|
POSSIBLE US MILITARY BUILDUP IN GEORGIA RAISES
ARMENIAN CONCERNS
Jean-Christophe Peuch: 3/14/02
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL
The expected arrival of American soldiers in Georgia as part
of Washington's global antiterror drive is generally viewed
in the Caucasus as heralding increased US involvement in the
region.
On 26 February, the United States announced it would send
up to 200 military advisers to help Georgia's armed forces
uproot al Qaeda fugitives reportedly hiding in a mountainous
area bordering Russia's separatist region of Chechnya.
Washington insists its aim is limited to helping Tbilisi
eradicate elements of Osama bin Laden's terrorist network.
But regional experts generally believe the decision to send
troops was prompted by broader security concerns. These could
include bolstering Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's
government, protecting a projected US-sponsored multimillion
dollar oil pipeline that would run through Georgia, or ensuring
a safe supply route to new US military bases in Central Asia.
In Armenia, which remains closely linked to Russia despite
efforts to initiate ties with NATO and the West, news of the
US deployment plans was met with a certain degree of wariness,
although Russian President Vladimir Putin, for one, does not
seem to be opposed to the deployment.
Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian said he thought
the presence of US soldiers in Georgia was unlikely to destabilize
the region in the immediate future. Yet, pressed by reporters
to assess the situation, he cautiously said: "Let's wait
and see what happens."
Armenia's pro-government daily Azg
was more critical. It wrote this month that the presence
of US troops might, in the long run, lead to "dangerous
developments." It cited possible troubles in Georgia's
Javakheti Province, a region mostly populated by ethnic Armenians
and where Russia maintains a major military base.
Armenia's former prime minister, Vazgen Manukian, told an
RFE/RL correspondent that, in his view, the ongoing changes
are likely to have a negative effect in a region that has
seen a decade of interethnic strife. Manukian, who now heads
the National Democratic Union opposition party, said uncertainty
over Washington's real aims in dispatching troops to Georgia
further complicates the picture.
"I do not expect anything good. Why? The problem is
not so much that the US and Russia are vying for influence
in Transcaucasia [the three southern Caucasus states of Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan]. The problem is that countries in
that region have no common vision of what they want. It took
two world conflicts before Europe finally decided what it
wanted and, after that, it was in a position to easily find
solutions to its internal problems. But our region has no
such common vision. And when there is no common vision, any
interference can hardly bring anything but troubles."
Since the United States made its plans public, Georgia's
separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have increased
their demands and asked to be included in the Russian Federation
as "associate members." The Kremlin has not reacted
to these demands, but Russia's State Duma adopted a non-binding
resolution on March 6 threatening to strengthen ties between
Moscow and both regions.
In the early 1990s, Abkhazia and South Ossetia successfully
fought against Georgian government troops with the active
support of Russia - which was seeking to undermine Georgia's
nationalist president at the time, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Despite
subsequent Moscow-brokered cease-fire agreements, both republics
are still formally at war with Tbilisi and international efforts
to bring all sides to sign comprehensive peace accords have
brought little so far. In addition, both South Ossetia and
Abkhazia remain de facto under Russian control.
Years of international mediation have failed to bring Armenia
and Azerbaijan to settle their 14-year-old territorial dispute
over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Both countries fought a
war that resulted in Moscow-backed ethnic Armenian troops
gaining full control over Karabakh and occupying half a dozen
Azerbaijani districts.
Some regional analysts believe the presence of US troops
in the region - however limited - might foster a peaceful
solution to the conflict by accelerating the search for a
compromise between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But other experts
say they do not expect any substantial progress unless Russia
changes its own foreign policy toward the entire region.
Svante Cornell is an analyst at the Washington-based School
for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University
and the editor of the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst"
newsletter. In an interview with RFE/RL, Cornell said the
almost-absolute preference given to Russia by landlocked Armenia
over the past decade - mostly due to security and energy supply
concerns - had left local leaders with virtually no alternative.
