EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia's Future Foreign Policy: Pragmatism in Motion

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA’S FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM IN MOTION
Yevgeny Bendersky 5/04/05
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from PINR

Russia’s recent geopolitical moves have distinguished themselves from the earlier attempts to regain the influence once exercised by its predecessor states, the U.S.S.R. Once Russia emerged from the ruins of a former superpower, its initial policies were directed towards consolidating influence in the previous Soviet regions. These moves were natural for a state that enjoyed and exercised unrivaled political, military and economic predominance as the lead republic within the U.S.S.R. Given the role Russia assumed on the global stage following 1991, its initial post-superpower drive was to emerge as the dominant power in the former Soviet Union, and as one of the world’s foremost geopolitical players.

As the reality of the 1990s and early 2000s played itself out, Russia was successfully checked on its borders by international and internal pressures within some former Soviet states. While Russia may appear to be on the "defensive" following a series of popular revolts that brought to power governments that took an openly pro-European and pro-American geopolitical stance, Moscow’s "waning" influence in the former Soviet regions should not be construed as the country’s weakness vis-à-vis its former sphere of influence. Even with the growing pressure for democratic reforms on the heels of Georgia, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz popular uprisings that brought down governments that were at least partially influenced by Moscow’s policies, Russia is still the region’s predominant economic power, a fact that is often underreported in numerous analyses on the former Soviet Union.

Moscow’s economic role in Georgia, Armenia, eastern Ukraine and in much of Central Asia gives it tremendous leverage even as it seems to officially "retreat" in the face of mounting popular pressure for reform and democratization. Additionally, the presence of millions of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics presents Moscow with yet another "international" advantage, even as it seems that for the moment this advantage is not used efficiently, if at all. Even as the current Russian military exhibits signs of inadequacy, the economic and ethnic factors are not lost on the Kremlin’s decision makers as they draft their country’s future moves in the world’s ever-changing geopolitical environment.

Future Pragmatic Moves

Russia sought to reemerge as a successor superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Its geostrategic maneuvering were somewhat natural for a state that once rivaled the United States on equal terms in practically every political, economic, social, military and technological aspect around the world. However, the harsh economic reality brought on by the demise of the Soviet empire made the attempts to once again "catch up" to the United States incredibly costly and unsustainable. Moreover, the loss of superpower status was incredibly painful to the general Russian population that still regards their country as one of the greatest powers on the globe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently alluded to the demise of the U.S.S.R. as a catastrophe for the Russian people in his April speech to the country. As Russia retreated from the numerous international commitments of its predecessor state, it sought to recreate them to a certain degree in its "near abroad," or former Soviet states. This policy led to open or covert interference in the internal affairs of these countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine. Given the growing U.S. and international presence in some of these states, Russia was effectively "checked" in its efforts, at least for the near future.

Its foreign policy in the 1990s and early 2000s attempted to at least partially assume the mantle once held by the Soviet Union, but its greatly diminished political, economic and military status relegated it to the role of the lesser powers, rather than "the one" power capable of challenging the United States. Russia is still tremendously important to the world’s major affairs, but its former Soviet clout is effectively replaced by that of the United States, European Union and China in areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, South Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yet, even in such conditions, Russia may find itself in an increasingly more advantageous position in the near future that would make it one of the world’s major players -- at a lesser cost than that paid for by the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. paid a tremendous price for its position as one of the world’s only two superpowers. Unlike the United States, the U.S.S.R. saw no real economic or military gains for its global presence, while its international obligations extracted massive social and economic costs on the country. Its attempts to court or keep in check its major and potential allies ultimately did not prevent the collapse of the Western world, nor diminished the West’s global influence. On the other hand, the coming geopolitical rearrangements expected to take place in the next 10-15 years will yield massive benefits for Russia, and present it with a number of advantageous options. Rather than attempting to dominate world affairs the way the U.S.S.R. once did, Russia can exercise an increasingly pragmatic foreign policy designed to extract the greatest advantage out of the numerous opportunities presented to it on the world scene.

Russia sees a multipolar world as the best opportunity to advance its interests and safeguard "world peace." This policy is enshrined in its military doctrine, and Russian policymakers have openly stated on a number of occasions that their country seeks to establish a multipolar environment that would diminish, at least partially, the position of geopolitical dominance currently held by the United States. In the last seven years, its moves towards China and other states have been viewed as manifestations of such policy. If the main predictions outlined in numerous policy papers come true, Russia will be able to choose from a variety of possible allies necessary to reach superpower status.

