Entering the headquarters of Sergei Bagapsh in Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, you could be forgiven for thinking that Bagapsh is already the president of this self-styled independent state.
Ever since elections in October, a throng of his supporters has stood outside his headquarters, greeting visitors with the words, "The president is in." And Bagapsh already appears more like a de facto president than one of two candidates in a disputed election. He controls parliament and Abkhazia's state television and radio stations, and occupies every government building.
Bagapsh sees himself as the genuine, freely elected president. Most Abkhazians voted for him in October, and he finished 15 percent clear of his rival in elections. Despite efforts by supporters of his opponent to swing the elections in their favor, every institution they have turned to has proclaimed Bagapsh the winner: Abkhazia's electoral commission, the Supreme Court, parliament, and even a traditional social institution called the Society of Elders, a gathering of village leaders whose decisions, though without legal weight, are highly respected in Abkhazia.
But with Bagapsh's inauguration day looming, on 6 December, the outgoing president, Vladislav Ardzinba, is refusing to leave office. He calls Bagapsh's assumption of power "unlawful" and "destructive."
Ardzinba and his chosen successor, Raul Khajimba, continue to insist on a rerun of the vote or completely new elections. (Calls by them for new, as-yet-unissued, Abkhazia identity cards to be the only form of voter identification allowed in future elections suggests their aim would be to gain control of how the ID cards are distributedand secure "victory.") The opportunities for compromise now seem limited: Khajimba has refused Bagapsh's offers for a position in his future government, and Russia's attempt to intervene by inviting both candidates to Moscow for negotiations has failed.
"We won these elections and we will not give away our victory," Bagapsh insists. And the political impasse might not normally seem an insurmountable obstacle for Bagapsh. The army seems to have adopted a neutral position and Bagapsh has strong support from veterans of Abkhazia's "war of independence" in 1992-93, a war that left thousands dead and hundreds of thousands homeless. Importantly, their backing is also valuable in practice. Their close ties to officials in the power ministries could ensure a nonviolent transitionunless Russia gets involved.
But each passing day appears to be raising the chances that Russia will step in. Ardzinba and Khajimba have the weight of Russia behind them. And Russia's weight is very heavy. Indeed, in many respects, Abkhazia already looks like a Russian region. The lingua franca is Russian; the currency is the ruble; 80 percent of the population has Russian citizenship or passports; its northern border to Russia has essentially been nonexistent; and Russian "peacekeepers," flags, and posters of President Vladimir Putin are very visible.
Russia is now throwing that weight around in support of Khajimba. In November, it stopped sending pensions and humanitarian aid. On 12 November, Russia sent extra soldiers and armored vehicles to a sanatorium for military personnel in Sukhumi. On 2 December, it imposed a sea and railroad blockade and beefed up its army and secret services along the border. The only road to Russia is now open just six hours a day, and trade is reportedly being restricted. A full blockade may be enforced if Bagapsh takes power.
Abkhazia is hunkering down. Government employees have been sent home until the situation settles, which means (at least for now) five days. The only foreign journalists allowed to enter the country are Russians. Even the United Nations is encountering difficulties getting in to monitor events. Television pictures of UN vehicles being prevented from crossing in from Georgia have been broadcast. Army reservists who support Ardzinba have declared that they would follow any orders Ardzinba gives, even to use force on 6 December.
Bagapsh is determined to continue with his inauguration ceremony on Sukhumi's Freedom Square. Khajimba's team plans to "protest." And with more than 40,000 Bagapsh supporters expected to turn upa sizable proportion of the region's population of 250,000--the possibility of bloodshed is mounting.
RUSSIA'S ROLE
Why is Russia doing this? The man arguably best-placed to know, Khajimba, believes "geopolitics interests Russia most."
If so, it might seem odd for Russia to have such a problem with Bagapsh. Speaking of the differences between his policies and Khajimba's, Bagapsh insists, "As regards our relations with Russia and Georgia, our positions are the same."
Sakrat Jinjolia, the head of Bagapsh's campaign staff, echoes his boss, saying, "I think everyone understands that either candidate will take a pro-Russia course."
Both want Abkhazia to gain internationally recognized independence from Georgia. Both embrace an "associated relationship" with Russia, allowing Russia to maintain military bases in Abkhazia, while Abkhazia would synchronize its foreign policy with Moscow and use the same law, currency, and customs regime.
But while both candidates claim to hold virtually identical foreign policies and support the status quo, their domestic policies are quite different.
This seems critical. "Russia wants a country with a stable government at its southern borders," says Khajimba, and change is not something that Abkhazia, or Russia, is used to. Vladislav Ardzinba is the only president Abkhazia has ever known.
But change was unavoidable as Ardzinba has been so incapacitated by illness that for the past two years he has not been seen in public, prompting speculation that he is in fact dead.
Bagapsh's desire to force substantial change is evident in the strong language used by Aleksandr Ankvab, Bagapsh's designated prime minister. "The current regime is authoritarian," he asserts. "The Bagapsh team will reform the system of government. Khajimba seeks to preserve it."
Two key elements of Khajimba's manifesto--reform of the law enforcement agencies and constitutional reform giving the president the right to disband parliament--suggest that he wants to exert even tighter control (Bagapsh supporters are strong in both these institutions). Still, the Ardzinba team was not so authoritarian that it prevented holding elections in October, the first contested elections in the region for a decade.
Be that as it may, Bagapsh claims, "The government used its entire administrative resources with the help of Russian political consultants and counsel. Despite everything, they lost. The government is now doing everything in its power to invalidate the elections. It does not want to hand over power."
Bagapsh pointed to Russians based in the Sukhumi military sanatorium as "leading these elections" and "dealing with the pre-election campaign" of his opponents.
As Abkhazia is not internationally recognized as an independent state, international monitors from the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe did not observe the vote or the preceding campaign. But Russia's involvement in the campaign was very evident.
Russia seems to have miscalculated, and its actions backfired (a failure that was, in passing, widely picked up among Ukraine analysts ahead of the Ukrainian elections). The election results showed that Bagapsh received 50.08 percent of the vote, enough (by a tiny fraction) to give him victory in the first round and well ahead of the 35.60 percent that Khajimba received.
Many observers believe Russia continues to back Khajimba simply because it is unwilling to acknowledge that it bet on the losing horse.
Bagapsh sees it differently. "If Khajimba won, everything would be the same," and Russia, he believes, "[wants] everything to be as before."
THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE
Why it might want everything to remain unchanged begins to become clear in conversations with members of Bagapsh's camp.
Bagapsh campaigned vigorously on an anti-corruption ticket, portraying Abkhazia as a country without the rule of law and asserting that many around the president were failing to pay taxes. "As far as internal affairs are concerned, if we come to power we will establish order in the country," Bagapsh says. "We will combat crime and corruption."
Leonid Lakarbaia, the leader of Aitaira, one of three main movements backing Bagapsh, explains, "We are talking about power. I think [Khajimba's team] has a lot to be afraid of." He points to the privatization of beach resorts and state property amounting to "tens of millions of dollars."
"Privatization and
Editor's note:
Theresa Freese is a freelance journalist and political analyst who has been conducting research on unresolved conflicts in the south Caucasus since September 2003.
