EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Turning Up Pressure on Georgia

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA TURNING UP PRESSURE ON GEORGIA
Igor Torbakov 12/01/03

Russia, concerned about geopolitical slippage in the Caucasus, is intensifying the pressure on the Georgia. Georgia’s pro-Western provisional leadership says the normalization of Tbilisi-Moscow ties are a priority, but many regional political observers believe bilateral tension will grow with the approach of the Georgian presidential elections.

In Moscow, the emergence of Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the National Movement, as the unified candidate of the leading opposition alliance in Georgia’s January 4 presidential election is an unsettling development. Saakashvili, who is the odds-on favorite to win the presidency, is widely perceived by Russia’s foreign policy establishment as being hostile to Moscow’s interests in the Caucasus. Maksim Yusin, a political analyst for the Russian daily Izvestiya characterized Saakashvili as a "populist and ultra-nationalist figure [who is] utterly unacceptable to Moscow."

Policy planners in Moscow are concerned that the recent changes in Tbilisi could give the United States a controlling interest over the Caucasus region’s political and economic development -- tipping the scales towards Washington in what, to date, has been a close-run US-Russian contest for regional influence. Sergei Prikhodko, the deputy head of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s administration, revealed Moscow’s concern in a November 30 article published by the Interfax news agency: "Time will tell which interests the new Georgian leadership will be guided by � American ones ... or the interests of the Georgian people."

Recognizing the presidential election’s potential implications, Russia is doing all that it can to exert pressure on Georgia’s provisional leadership to preserve the preferred status that has traditionally been accorded to Moscow.

The most prominent lever of influence available to the Kremlin is its relationship with Georgia’s three autonomous republics � Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow has repeatedly maintained that it supports Georgia’s territorial integrity. At the same time, Russian officials have engaged Ajarian, Abkhazian and South Ossetian leaders in talks, while excluding representatives of Georgia’s provisional leadership. The Russian consultations were continuing in Moscow on December 1, the Russian Itar-Tass news agency reported.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said Russia would continue to provide aid to the three regions, Interfax reported. "It is primarily a question of helping these republics getting through the winter in normal conditions," Interfax quoted Kasyanov as saying.

Perhaps the clearest warning signal sent by Russia was the November 28 announcement by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov that Moscow would consider lifting its visa regime with Ajaria, whose leader, Aslan Abashidze, has described the turnover of authority in Tbilisi as a "coup." Russia currently enforces a visa regime with Georgia proper, including Ajaria, citing the threat posed by chronic Georgian instability. The visa regime already does not apply to the other two autonomous regions � Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which both won de facto independence, with Russian backing, during the tumult that swept Georgia in the early 1990s.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia have in recent days sought to strengthen ties with Russia. According to Izvestiya, one issue reportedly discussed during the Moscow consultations was the notion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia becoming "temporary protectorates" of Russia. For now, it appears that Russian leaders are not prepared to take such a step. On November 28, the Russian parliament soundly defeated a motion to start debate on the annexation of the two Georgian regions.

Russia is also exerting economic pressure on Georgia. On November 29, Russia effectively cut off electricity supply to more than half of Georgia’s territory for 12 hours. The outage was attributed to a need to carry out "regular repair works" on Russian territory, Interfax agency quoted the officials at Russia’s Ministry of Fuel and Energy as saying. But a commentary published by the Gazeta.ru website said the move was yet another "transparent message" from the Kremlin to Georgia’s provisional leadership.

Georgian leaders have complained sharply about Russian meddling, pointing to the Moscow consultations with Ajarian, Abkhazian and South Ossetian representatives. The consultations "do not sit well with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assurances that he respects the territorial integrity of Georgia," Georgia’s interim president, Nino Burjanadze, said in an interview with Izvestiya.

In earlier comments broadcast on Georgian television November 27, Burjanadze suggested that Russia’s visa regime towards Georgia was based on a double standard. "The [Russian] visa regime should either be abolished, or simplified to concern Georgia as a whole, or there should be equal requirements for all parts of Georgia, including Abkhazia, South Ossetia and especially Ajaria."

espite their displeasure, Georgia’s interim leaders are pressing an effort in the Russian media to foster a favorable image. Zurab Zhvania, Georgia’s interim state minister, insisted the provisional leadership is committed to stabilizing bilateral relations. "We must take real action to bring Georgian-Russian relations back to normality," Zhvania told Interfax.

In comments broadcast by the Russian NTV Mir channel on November 30, Saakashvili sought to downplay his image as a nationalist politician. He rebuffed a comparison between himself and Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a notorious nationalist. "We have nothing in common," Saakashvili said. "We can have nothing in common."

While the words voiced by Georgia’s provisional leaders are solicitous of Moscow, many observers expect Tbilisi’s actions in the coming weeks to be the opposite. Some analysts, for example, say that Georgian leaders will redouble efforts to complete the US-supported Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan will remain top priority for any Georgian government that is not pro-Russian," Aleksandr Rondeli, head of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, told the Turkish Daily News. "The politicians who came to power in Tbilisi are strong supporters of the BTC pipeline."
Russia has always eyed the BTC project warily. "Russia never liked the [BTC} idea, which deprived it [Moscow] of both the transit fees and the regional geopolitical influence," Analyst Olga Romanova wrote in the Vedomosti business daily.

Moscow is also concerned by recent statements made by Georgi Baramidze, Georgia’s interim interior minister, who said that "Georgia would cooperate with all [countries] except Russia and North Korea." Baramidze has been particularly critical of deals made between former president Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration and the Russian conglomerates Gazprom and RAO Unified Energy Systems. (UES). [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Some in Moscow believe Tbilisi may soon attempt to dilute the existing control of Russian companies over Georgia’s energy market.

The Russian companies indicate that they will fight to maintain their market positions. "We have come here [to Georgia] to do business and are not going to leave," UES spokesman Andrei Yegorov told the Vremya Novostei newspaper.

Editor�s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now based in Istanbul, Turkey.

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