For example, the U.S. National Security Council’s "Project 2020" analysis points to the rising influence of China and India in world affairs in the next 15 years. Assuming the European Union will be able to overcome its current divisions and emerge as a more unified entity, its global presence will also be felt on all five continents. Already, many Middle Eastern states look to Russia as a possible counterbalance to America’s influence. [See: "Warning to Washington: ’Project 2020’"]

Russia will remain a major global player in the near future for two main reason: its abundant natural resources will assume greater importance to the world’s major developed economies, and its military research and development will continually earn it a top place as one of the top producers and suppliers of hardware around the world. Its economic strength is still under question -- even if major improvements take place in the Russian economy, it will still be a fraction of China’s and even a smaller fraction of the U.S.’ and Europe’s economies for the next several decades. Its stabilized economy, while still capable of attracting much needed foreign investment, will be behind major growth in Europe, China and India.

Nonetheless, Russia’s pragmatic foreign policy is being outlined today. In an interview with Israeli television prior to his historical visit to the country in late April 2005, Putin was asked if Russia would seek to establish itself as a superpower on the par with the U.S.S.R. Putin replied that the costs associated with such status-seeking moves will outweigh the benefits, and that Russia today is already a great state, with major presence in Europe and Asia, in both the "northern" and "southern" tier countries. At the same time, Putin defended his country’s effort to have productive relations with states like Syria and Iran, seen by the U.S. and Europe as having a destabilizing influence on the Middle East -- even as Russia courts Israel at the same time. Specifically, Putin stated that since Iran is a large country located on Russia’s periphery, therefore it would be counterproductive to adopt a hostile or competitive attitude with it. The same attitude is currently applied to China, as the Asian rising power is seen more as an economic and strategic partner rather than as a possible threat.

Assuming that today’s geopolitical patterns hold true for the next 15 years, Russia will find itself in a political environment that will at least partially resemble multipolarity. China’s and India’s improved economies will give the two states greater international clout, prompting the United States to adjust its foreign policy to reflect the appearance of two more powers on the world scene. The U.S. will not likely diminish in its hegemonic status; however, major policy centers like the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington predict that it will have more difficulties in advancing its policies around the world. It is also predicted that the European Union will possibly emerge as a more unified political entity with as much desire to advance its interests as the United States, China and India. In this environment, Russia will have several options it would be capable of pursuing. [See: "Testing the Currents of Multipolarity"]

Sino-Russian Competition

If China emerges as a possible "threat" to Russia given its increasing need for natural resources, advanced technology and an increasingly mature global influence, Russia will attempt to seek partners in checking China’s influence, albeit in a more careful style than the Soviet Union’s openly hostile policies of the 1970s. Russia’s population is expected to decline in the next two decades, while China’s is expected to rise. Given the already sparse population in Russia’s Far East -- a resource-rich area -- this disparity between this economically weak portion of the Russian Federation and economically dynamic Chinese territories directly to the south means a certain amount of friction may emerge between the two states that today enjoy cordial relations. Russia would then not be the only country seeking to contain China’s influence -- Japan would also be high on that list.

While today Japan is viewed as the world’s second largest economy, it is expected to cede that status to China in the next two decades. Japan relies on the import of natural resources vital to its economy -- as China does today and will do so in the future. The rising competition with a much more powerful Asian neighbor may prompt Japan to look for possible "allies in principle," so as not to engage Beijing openly as an adversary.

Russia is well suited to play that role, as it currently enjoys growing economic connections with Tokyo. The United States is already interested in preventing the rise of China as its possible competitor in Asia, and is Japan’s major ally. Tokyo enjoys strong economic, military and political connections with Washington, a relationship that is expected to continue for the next several decades. Thus, if both Japan and Russia would be interested in containing China’s influence, the United States could become a third partner in this new alliance.

Sino-Russian Cooperation

On the other hand, if Russia chooses to throw its hat in China’s corner following a natural progression of their relationship, it will find itself in an increasingly dichotomous role as a major partner to one of the world’s great powers. On the one hand, Russia will assure its territorial integrity and increased economic cooperation with one of the world’s largest economies. On the other hand, it might find its own economy harnessed to growing Chinese needs. Nonetheless, as a strategic and economic partner to China, Russia will be capable of exercising tremendous leverage on the world scene as the country closest to Beijing -- much as today’s Japan is viewed as one of Washington’s most reliable partners, and is therefore courted by many states wishing to exert their influence with the United States.

