EurasiaNet Civil Society - Kazakhstan: Officials Pledge to Act as OSCE Bridge Connecting North Atlantic, Eurasian States

CIVIL SOCIETY

KAZAKHSTAN: OFFICIALS PLEDGE TO ACT AS OSCE BRIDGE CONNECTING NORTH ATLANTIC, EURASIAN STATES
Joanna Lillis 12/10/07

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President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s administration is casting the OSCE’s decision to designate Kazakhstan as the 2010 chair of the 56-state organization as an endorsement of Astana’s economic and political policies. Kazakhstani officials say the country will seek to repair a rift among members and strive to bolster the organization’s democratization capacity.

The OSCE announced in late November at a Ministerial Council meeting in Madrid that Kazakhstan would serve as chair in 2010. Astana had been lobbying for the OSCE chair since 2003, and in recent years the matter had become a top policy priority for Nazarbayev. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Originally, Astana sought the OSCE chair in 2009. The OSCE debated Kazakhstan’s application late last year and could not make a decision, ultimately deferring the issue for a year due to concerns about the country’s democratization record. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

After the announcement, local media outlets hailed Nazarbayev’s leadership. "Experts attribute a huge role in this success to the president of Kazakhstan, whose international standing is very high," state-run Khabar TV commented. "This adherence to the universal principles of democracy and a law-based state was what the OSCE member states primarily had in mind when they voted in favor of our country’s candidacy." Meanwhile, the official government newspaper Kazakhstanskaya Pravda called the announcement "sensational."

Nazarbayev, addressing foreign diplomats in Astana on December 10, pledged that Kazakhstan during its chairmanship would "make efforts to strengthen the organization’s institutions," the Kazinform news agency reported. Nazarbayev characterized the OSCE as a "unique dialogue platform that unites the north Atlantic and Eurasian spaces."

Political analysts suggested that, despite ongoing concern about Astana’s respect for basic civil and political freedoms, practical considerations underpinned the OSCE’s decision. Kazakhstan’s rising geopolitical importance, especially its role as a major energy exporter, made European Union member states, as well as the United States, reluctant to say �no’ to Nazarbayev.

"I think that pragmatic economic interests were the reasons behind the awarding of the OSCE chairmanship to Kazakhstan," Maria Disenova, research fellow at the Almaty-based Institute for Economic Strategies-Central Asia, told EurasiaNet. "This follows the inclusion of the energy security aspect in the European strategy plan for Central Asia. This could also be related to many different factors: such as Russia being the main supporter of Kazakhstan chairing the OSCE, and, at the same time, being one of the West’s main energy suppliers."

A trade-off does appear to be part of the OSCE’s decision: in return for their consent on the Kazakhstani chairmanship issue, EU members and the United States appear to have received assurances that Astana will continue to support election monitoring activities conducted by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Russia has sought to drastically curtail ODIHR’s monitoring responsibilities in recent months. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"Kazakhstan commits itself to retaining the ODIHR and its existing mandate and will not support any attempts to weaken them," Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin said at the Madrid meeting.

ODIHR has not sent full missions to some recent CIS elections: delays in issuing visas caused it to pull out of monitoring the recent parliamentary elections in Russia, and to pledge only a limited mission to the presidential poll in Uzbekistan later this month. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Beyond the ODIHR commitment, Kazakhstan is planning steps to improve its democratization image. Tazhin indicated that the government would promote new media legislation in 2008 that incorporates OSCE recommendations to decriminalize libel and liberalize media registration, as well as submit an electoral reform bill to parliament.

Opposition political figures were divided on what the OSCE chairmanship will mean for Kazakhstan. Some welcomed the announcement, saying it would put Kazakhstan in the spotlight for the next few years, and thus exert pressure on the Nazarbayev administration to open up the country’s political environment. "This will allow Kazakhstani civil society and democratic political parties to effectively achieve democratic reforms inside the country," said a written statement issued by leaders of the Alga! Party � an entity which has long been denied official registration.

Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, leader of the National Social Democratic Party, also gave the OSCE decision a cautious endorsement, describing it in remarks quoted on the Zonakz.net website as "an innovative, brave step" signaling an OSCE desire to see real democracy in Kazakhstan.

Others were more skeptical, citing the fact that during this year � a period when the OSCE was supposedly scrutinizing Kazakhstan’s behavior � the country adopted constitutional changes that enable Nazarbayev to serve as president-for-life, and held a parliamentary election that resulted in the exclusion of opposition political forces from the legislature. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"After receiving the post of chairman in 2010 the people at the top in Kazakhstan will stop moving altogether," Nagyz Ak Zhol party co-leader Bolat Abilov said in an article published in the Taszhargan newspaper. "Why should they change anything when, on the one hand, they can continue trampling on human rights, failing to observe the one-person, one-vote principle, and, on the other, occupy the post in an organization intended to boost and defend democratic principles in our countries?"

Other commentators voiced doubt that OSCE decision would have much influence on Astana’s actions. "I think that most of the reforms which Kazakhstan has pledged will be �paper-based’ ones since from the moment of its application for chairmanship in 2003 Kazakhstan has not advanced much in that area, but has become even more authoritarian and less democratic," Disenova said.

Editor�s Note: Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specializes in Central Asia.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.