Eurasia Insight:
CENTRAL ASIA: RETHINKING BORDER-CONTROL ASSISTANCE
12/03/07
A EurasiaNet Commentary by Nick Megoran

Alarmed by threats of terrorism and drugs trafficking, foreign donors have been pouring money into helping Central Asian republics bolster boundary control infrastructures. The wisdom of this has rarely been questioned, but the donors’ existing aid strategies may be inadvertently exacerbating problems on the ground.

International concern about regional border issues was on display during a November economic conference in Berlin, sponsored by the European Union and attended by top Central Asian diplomats. In her keynote address, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner indicated that a top EU security priority for Central Asia was strengthening border controls, especially along the Tajik-Afghan frontier.

On the face of it, promoting better border control appears very sensible. The trafficking of drugs, arms, radioactive material and people is well documented. Increasing migration flows threaten to overwhelm underfunded and already overburdened social services. In many instances, national boundary control agencies, hampered by shortages of funds and trained personnel, are unable to adequately address current challenges.

It is thus hardly surprising that Central Asian governments have welcomed foreign assistance, and that donors, in particular the United States, EU and the OSCE, have provided generous sums. These funds have helped pay for material improvements, such as border patrol vehicles, X-ray machines, and checkpoint refurbishment. In addition, donors have shared know-how on border management techniques, through training programs and assistance in building integrated computer databases to monitor the movement of people.

These programs all assume that Western experience can easily be transferred to Central Asia. However, it can be argued that current aid strategies are not well fitted to the social, economic and political realities in Central Asia, and, therefore, are having unintended consequences. A major flaw is that the aid programs do not give sufficient attention and resources to corralling corrupt practices.

An obvious consequence of flawed border-control strategies is a high rate of violence and intimidation at border-crossing points. Border guards have great power, and often use this to threaten people crossing borders and extort money or goods. Guards are generally male and private shuttle-traders female, making gender-based intimidation an added hazard at border posts. This process has, secondly, complicated Central Asia’s diplomatic environment. Occasional fatal shootings and other incidents at crossing points have stoked tension between neighboring governments and have inflamed public opinion on both sides of the border. For example, an incident in November 2006 -- in which a Tajik border guard shot and killed an Uzbek counterpart -- touched off a round of bilateral bickering, including an Uzbek accusation that Dushanbe was engaging in “criminal” behavior.

Thirdly, there have been sharp economic consequences of the multiple new measures to control movement. Cross-border trade in border regions such as the Ferghana Valley has been reduced considerably as a result of customs and borders policies that raise transport costs. The impacts on the rural poor have been particularly harsh, contributing towards large-scale migration that itself has many knock-on social impacts.

Fourthly, border controls have caused massive disruption to local communities that have long straddled the present borders, many of which are the result of arbitrary decisions taken by Soviet authorities in the 1920s and 30s. This has particularly been true for ethnic minorities, increasingly cut off from family and friends, leading to a greater sense of insecurity.

Finally, expanded border management systems enable repressive governments to become more efficient in stifling political and economic freedom. Integrated databases permit better surveillance of those deemed potential dissidents. For example, it is not unknown for independent journalists and activists to be charged with politically-motivated offences such as 'illegal border crossings.'

Although there have undoubtedly been some successes, recent changes have not produced a discernable reduction in corruption. Widespread corruption means that smuggling still occurs with the complicity of officials. Big players can use money and connections to subvert the system, whereas smaller traders bear the brunt of control measures. Indeed, the expansion of boundary controls increases the potential for corruption.

While a lack of resources does hamper border-crossing controls, it is not the primary reason why smuggling continues, and merely increasing technical resources and training may not therefore be the solution.

The governments of Central Asia do have both a right and a duty to control their boundaries and protect their citizens from real dangers. Western donors should support this by sharing best practices and providing material assistance, where requested. But what are that best practices? They do not necessarily include tighter border controls -- at least when looking at the frontiers dividing Central Asian states from each other. The EU has shown that opening borders and promoting closer inter-state cooperation can have a beneficial effect. Perhaps international assistance efforts should pay more attention to promoting border-control cooperation in Central Asia.

Editor’s Note: Nick Megoran is a scholar and freelance writer who specializes in Central Asian affairs.