Today, more than 60 percent of all Russians think that China is a partner and is expected to be such in the near future. As a major Chinese ally, Russia’s geopolitical clout vis-à-vis the United States and Europe may increase, but stands the danger of being supplanted by the eventual emergence of China as an economic and military superpower. While both sides to the discussion on China’s future status point to various internal and international reasons that may aide or deter China’s rise, they point to Russia’s increasingly important role in the "Sino-Russian alliance."

Such an alliance would be capable of diluting -- though not diminishing -- the influence currently exercised by the United States around the world, creating a major competing economic and military entity. If, for example, Russia’s economy would begin to suffer due to international or domestic unrest, its decision makers, wary of the strong U.S. role in the Russian economy in the 1990s, may decide to stay closer to China as a counterbalance to Washington. The alliance with Beijing could catapult Moscow back to world superpower status, though the eventual political and economic beneficiary of this relationship may be China.

Relations with the European Union

The European Union, apart from possibly emerging as one of the main power centers, may itself undergo a transformation in the next two decades. Its core population is expected to decline and age, prompting an urgent need for fresh workforce. Lately, and into the near future, immigration has been growing in importance for Europe’s economy, and is expected to become even more vital as more Europeans retire expecting benefits that have long been a staple of Europe’s generous social programs.

More importantly, Muslims from North Africa, Southeastern Europe, Turkey and the Middle East have formed the bulk of that immigration and, consequently, a growing percentage of the European population. Already, Muslims form ten percent of the French population. This phenomenon is not new in itself, as millions of Turkish immigrants came to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, but it is made more prevalent by the declining birthrates among Europeans aged 25-45.

Russia has been experiencing a similar trend -- with its current birthrates and aging populace, it too will come to rely on immigration to sustain its economy. Much of that immigration will come from its own near abroad, and, to a lesser extent, from other countries such as China. Muslims now form nearly 14 percent of the Russian population and the percentage is expected to increase. Thus, the European Union and the Russian Federation may find themselves in a very similar situation in the coming decades, and may cooperate more closely on issues such as the economy and immigration. Russia is already one of the key trading partners of the European Union, and that relationship is expected to continue.

However, if the current trends hold, both entities will have increasing Muslim populations and the need for a more cooperative strategy toward certain states in North Africa and the Middle East. Given Russia’s well-established position in the Middle East, as well as European foreign policy towards Muslim states in general, Russia can find itself a beneficiary of a trilateral relationship between itself, Europe and a collection of several Muslim states that will become increasingly important to the economy and foreign policy of the new Europe. For example, it is expected that Turkey might finally accede to the European Union in the near future, and given Russia’s constructive relationship with Ankara, might facilitate the formation of this "alliance of need."

There are certain policies that might disrupt the strengthening of this relationship -- such as the strong U.S. presence in the Middle East, or the growth of N.A.T.O. and the European Union to encompass more former Soviet states such as Ukraine. Nonetheless, Russia’s historical ties to Europe and Moscow’s own view of itself as a European power will allow it to forge domestic and foreign policies to compensate for the "loss of prestige," as its former sphere of influence might be incorporated into an emergent political order.

Importance of the Military in Russian Foreign Policy

Russia considers military strength to be an important determinant of its ability to become a powerful state. While it is not expected to regain the global military reach once exercised by the Soviet Union, its military is expected to reform and modernize. Military exports form a significant part of Russia’s military strength, and Moscow will adopt a further pragmatic approach to weapons exports that will allow it to gain more contracts and hard currency. Putin stressed as much to Israeli television when he defended Russia’s military sales to Syria and Iran, while potentially even courting Israel’s powerful military market.

Russia’s relationship with another rising power, India, might evolve among the ties associated with military exports. India is currently one of the biggest buyers of Russian military hardware, and its purchases are allowing it to field one of the largest and most technologically advanced armies in the world. Even as India is establishing peaceful relations with Pakistan and is courting Beijing’s favors, it still desires to emerge as a powerful state on its own terms.

