EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Georgian Diplomats, Blaming Russia, Invite Important Questions

EURASIA INSIGHT

GEORGIAN DIPLOMATS, BLAMING RUSSIA, INVITE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
Irakly Areshidze 11/27/02
A EurasiaNet Commentary by Irakly Areshidze and Irakly Chkhenkely

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A few days before the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers visited Georgia to review the state of the two country’s new military alliance, two of Georgia’s senior ambassadors argued that Russia’s aggressive foreign policy still troubles Tbilisi. But the ambassadors downplayed clues that Georgia may undermine its own foreign and internal security by its dealings with Russia.

On November 21, Levan Mikeladze, Georgia’s Ambassador to the United States, and Revaz Adamia, Georgia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, gave a talk at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Georgia Forum. While examining how Russia’s foreign policy has troubled Georgia following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the diplomats did not address many ineffective and sometimes contradictory elements of Georgia’s foreign and national security policies. Mikeladze described the complex interplay between Georgia and Russia, which he ascribed to the unwillingness of certain elements in the Russian elite to recognize Georgia’s independence.

Adamia focused on the United Nations’ effort to draw international attention to Abkhazia and described Russia’s policy there as a barrier to settlement. Both the men chronicled familiar Georgian grievances with Russia. These include Russia’s visa policy towards Georgians, the issuance of Russian passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the frequent sight of "unidentified" aircraft heading south across Georgian airspace, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 11 declaration that troops could pursue Chechen rebels in the Pankisi Gorge. Speakers portrayed Russia as bound to former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s doctrinal belief in maintaining control of the "near abroad." This analysis ties Georgian insecurity to Russian mistakes, deemphasizing Georgia’s role.

While on target in outlining the challenge that Russia has been for Georgia over the last decade, these presentations did not bring forth many important challenges to Georgia’s foreign policy outlook. They did not contend with the idea that Russia is able to manipulate Georgia only because of the internal weakness of the latter’s state. Nor did they address contradictions in Georgian policy toward Russia. These contradictions, which involve how Georgia’s government works, have shaped its posture toward Russia. After Georgia accused Russia of bombing the Pankisi Gorge on August 6, its Parliament demanded that Georgia leave the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. However, President Eduard Shevardnadze ignored this demand and did not explain his reasons. The question of Georgia’s role in a regional organization dominated by a country that can scarcely be called neutral on issues of Georgia’s territorial integrity remains unresolved.

Not only are elements of Georgian foreign policy unclear, but the government seems conflicted in terms of national security policy. On September 13, two days after Putin’s announcement, Parliament approved a roughly $5 million increase in defense spending, to fund the Defense Ministry’s purchase of air defense missiles. This sum represents a significant increase given Georgia’s budgetary problems. At an October budget hearing in Parliament organized by New Rights party leader David Gamkrelidze, Finance Minister Mirian Gogiashvili declared that he could ignore the bill and not transfer the funds because he had information from credible sources that Russia would not bomb Georgian territory again. By mid-November the supplementary funds had still not been transferred to the Defense Ministry.

As these operational problems persist, Russia’s broader policy continues to affect its relationships with Georgia. Some have argued that Georgia has become a divisive issue in the nascent friendship between Putin and US President George W. Bush. Undeniably, Georgia presents a unique test case for President Putin’s true intentions. As Russia’s president shows signs of flirting with authoritarian rule, Georgia has been unwilling to present itself as a victim of Russian aggressiveness. Before credibly blaming Russia for all its foreign and security problems, Georgia must organize its internal positions. If it does, it may present the Bush Administration with a perfect opportunity to test Russia’s commitment to national sovereignty.

Editor�s Note: Areshidze is a Visiting Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies in Washington. Chkhenkely is a Research Associate with Partnership for Social Initiatives (PSI in Tbilisi. Views expressed in this piece are those of the authors, and not of the organizations with which they are affiliated.

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