EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Looks to Protect Economic Interests in Turkmenistan amid Political Uncertainty

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA LOOKS TO PROTECT ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN TURKMENISTAN AMID POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
Sergei Blagov 12/22/06

President-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov’s sudden death appears likely to set off not only a power struggle inside Turkmenistan, but also an international scramble for access to the country’s abundant natural gas reserves. The stakes in this contest are perhaps highest for Russia, which currently maintains a stranglehold on Turkmen gas exports.

Niyazov - the self-styled Turkmenbashi, or great head of the Turkmen people - reportedly died of a heart attack on December 21. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A state funeral is scheduled for December 24.

Political analysts are predicting a turbulent political transition for the Central Asian nation of about 5 million. During his 15-plus years in charge of post-Soviet Turkmenistan, Niyazov gained the reputation as one of the world’s foremost tyrants. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

He purged the top ranks of Turkmenistan’s political leadership so thoroughly that he left behind no clear-cut successor. [For background see the Eurasia Insight].

The country’s constitution designates the parliament chairman as the presidential successor, yet the deputy prime minister, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, has assumed the provisional presidency. Earlier, the country’s prosecutor-general opened a criminal case on unspecified charges against Parliament Chairman Ovezgeldy Atayev, thus making him ineligible for the presidency.

Berdymukhammedov announced that Turkmenistan’s People’s Council would convene December 26 to determine the framework for a special presidential election. He pledged that the country would maintain the political course established by Niyazov. The government "will steadily put in practice the internal and external policy of Turkmenistan’s first President Saparmurat Niyazov based on the principles of peace loving and humanism," Berdymukhammedov said in a statement issued December 22 and distributed by the Itar-Tass news agency.

In recent years, Niyazov had gone to great lengths to insulate Turkmenistan from outside influences. Thus, outside powers now have few means to sway political developments. Having little leverage over Ashgabat, Russia and other states could only appeal for stability.

"We hope for a legitimate transfer of power and continuity in our relations," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said. Sergei Prikhodko, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aide, also urged Turkmenistan’s new leadership to strengthen bilateral ties. Putin has announced that he will not be attending the state funeral for Niyazov. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov will be leading the Russian delegation.

Russian officials worry that Niyazov’s death could spark volatility in Central Asia. The fact that the presidential succession process has already deviated from the constitutionally mandated transition is being viewed with caution by many Russian officials, such as Sergei Mironov, chairman of the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament.

The primary concern in Moscow is that political instability in Ashgabat could disrupt Turkmen gas exports to Russia, which are estimated to exceed 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) this year. The loss of regular and cheap gas supplies from Turkmenistan would be an economic disaster for Russia. Moscow depends on Turkmen supplies to meet its own domestic needs, as Russia’s domestically produced gas is exported to Western Europe. Moscow has an agreement under which it pays Turkmenistan $100 per thousand cubic meters of gas through 2009. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Niyazov’s death could cause Ashgabat to want to renegotiate the gas export price upward, said Maxim Shein, head analyst with Broker Credit Service, a Moscow-based brokerage.

"With many powers interested in Turkmenistan’s hydrocarbon riches, the country could become a playground for diverse conflicting interests," said a commentary published by Moscow News.

The nightmare scenario for Russia would be one in which a pro-Western government eventually comes to power in Ashgabat. Various Turkmen political leaders, now living in exile in Western European states, are looking to return and push for radical change in Turkmenistan. If they ever succeeded, they could steer Turkmen energy exports away from Russia and toward Turkey and the European Union.

In any event, Turkmenistan’s new leaders may be tempted to revisit the idea of participating in the planned trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which would facilitate exports to Western Europe while circumventing Russian routes. The trans-Caspian project enjoys the strong backing of the United States. Last September, Niyazov reassured Moscow that the trans-Caspian gas pipeline was not on his agenda. "First of all, we will be supplying gas to Russia," Niyazov said on September 5. "Do not think that Turkmenistan wants to go elsewhere with its gas."

While concerned about the risks, Russian officials also see an opportunity to tighten their control over Turkmen energy reserves. Earlier in 2006, Niyazov took steps to diversify Turkmenistan’s export options, reaching a deal with China to build an export pipeline in 2009. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

With the mercurial Niyazov now out of the picture, Moscow could potentially persuade the new Turkmen leadership to drop the Chinese pipeline project.

Over the medium term, Russia will look to protect its economic interests by promoting Turkmenistan’s re-integration into the Commonwealth of Independent states. Niyazov in recent year had kept the CIS at arm’s length. Andrei Kokoshin, head of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on CIS Affairs, warned against attempts by "external forces and third countries" to meddle in Turkmenistani affairs in a bid to control its gas riches. Turkmenistan is the largest natural-gas producer in Central Asia. Its hydrocarbon reserves are estimated at 81 billion barrels (11 billion tons) of crude and 5.5 trillion cubic meters of gas.

To help Turkmenistan retain its pro-Moscow orientation, the Kremlin may try to gain leverage through Turkmenistan’s significant ethnic Russian minority. Konstantin Kosachev, head of the duma’s International Affairs Committee, told Moscow News that Russia expected the "the future Turkmenistani leadership would better protect Russian-speakers there."

Editor�s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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