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EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA WARY OF GEORGIA’S REGIME CHANGE
Sergei Blagov 11/26/03

Georgia’s interim authorities promised on November 26 to elect a successor on January 4 to Eduard Shevardnadze, who resigned on November 23. For Russia, whose foreign minister tried strenuously to mediate between Shevardnadze and the politicians who defeated him, Georgia’s next chapter looks uncharted and potentially dangerous.

Igor Ivanov, Moscow’s Foreign Minister, witnessed Shevardnadze’s subdued resignation. His boss took care to distance himself from Shevardnadze the next day. Russian President Vladimir Putin told his cabinet on November 24: "The change of power in Georgia is the logical result of a series of systemic mistakes in its domestic, foreign and economic polices." This made no overt reference to the disputed November 2 parliamentary elections, which triggered mass protest. Instead, Putin proposed that Shevardnadze had lost favor by seeming to drift toward the United States for military and strategic support. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. The deposed leader � who had served as the Soviet Union’s last Foreign Minister � pursued a global strategy that failed to "take into account geopolitical realities," Putin said.

While Georgia built a foreign debt that Putin claimed would consume more than half its output, its foreign policy also gave Moscow tactical leverage. Shevardnadze often quarreled with Moscow but never pursued an authoritarian course. Putin and Ivanov have implied that the politicians now provisionally running Georgia forced Shevardnadze’s resignation on some level. There is no evidence of this, but the Kremlin does have reason to worry about destabilization or autocratic steps in Georgia.

One reason is that an unstable Georgia could aggravate Russia’s war in neighboring Chechnya. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. It could also spread unrest throughout the Caucasus, which in its mildest form would send more immigrants into Russia. Vladimir Zorin, Putin’s Minister of Nationalities Policy, warned on November 26 against destabilization in Georgia. He added that 198,000 ethnic Georgians now live in Russia � a 51 percent increase since 1989.

Perhaps to warn that it might act on signs of instability, the Kremlin painted Shevardnadze’s departure in sinister terms. "Shevardnadze made his decision to step down under heavy pressure, so it cannot be said that this decision was fully democratic," Ivanov said on November 24. "Although constitutional formalities were observed, we are not fully satisfied with the way the change of power took place." The foreign minister said he had achieved his short-term goal by helping Georgia avoid violence, but warned that Moscow’s further steps would depend on the outcome of upcoming elections and the new leadership’s direction.

Russia will have to develop a coherent policy toward whoever gains office in Tbilisi and toward the leaders in Georgia’s autonomous provinces. One of these, Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze, had traveled to Moscow during the second week of Georgia’s political crisis for closed-door consultations. [See related story]. In recent years, Abashidze has not been subordinate to Tbilisi, reportedly withholding taxes at some points. His opponents in Georgia have accused him of reliance on Russian troops based in Batumi to preserve bargaining power and quasi-independence. So far, he seems interested in cleaving to Moscow as he seeks to discredit the alliance likely to settle into power in Tbilisi.

The day that Shevardnadze stepped down, Ivanov visited Ajaria � reportedly at Shevardnadze’s request. Abashidze stated that day that he would close his borders with Georgia proper, and left for Moscow soon thereafter. He met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov on November 26 and later told reporters that the current authorities in Georgia had executed a "coup" whose follow-up steps would be "impossible to predict."

At the same time, Russia is insisting that its military plans and diplomatic programs have not changed. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has ruled out any Russian military interference in Georgia. Russian military officials have dismissed allegations that Russian troops in Georgia went on high alert during the crisis. Russian military bases in Georgia remain "continuous and sustainable," Yuri Baluyevsky told reporters in Moscow on November 26. "Russian military personnel do not follow any orders from local leaders," said Baluyevsky, the first deputy chief of general staff for Russia’s military, dismissing reports of allegiance between Russian commanders and Abashidze’s loyalists.

Russia must, though, look at Georgia’s breakaway regions warily. Baluyevsky stated that the Russian military bases are to remain in Georgia for at least another decade. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. The next Georgian president could revisit old quarrels with Moscow: Russia has accused Tbilisi of assisting Chechen fighters in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, and Georgian politicians have charged Russia with meddling in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

For now, Russia is playing the role of stabilizer. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoyev wasted little time in allying himself with Russia after Shevardnadze withdrew. He told reporters in Moscow on November 25 that he would be ready for "political dialogue with Georgia mediated by Russia following a legitimate election in Georgia." He also reiterated his interest in making the province part of the Russian Federation, prompting Igor Ivanov to assert that "Russia has recognized and recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia." [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives].

Moscow and Tbilisi also share a joint economic interest in stability. Georgia’s energy system still needs serious investment to revitalize its three ailing main hydroelectric power stations and several small stations. In recent months, Shevardnadze’s regime allowed Russian companies to essentially take over Georgia’s electric and natural-gas distribution networks. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Chaos in the country could upset Russia’s investments and its images, if blackouts become part of their backdrop. In an indication of its wary eye on the future, Russian electric company RAO Unified Energy Systems wrote to Georgian energy regulators on November 24 and suggested postponing 20 percent tariff increases until April. By then, the Kremlin presumably hopes, Tbilisi will look more manageable in Moscow.

Editor�s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

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