EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Kyrgyzstan: Southern Region More Likely to Experience Election Trouble

EURASIA INSIGHT

KYRGYZSTAN: SOUTHERN REGION MORE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE ELECTION TROUBLE - EXPERTS
Joshua Kucera 12/14/07

Parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan on December 16 are more likely to experience difficulties in the southern part of the Central Asian nation than in the North, US experts believe.

Because Kyrgyzstan has a weak central government, its southern half - separated from the capital Bishkek by the Tien Shan mountain range, and possessing distinct cultural differences from the North that are mainly connected with the South’s large ethnic Uzbek minority -- poses unique challenges. That was the conclusion of a December 12 panel, titled "Kyrgyzstan’s South: Zone of Problem or Potential?" sponsored by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Washington.

"Should malfeasance happen on [December 16] ... it’s more likely to happen in the South than in the North because of the degree of past acceptance and, quite frankly, the ability to get away with it," said Anthony Bowyer, Central Asia and Caucasus Program Manager for the democracy group IFES. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Reasons cited by the panel include the weakness of political parties and the media outlets in the South. Political parties in Kyrgyzstan tend to be poorly financed, so it is difficult for them to maintain operations outside the capital, Bishkek, said Eric McGlinchy, a professor at George Mason University and a Central Asia expert. In addition, parties tend to be closely identified with their leaders. "And if all the personalities are based in the North, then all the party activities will take place in the North. There’s very little political activity going on in southern Kyrgyzstan," McGlinchy said.

Media outlets, as well, tend to be less influential in the South. "There are very few outlets for independent media in southern Kyrgyzstan," McGlinchy said. "Even Azadliq, the [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty] subsidiary in Kyrgyzstan, is seen as being excessively biased against the government," so listeners tend to not rely on it, either. This gives a large advantage to the ruling Ak Zhol party of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, which utilize administrative resources to gain an advantage in the election, he said. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Bowyer alleged that even the technical expertise of poll workers in the South is lower than that of their northern counterparts.

More broadly, there is increasing tension between the government and citizens in the South because of the government’s increasingly heavy-handed treatment of radical Muslims there, McGlinchy asserted, citing the murders last year of Mohammed Rafik Kamalov, a popular imam in Kara Suu, and this year of Alisher Saipov, a well known journalist based in Osh. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The government has insinuated that both men were killed because of their ties to Islamist groups - ties that were tenuous at most in both cases, McGlinchy said. "The state is manipulating Islam, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan," he said.

Islamic groups are perceived as a threat because they are filling in where the government is failing in southern Kyrgyzstan. "These are civil society organizations that are stepping in and providing services the government can no longer provide," McGlinchy said. "This sounds very similar to what happened in Andijan," he said, referring to the killing of hundreds of protesters in 2005 in Uzbekistan because the government perceived a threat to its authority there. "You had businessmen getting together and providing services that the government can’t provide - welfare, jobs, a sense of belief and ideology, and I think when Bakiyev looks at what’s going on in southern Kyrgyzstan, there is a real sense of fear." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

There is also speculation that Uzbekistan was behind the murders of Kamalov and Saipov, a suspicion that is not unwarranted, McGlinchy said. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"A lot of what happens on the Uzbek side of Ferghana emanates from the freer - unfortunately increasingly less free, but still freer - Kyrgyz side. So could Karimov be pressing Bakiyev? Absolutely. The question is; ’what does Karimov have that could make Bakiyev respond?’ And the answer, simply put, is gas. If you look at the price of Uzbek gas being sold to Kyrgyzstan, in the last three years it’s gone up from $42 to $100 for 1,000 cubic meters," he said.

"So there’s a lot of tension going on, and I don’t think it would be unreasonable to think that this is a lever that the Karimov government is using to influence the Bakiyev regime," he added.

Editor�s Note: Joshua Kucera is a Washington, DC,-based freelance writer who specializes in security issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

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