ELECTIONS IN LIMBO-LAND
Irina Sargsyan and Anna Hakobyan: 8/09/02
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from Transitions Online

A year ago, many in the Caucasus felt that a historic breakthrough was on the cards. At talks in Key West in the United States, Armenian President Robert Kocharian and his Azeri counterpart, Heidar Aliev, seemed closer than ever to reaching an agreement that would transform the 1994 cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh into a peace deal. The talks failed, leaving Nagorno-Karabakh’s status unchanged: a former region of Azerbaijan, now a self-declared republic searching either for full independence or incorporation into Armenia. But, following the 11 September attacks, Caspian oil has increased in importance, and with it the value of a lasting peace has increased. As the people of Nagorno-Karabakh prepare to go to the polls to elect a president on 11 August, they might be expected to feel that their vote has an added significance.

But instead of feeling key players in an issue that is central to the stability of the region, many feel that the republic has been relegated to the role of a bit player. For a number of years after the 1994 cease-fire, Armenia said that it was not directly involved in the conflict and therefore it would accept any solution to the conflict acceptable to both Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. The onus for brokering a deal was on the Minsk Group, set up by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to broker a deal in the region, and the Minsk Group’s approach to peace-making was to go step by step, reaching small agreements rather than a comprehensive deal.

Now, however often representatives of the Minsk Group fly to and fro in the region, all substantive talks are being carried out between Kocharian, and Aliev. Their efforts have been focused on reaching a "package" settlement, in the hope of resolving all aspects of the conflict in one go. Many in Nagorno-Karabakh feel that they have been deliberately sidelined by Kocharian - and that this has played into the hands of Azerbaijan (which in 1995, for example, sought to persuade the OSCE to deny Nagorno-Karabakh full negotiating rights in peace talks).

Adding to the growing sense of isolation is a sharp reduction in the amount of financial support from Yerevan. Once drip-fed by Armenia, itself hardly prosperous, Nagorno-Karabakh has found its supply of lifeblood thinning and slowing.

THE (MIS)FORTUNES OF THE GHUKASIAN PRESIDENCY
The prospects looked so different in November 1996 when Kocharian won himself a second term in office as president of Nagorno-Karabakh. A tough man, Kocharian had successfully led Karabakh’s war of independence from Azerbaijan, established Karabakh’s place at the peace table, and secured financial support from Armenia. He was a politician of stature in Armenia as well as Karabakh, and his re-election seemed to herald another five years of progress in Karabakh’s effort to establish itself firmly, both politically and economically.

But just a few months later, Kocharian sought and won the presidency of Armenia. The sense of betrayal in Nagorno-Karabakh was palpable. For many, that feeling has deepened in the four years since. In Yerevan, Kocharian has concentrated power in his own hands. By the same logic, he has asserted his control over negotiations over the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. That is understandable, argue some. Without a solution to the conflict, they assert, there will be no economic development either in Armenia or Karabakh itself. But that is not a good enough argument for many in Karabakh, who see their control over their always precarious destinies being taken away from them. That is supplemented by fear that some priorities in Yerevan (such as ensuring transport links with Russia via Azerbaijan) might lead to concessions that compromise priorities in Stepanakert (such as guarantees of its security and a final recognition of its status).

The reaction has been a huge drop in President Arkady Ghukasian’s popularity. Although not Kocharian’s initial choice for president, Ghukasian has always been a close associate of Kocharian’s. In September 1997, that benefited him. He was swept to power with 85 percent of the popular vote. As real power has moved toward Yerevan, so his support has fallen. Four weeks ago, opinion polls conducted by the Press Club in Nagorno-Karabakh (and backed by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation), showed just 30 percent support nationally for Ghukasian - and just 20 percent in Stepanakert, the capital.

Paradoxically, the plunge was partly due to an attempt on Ghukasian’s life in March 2000, which left the president wounded and hospitalized. The would-be assassin? General Samvel Babayan, the police said. A political prisoner, said Amnesty International. Whatever the truth - and, in the eyes of many in the region, so far no conclusive evidence has been supplied to prove or disapprove the general’s guilt - the arrest of Babayan removed not just one of the region’s most powerful politicians, but also one of its most popular. Babayan was the general who led the Karabakh’s troops during the war. He was a man who brought the same military qualities of leadership and control to civilian life. He was a man with huge political clout. Nothing, it was said, was done without his approval. Negotiating subsidies from Yerevan was always a difficult task; it was Babayan, the claim was, who was critical in securing flows of cash from Yerevan.

In short, Babayan was a man who enjoyed power. He was also a direct challenger to Ghukasian, sacked as head of the Karabakh Defense Army in December 1999. All that and the timing of the attack - in the run-up to parliamentary elections in which Babayan’s supporters stood a good chance of winning - appeared to produce two plausible explanations to the assassination attempt: that Babayan was behind the attempt, or that Ghukasian had seized on the opportunity to rid himself of a challenger.

READING EASILY READ RUNES
This election campaign has produced some opening up of the republic’s political system. In 1997, the elections were a run-off between members of the government. In these elections, there are three new challengers, all of which have the backing of separate parties and sections of the population: Artur Tovmassian was formally the parliamentary speaker in Stepanakert; Albert Ghazrian is the leader of the Christian-Democratic Party; and Grigoriy Afanasyan, leader of the Unity block.

What’s more, the administration may be loosening its hold over some areas of life in response to Ghukasian’s fall in popularity. Talk of an amnesty for Babayan is no longer restricted to parliament and the streets and cafes of Stepanakert, but has also been discussed on the tightly controlled national television station. Tovmassian recently said on television that one of the main issues in the campaign is the release of Babayan. Two months ago, such statements would not have been aired.

This may betray some concern in the Ghukasian camp, but the collapse in his support is highly unlikely to cost Ghukasian a second five-year term in office. None of these opponents appears strong enough to dislodge Ghukasian. The candidates started off at a disadvantage. According to Dr. Karen Ohanjanyan, chair of the Helsinki Initiative-92 human rights group, there are a "great many laws that do not grant equal rights to candidates and that also do not open the possibility for everyone to play an active role in the political life of the country." The possibility of a new president, always improbable, has become remoter still since early July, when the leading (and powerful) opposition party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutiun (HHD), announced that it would not be putting up its own candidate and would instead support Ghukasian.

If that prediction proves accurate, it will be welcomed by Kocharian and, possibly by Russia, the United States, and France--the countries represented by the Minsk Group. For, however much Nagorno-Karabakh has been sidelined in talks in recent years, the continuity of the current peace talks rests heavily on the continuity of political leadership in the self-proclaimed republic.

That view indicates the current international attitude toward Nagorno-Karabakh’s role in the region: the less it says, the better. The events of 11 September have merely underlined that. The importance of oil in the Caspian (and therefore Azerbaijan) has risen. The interest in a solution to the conflict has increased. A simplified, rather than comprehensive peace deal has become more attractive--and removing Nagorno-Karabakh from the peace table is one way of simplifying talks. Ghukasian’s re-election would ensure that status quo continues. However, with or without him, the failure to involve the Nagorno-Karabakh administration in talks could prove critical. Ultimately, the success of any peace talks rests on the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. If they are not included in the talks, it may well be that the chances of success will fall--just as the president’s popularity has.

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Posted August 9, 2002 © Eurasianet
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