Asked whether he expects the presence of US troops in Georgia
to affect relations between Yerevan and Moscow, Cornell says:
"No, absolutely not, because Armenia's foreign policy
is deeply tied to Russia. Armenia's dependence on Russia has
been increasing over the past few years. Armenia's debts to
Russia are being paid not in cash, but by Russia acquiring
large Armenian enterprises and industries. So, not only politically,
but also economically, Russia is increasing its control over
Armenia. For Russia, Armenia is a very important piece of
real estate, which will enable it to have a continued influence
in the South Caucasus - even [though] Georgia and Azerbaijan
continue to be outside Moscow's orbit."
In Cornell's view, "given Armenia's economic difficulties,
only an alliance with Russia will allow it to exert control
over Karabakh in the short and middle term."
Cornell also says Moscow's continued backing of Yerevan will
deter Baku from attempting to regain control over its occupied
territories by force.
Gagik Avakian is an Armenian political analyst and the co-chairman
of a Yerevan-based non-governmental organization known as
"Cooperation and Democracy." Avakian tells an RFE/RL
correspondent that, while the majority of Armenia's population
sees Russia as the main guarantor of its security, the leadership
is looking at other strategic partners as part of the "complementary"
foreign policy launched in the mid-1990s by then-President
Levon Ter-Petrosian.
Avakian believes this complementary policy explains why Armenian
leaders have reacted cautiously to the upcoming deployment
of US soldiers in Georgia, although he says these developments
did not come as a surprise to anyone in Armenia.
"Armenia has no real clear-cut conception of what its
foreign policy should be. Our [foreign] policy is a very responsive
one. Given the existing balance [of forces in the region,]
our reflex has to be wait and see. Of course it would be much
better if we could have a real foreign policy because we could
then use it to defend our national interests. But this not
being the case, we have to have a wait-and-see policy and
see how the situation develops further."
Avakian believes that, despite their stated pro-Western foreign
policies, both Georgia and Azerbaijan are confronted with
the same problem. He says that, like Armenia, neither of these
countries is really the master of its own fate.
"I think that, today, not a single country in the southern
Caucasus region can really initiate anything. The deployment
of US troops is not entirely the result of a decision made
by Georgia. The decision was not made entirely on Georgia's
initiative. Georgia rather yielded to external circumstances
and the US deployment could end up not being as advantageous
as it seems for Georgia, because tomorrow or the day after
tomorrow, Russia can decide to take action against [Tbilisi].
[Moscow] has a whole range of instruments at its disposal
to do so, including economic ones."
Like former Premier Manukian, Avakian believes the only viable
solution for Armenia and its southern Caucasus neighbors lies
in regional cooperation. Both men believe that only regional
ties can help all three southern Caucasus states meet their
long-term security challenges.
Manukian says: "We are not refusing assistance offered
by international organizations or great powers. But it seems
to me that [our] region is the scene of competing ambitions,
that [these great powers] are playing a game and are sometimes
behaving with us as if we were nothing but pawns. With such
an approach, it is impossible to solve our problems."
Meanwhile, the situation in Georgia's southern Javakheti
Province - where local ethnic Armenians have staged street
protests in recent weeks to demand autonomy - has raised speculation
that Tbilisi might look for further foreign military help.
Those protests were prompted by reports that Tbilisi might
ask Turkey - which last year refurbished a Georgian military
air base vacated by the Russian Army and is modernizing another
airfield located near the Armenian border - to send troops
to Javakheti. Even though these reports were later denied
by Georgian authorities, they raised alarm in Armenia, which
sees Azerbaijan's Ankara ally as the main threat to its security.
In Avakian's view, any Turkish military buildup in the region
would inevitably prompt Yerevan to turn to Moscow for increased
military supplies.
Copyright © 2002. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave.,
N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org
Email this article
Posted March 14,
2002 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org
 |
 |
The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website,
meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed
debate about the social, political and economic developments
of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the
Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New
York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation
that promotes the development of open societies around
the world by supporting educational, social, and legal
reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex
and controversial issues.
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily
represent the position of the Open Society Institute and
are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.
|
 |
 |
|