EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Focus of Central Asia’s Geopolitical Contest Set to Shift to Kyrgyzstan

EURASIA INSIGHT

FOCUS OF CENTRAL ASIA’S GEOPOLITICAL CONTEST SET TO SHIFT TO KYRGYZSTAN
Stephen Blank 12/05/05
A EurasiaNet Commentary

Kazakhstan’s presidential election confirms that the "color revolution" phenomenon is ebbing in Central Asia. Geopolitical attention now appears set to shift to neighboring Kyrgyzstan, where Russia and its new ally, Uzbekistan, want to roll back the revolution.

The Kazakhstani election repeated a well-establish pattern in Central Asia and the Caucasus: incumbent president Nursultan Nazarbayev won a whopping 91 percent of the vote, according to preliminary results. The closest of four challengers -- Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, a leader of the For a Fair Kazakhstan movement -- garnered roughly 6.6 percent. The lopsided tally prompted Nazarbayev opponents to cry foul, saying the administration manipulated media and massaged turnout and balloting figures.

In recent years, opposition complaints about crooked elections evolved into popular protests that toppled incumbent regimes in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan – a process that came to be known as the color revolution phenomenon. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. There is no chance of such a scenario playing out in Kazakhstan, however. Over the past year, the Nazarbayev administration has kept opposition parties and movements in Kazakhstan off-balance. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Opposition leaders now say they will not even attempt to organize public demonstrations to complain about election manipulation. Instead they will seek to redress their complaints through Kazakshtan’s court system, which is widely viewed as under the executive branch’s thumb.

The downfall of Kyrgyzstan’s former leader Askar Akayev in March may have marked the high-water mark for the color revolution phenomenon. Since then, counter-revolutionary forces, especially in Uzbekistan, have been gaining strength. The great catalyst for the counter-revolution was the Andijan events in May. [For background see the Eurasia Insight]. Over the past seven months, President Islam Karimov’s regime in Tashkent has moved to snuff out all traces of democratization at home, including the eradication of independent media outlets. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, the country’s erstwhile allies, namely the European Union and the United States, have been transformed by Uzbek officials into enemies, with Tashkent ordering the eviction of American troops from the Uzbek base in Karshi-Khanabad. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

By the fall of 2005, Karimov began focusing his ire on external foes in the region, Kyrgyzstan in particular. In September, Uzbek authorities accused Kyrgyzstan of assisting in the training of Islamic radicals who supposedly participated in the Andijan events. As a result of these accusations, Tashkent suspended most of its gas shipments to Kyrgyzstan thereby provoking a local energy crisis. Allegedly it did so because the Kyrgyz companies were behind on their payments, but the real motivation was clear: Tashkent wanted to punish Bishkek for bowing to international pressure and allowing Andijan refugees to leave for third countries, [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbekistan had demanded that all the refugees be returned. Human rights advocates had warned that the refugees would like face torture and possibly death if Kyrgyz authorities ordered their return.

The Uzbek gas gambit ultimately failed, as the United States stepped in to broker a deal to help Kyrgyzstan obtain electricity. So Uzbekistan, in November had to relent and signed a deal to provide 750 million cubic meters of gas to Kyrgyzstan. Initial defeat, however, doesn’t seem to be deterring Tashkent.

Not only does Uzbekistan feel threatened from within, it also feels abandoned by the EU and the United States. Both Brussels and Washington insisted on an independent investigation into the Andijan events, something rejected out of hand by Tashkent. As a result, Karimov has moved Uzbekistan into Russia’s orbit. In November, Karimov signed gas deals with Moscow and concluded a strategic alliance that opens the way for a large Kremlin strategic role in Uzbekistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Local and Russian media have been full of reports that Moscow covets the use of the base at Karshi-Khanabad once American forces depart in early 2006. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Despite Russian denials, the Uzbek-Russian treaty’s language clearly leaves open the possibility.

Like Uzbekistan, Russia seems intent on turning up the heat on Kyrgyzstan, which now can be considered the closest US ally in Central Asia. Russian media outlets have reported that Moscow seeks a gradual transfer of Kyrgyzstan’s energy sector to Russian control. Those reports have coincided with stories outlining Moscow’s desire to establish a second military base in Kyrgyzstan, this one to be under the control of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Washington’s reaction has evidently stopped such pressure for at least the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz politics are in a state of disarray, and President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s administration seems fragile. Rampant organized crime, some Kyrgyz officials admit, is undermining the government’s ability to function. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The uncertain conditions in Bishkek would suggest the Bakiyev government remains vulnerable to outside pressure.

Ultimately, by keeping pressure on Bishkek, Russia hopes to drive US forces from the region. The sole remaining US base in Central Asia is located at Manas, outside the Kyrgyz capital. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Within the context of recent developments, it appears that Karimov may have acted against Kyrgyzstan with Moscow’s blessing, if not prompting. In an effort to ensure his regime’s perpetuation, Karimov evidently is willing to mortgage Tashkent’s freedom of foreign policy action to Russia, acting like a pawn in a dangerous effort to undermine Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty. In this sense, it is more than Uzbekistan’s relationship with Kyrgyzstan that now seems at risk: the larger issue concerns those two states’ future independence.

Editor’s Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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