Consequently, even the warming of relations with Islamabad and Beijing will cause New Delhi to keep a watchful eye on its neighbors. Russia can aid India’s rise as a regional power, a possible counterbalance to China’s economic and political prowess, as well as a probable partner to check U.S. influence. That policy can be complicated by Washington’s own overtures towards India, as the two countries are increasing their political and economic contacts. Nonetheless, Russia stands ready to invest more into its bilateral relationship with India, given its recent Cold War ties to New Delhi.

Relations with the Muslim World

A true wild card will be Russia’s relationship with the Muslim world of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. There is currently no single state besides Iran that can absorb the bulk of the benefits of its bilateral relationship with Moscow. Russia is also used to dealing with authoritarian, one-party states. Given the current trends in the Middle East, certain political and social changes are expected in the coming years that may alter Russia’s approach to these countries. These changes will also determine the level of U.S. influence in the region. If the current "democratization" trend continues, America’s role is expected to increase. Soviet authority in that region has been declining since the 1980s, and Russia’s weak international position in the 1990s solidified that trend.

However, Moscow is expected to maintain a pragmatic approach to the region, courting stronger and more stable regimes, while acting as the possible supporter of weaker ones in order to keep a place at the international negotiation table. Putin’s current approach to Israel, Iran and Syria signifies this trend -- Moscow will allow Washington to take the initiative and pay for its successes and mistakes, and then step in as an ally, a counterbalance, or even a possible competitor. Since extensive involvement in the region today involves investment and political clout -- rather than Cold War style arms transfers and economic "gifts" in exchange for influence -- Russia is expected to play a smaller role than that occupied by the Soviet Union.

Still, considering the enormous investment by the U.S.S.R. in the Muslim world during the 1950s through 1980s, Russia is well poised to assume at least part of that tremendous burden, and to be considered an important player in the region. It is already courted by major Islamic multinational organizations, given its own rising Muslim population.

Conclusion

What is surprising about Russia’s current situation in the former Soviet Union is the speed with which several key states overthrew their governments that at least nominally enjoyed cordial relations with Moscow. This trend is also expected to continue, especially given U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s comments that Belarus, one of the last authoritarian states in Eastern Europe, should undergo a profound political change. Still, even with America’s physical presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and an increasing interest in these regions’ energy sources by China and India, Russia may yet play a powerful broker in its formerly controlled territories. The presence of millions of Russian nationals in these states, as well as the former Soviet states’ economic reliance on Russia as their largest trading partner, will assure Russia’s strong role at least for the next several decades.

Moscow has been closely observing U.S. hegemonic practices since 1991, and has extracted several important lessons. The level of influence exercised by the United States throughout the world is costly and problematic, even if it yields important short-term results. Superpower status also has its limitations, as the U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrated both the scope and ability of its armed forces and initial political pressure, as well as the need for extensive alliances in the medium and long run. The said invasion also showcased Russia’s ability to launch at least a partially successful challenge to the United States in tandem with France, Germany and China. Thus, Russian foreign policy can be expected to utilize extensive alliance-building, covering as many "bases" as possible without damaging its international credibility.

It would be difficult for Russia to rise once again as a global superpower in the absence of an ideology capable of polarizing the international community into two camps, thus aiding alliances and constructing independent economic and political spheres of influence. The world in the coming decades will still be dominated by the United States, but will undergo a transformation, as more countries will assume greater economic and political clout.

Therefore, Russia will seek to build "alliances of convenience" with these countries -- whether they be China, India, the European Union, or even Indonesia or Brazil -- in order to extend its influence around the world. This is premised on the fact that Russia’s foreign policy will follow Putin’s doctrines, for he is expected to step down in 2008. Much can take place after that year if his successors will not be able to sustain the country on a track launched by him when he took office in 2000.

Nonetheless, Russia can be expected to continue its policy of "superpower on the cheap" -- that is, building credible alliances to share the costs of global influence, instead of paying these costs themselves, as the Soviet Union did in the Cold War. This approach can potentially allow it to increase its global influence and status without extensively damaging its domestic and international standing. Russia may even end up as an ally of the United States if the right opportunity presents itself. Its foreign policy could stay as one of well-calculated pragmatism, making it a very important international player in the coming decades.

Editor�s Note: Yevgeny Bendersky is a senior analyst with the Power and Interest News Report and is presently studying international security and conflict resolution at the Fletcher School of Tufts University.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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