with Russian officials. An Abkhazian representative was expected to also participate in the discussion on a response to developments in Tbilisi.

For most of the post-Soviet era, Ajaria has been the only autonomous republic that has politically engaged Tbilisi. But that appears to be changing. Abashidze is widely seen in Tbilisi as having been complicit in Shevardnadze’s attempt to steal the November 2 parliamentary vote. Official vote totals, which were discredited as rigged, showed the Ajarian region party, the Revival Union, as finishing in second place, behind Shevardnadze’s own election bloc. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Abashidze is now taking steps to preempt retribution, announcing November 24 that he was "breaking off all relations with people who have come to power by using force and overthrowing the legitimate president," the Russian Interfax news agency reported. Ajarian authorities have sealed the territories border with Georgia proper, the Russian RTR television channel reported.

He went on to claim that the provisional government sought to initiate a radical overhaul of Georgia’s political status quo. "Steps aimed at overthrowing a constitutional system by force may breed similar actions [towards autonomous regions]," Abashidze said. "Once Shevardnadze has been toppled, others may follow."

The Tbilisi triumvirate of Burjanadze, Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili has refrained from making specific comments concerning the autonomous republics. However, Saakashvili, the leader of the National Movement and the main catalyst for the recent popular protests, is widely known to be an antagonist of Abashidze. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In the coming weeks, Tbilisi will have to confront the Ajarian question, and, more broadly, the issue of how Tbilisi interacts with its separatist-minded autonomous republics. But the more immediate task for provisional leaders is consolidating their own authority in the capital. In striving to ensure order, Burjanadze said that she had "no intention of making personnel changes [in government] my main objective."

Nevertheless, an effort to rid government of Shevardnadze’s staunchest supporters is well underway. Interior Minister Koba Narchemashvili and State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze are the most prominent members of Shevardnadze’s cabinet to have resigned. In departing, Narchemashvili warned that Georgia would be "exposed to a great danger that unmanageable processes will develop," Georgian television reported. In addition, other local and regional Shevardnadze allies and appointees, including Tbilisi mayor Vano Zodelava, have quit.

Some Shevardnadze administration members appear set to retain their posts, including National Security Council Secretary Tedo Japaridze and Foreign Minister Irakli Menaghaishvili.

Perhaps the most significant personnel changes planned by the provisional authority will concern the country’s Central Election Commission (CEC), which oversaw the tainted November 2 vote and sanctioned the fraudulent results. Burjanadze, who described the CEC as "completely discredited," indicated that the current commission would be dissolved.

The looming reorganization of the CEC is just one of many logistical obstacles to organizing new parliamentary and presidential elections. Authorities’ primary objective is to build a computerized data base of accurate voter lists. Opposition leaders say Shevardnadze’s administration manipulated the voter lists in the effort to rig the vote.

On November 25, a special session of the Georgian parliament, which comprised members elected in 1999, set January 4 as the date for the presidential vote. Burjanadze, in opening the session, called for the "unity of political forces to carry the country out of the current crisis," the Russian web site Lenta.ru reported.

Earlier, Burjanadze said no decision had been made on whether the presidential and parliamentary vote would be held simultaneously. She indicated November 24 that discussions were continuing over the timing of parliamentary election. "We will have to reach full consensus on the issue."

Embattled CEC chairwoman Nana Devdariani said that the provisional government will be hard-pressed to hold free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections within the constitutionally mandated timeframe of 45 days after Shevardnadze’s resignation. Without sufficient time to correct existing problems, especially the voter list issue, Devdariani predicted the new parliamentary vote would be marred by fraud. "We have been caught in a legal dilemma," Devdariani was quoted as saying by the Kavkasia Press news agency.

The latest bout of separatist tension could dim hopes that the new elections can produce executive and legislative branches of government that are accepted as legitimate by a critical mass of Georgia’s population. As it strives to meet deadlines and resolve electoral issues, the provisional authority can count on assistance from the European Union, said Heikki Talvitie, the EU’s special representative to the South Caucasus. "We should realize that this [Shevardnadze’s resignation] is only the beginning," Talvitie said. "In the [near] future, we will have to perform very serious and important tasks."

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Posted November 25, 2003 © Eurasianet
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