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Pivotal Election Can Change the Islamic Republics Course
December 15 could prove a pivotal date for the neo-conservative movement in Iran.
On that day, Iranians will go to the polls to cast ballots in two elections; in municipal elections, which have attracted the bulk of attention from pundits; and for the Assembly of Experts, the country's most powerful religious oversight body.
Since emerging victorious in the last municipal elections in 2003, Iranian neo-conservatives, led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have enjoyed an unbroken string of success at the polls. After gaining control of Tehran's City Council, the neo-cons went on to capture the parliament and the presidency. [For background see the Eurasia insight archive].
There are signs that the neo-cons' momentum may be checked in the municipal elections. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. However, the Assembly of Experts vote is far more important for the further implementation of the neo-conservative agenda. Observers say that neo-conservatives aim to use the assembly vote to seize control of Iran's ecclesiastical establishment, and thus remove major restraints on the exercise of their political power.
The Assembly of Experts, or Majles-e-Khobregan, comprises 86 clerics and is elected every eight years. The body, which meets twice annually, is charged with oversight of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It has the power to select, and, in theory, remove a supreme leader. In addition, it enjoys the authority to veto constitutional amendments.
The assembly has always operated in the shadows of Iran's opaque political system. But the polarizing nature of Ahmadinejad's presidency, and the movement he represents, has infused the upcoming assembly election with a sense of urgency. If neo-conservatives manage to extend their influence over Iran's main religious oversight body, many political analysts in Tehran believe the country will make a radical, possibly irreversible departure in both foreign and domestic policy.
In all, 144 candidates, all of them clerics, will be vying for the 86 assembly seats. The 144 were winnowed down from an original pool of almost 500 candidates by the Council of Guardians, an unelected religious body that vets the qualifications of those seeking elective office.
Behind-the-scenes maneuvering is being influenced by two trends; the general, if gradual decline in the prestige of the clergy as a class; and the emergence of a group of clerics who espouse militantly orthodox beliefs and who are generally aligned with political neo-conservatives.
These ultra-orthodox clerics have coalesced around Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, who is reputedly President Ahmadinejad's spiritual mentor. Mesbah Yazdi is known for a puritan and regressive interpretation of Islam, and thus is a vigorous opponent of political and ecclesiastical modernization. Mesbah Yazdi has also courted controversy by sanctioning the use of violence against those who oppose his brand of Islam.
Most candidates in the assembly vote are aligned with one of four clerical factions. The Mesbah Yazdi-led faction is known as the Elites of Seminaries and Universities, and, as its name suggests, its popularity is limited to Iran's major centers of religious learning, including Tehran and the holy cities of Qum and Mashhad.
The largest faction in the current assembly holding roughly two-thirds of the seats is the so-called Traditional Right, comprised of the clerical old guard. Mesbah Yazdi's hopes of gaining control of the next assembly hinge on his ability to attract a large number of traditionalists to his cause. This may prove difficult, as many traditionalists have been plainly alarmed by the aggressive strategy and tactics employed by Mesbah-Yazdi and his militant followers. Many traditionalists also fear that any allegiance given to Mesbah-Yazdi would not be reciprocated, and he would replace them with his own hand-picked allies at the first opportunity.
Despite their concerns, traditionalists have taken care not to alienate Mesbah-Yazdi. At the same time, they have encouraged Mesbah-Yazdi's main rival for power, former president Aliakbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Another faction comprises reformists, who hold seven seats in the current assembly, but whose representation is expected to drop in the next. This is because the hardliner-controlled Council of Guardians prevented many reform-minded clerics from contesting the vote. The reformists who do gain seats in the next assembly are expected to back Rafsanjani's leadership bid, viewing the former president as the only person capable of holding Mesbah Yazdi at bay.
The last major faction, dubbed Khobregan and Competency, is made up of mid-level clerics who tend to be pragmatists. Many have connections to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Like the reformists, this pragmatist faction is projected to win only a handful of seats in the new assembly. But these few seats could possibly tip the balance of power.
Mesbah Yazdi has so far eschewed directly challenging traditionalists as a faction. But he, along with his followers, have not hesitated to verbally spar with Rafsanjani, reformist leader and former president Mohammad Khatami, former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani and the aging but still-powerful custodian of the vast Shrine of Imam Reza Endowment, Ayatollah Abbas Vaez Tabasi.
The pre-election maneuvering has so far yielded some surprises, none greater than the Council of Guardians' move to disqualify a significant number of Mesbah Yazdi allies, including his son, Ali, who reportedly did not pass the written eligibility test. Throughout the vetting process, the Council of Guardians appeared to show a preference for traditionalist candidates. It is believed that several members of the council are sympathetic to Mesbah-Yazdi's religious beliefs, but these members apparently had to go along with the wishes of key clerics aligned with the traditionalist camp.
Ayatollah Khamenei's stance on the Assembly of Experts vote is nuanced. While the supreme leader has misgivings about an alliance with Mesbah Yazdi, his relations with Rafsanjani have long been strained. It may be that Khamenei sees Mesbah Yazdi has a useful counterweight to Rafsanjani.
The intensity of the maneuvering has encouraged an unprecedented level of public debate about the Assembly of Experts' authority. In a speech December 9, Rafsanjani revealed previously unknown details of Ayatollah Khamenei's selection in 1989 as supreme leader. The net effect of the revelations, according to observers, was the demystification of the supreme leader's image.
In addition, Rafsanjani called for a broad interpretation of constitutional provisions that would expand the next Assembly of Experts' powers to oversee the activities of such state institutions as the army, the Expediency Council and the Judiciary, all of which fall under the supreme leader's control. Such broad oversight authority could be used to counteract neo-conservative influence. Mesbah Yazdi has vigorously opposed such a broadening of the assembly's oversight capacity. If implemented, broader Assembly of Experts oversight could place a considerable check on the supreme leader's existing power.
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