Eurasia Insight:
ABKHAZIA: AT WAR WITH ITSELF
Theresa Freese: 12/03/04
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from TOL

Entering the headquarters of Sergei Bagapsh in Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, you could be forgiven for thinking that Bagapsh is already the president of this self-styled independent state.

Ever since elections in October, a throng of his supporters has stood outside his headquarters, greeting visitors with the words, “The president is in.” And Bagapsh already appears more like a de facto president than one of two candidates in a disputed election. He controls parliament and Abkhazia’s state television and radio stations, and occupies every government building.

Bagapsh sees himself as the genuine, freely elected president. Most Abkhazians voted for him in October, and he finished 15 percent clear of his rival in elections. Despite efforts by supporters of his opponent to swing the elections in their favor, every institution they have turned to has proclaimed Bagapsh the winner: Abkhazia’s electoral commission, the Supreme Court, parliament, and even a traditional social institution called the Society of Elders, a gathering of village leaders whose decisions, though without legal weight, are highly respected in Abkhazia.

But with Bagapsh’s inauguration day looming, on 6 December, the outgoing president, Vladislav Ardzinba, is refusing to leave office. He calls Bagapsh’s assumption of power “unlawful” and “destructive.”

Ardzinba and his chosen successor, Raul Khajimba, continue to insist on a rerun of the vote or completely new elections. (Calls by them for new, as-yet-unissued, Abkhazia identity cards to be the only form of voter identification allowed in future elections suggests their aim would be to gain control of how the ID cards are distributed—and secure “victory.”) The opportunities for compromise now seem limited: Khajimba has refused Bagapsh’s offers for a position in his future government, and Russia’s attempt to intervene by inviting both candidates to Moscow for negotiations has failed.

“We won these elections and we will not give away our victory,” Bagapsh insists. And the political impasse might not normally seem an insurmountable obstacle for Bagapsh. The army seems to have adopted a neutral position and Bagapsh has strong support from veterans of Abkhazia’s “war of independence” in 1992-93, a war that left thousands dead and hundreds of thousands homeless. Importantly, their backing is also valuable in practice. Their close ties to officials in the power ministries could ensure a nonviolent transition—unless Russia gets involved.

But each passing day appears to be raising the chances that Russia will step in. Ardzinba and Khajimba have the weight of Russia behind them. And Russia’s weight is very heavy. Indeed, in many respects, Abkhazia already looks like a Russian region. The lingua franca is Russian; the currency is the ruble; 80 percent of the population has Russian citizenship or passports; its northern border to Russia has essentially been nonexistent; and Russian “peacekeepers,” flags, and posters of President Vladimir Putin are very visible.

Russia is now throwing that weight around in support of Khajimba. In November, it stopped sending pensions and humanitarian aid. On 12 November, Russia sent extra soldiers and armored vehicles to a sanatorium for military personnel in Sukhumi. On 2 December, it imposed a sea and railroad blockade and beefed up its army and secret services along the border. The only road to Russia is now open just six hours a day, and trade is reportedly being restricted. A full blockade may be enforced if Bagapsh takes power.

Abkhazia is hunkering down. Government employees have been sent home until the situation settles, which means (at least for now) five days. The only foreign journalists allowed to enter the country are Russians. Even the United Nations is encountering difficulties getting in to monitor events. Television pictures of UN vehicles being prevented from crossing in from Georgia have been broadcast. Army reservists who support Ardzinba have declared that they would follow any orders Ardzinba gives, even to use force on 6 December.

Bagapsh is determined to continue with his inauguration ceremony on Sukhumi’s Freedom Square. Khajimba’s team plans to “protest.” And with more than 40,000 Bagapsh supporters expected to turn up—a sizable proportion of the region’s population of 250,000--the possibility of bloodshed is mounting.

RUSSIA’S ROLE

Why is Russia doing this? The man arguably best-placed to know, Khajimba, believes “geopolitics interests Russia most.”

If so, it might seem odd for Russia to have such a problem with Bagapsh. Speaking of the differences between his policies and Khajimba’s, Bagapsh insists, “As regards our relations with Russia and Georgia, our positions are the same.”

Sakrat Jinjolia, the head of Bagapsh’s campaign staff, echoes his boss, saying, “I think everyone understands that either candidate will take a pro-Russia course.”

Both want Abkhazia to gain internationally recognized independence from Georgia. Both embrace an “associated relationship” with Russia, allowing Russia to maintain military bases in Abkhazia, while Abkhazia would synchronize its foreign policy with Moscow and use the same law, currency, and customs regime.

But while both candidates claim to hold virtually identical foreign policies and support the status quo, their domestic policies are quite different.

This seems critical. “Russia wants a country with a stable government at its southern borders,” says Khajimba, and change is not something that Abkhazia, or Russia, is used to. Vladislav Ardzinba is the only president Abkhazia has ever known.

But change was unavoidable as Ardzinba has been so incapacitated by illness that for the past two years he has not been seen in public, prompting speculation that he is in fact dead.

Bagapsh’s desire to force substantial change is evident in the strong language used by Aleksandr Ankvab, Bagapsh’s designated prime minister. “The current regime is authoritarian,” he asserts. “The Bagapsh team will reform the system of government. Khajimba seeks to preserve it.”

Two key elements of Khajimba’s manifesto--reform of the law enforcement agencies and constitutional reform giving the president the right to disband parliament--suggest that he wants to exert even tighter control (Bagapsh supporters are strong in both these institutions). Still, the Ardzinba team was not so authoritarian that it prevented holding elections in October, the first contested elections in the region for a decade.

Be that as it may, Bagapsh claims, “The government used its entire administrative resources with the help of Russian political consultants and counsel. Despite everything, they lost. The government is now doing everything in its power to invalidate the elections. It does not want to hand over power.”

Bagapsh pointed to Russians based in the Sukhumi military sanatorium as “leading these elections” and “dealing with the pre-election campaign” of his opponents.

As Abkhazia is not internationally recognized as an independent state, international monitors from the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe did not observe the vote or the preceding campaign. But Russia’s involvement in the campaign was very evident.

Russia seems to have miscalculated, and its actions backfired (a failure that was, in passing, widely picked up among Ukraine analysts ahead of the Ukrainian elections). The election results showed that Bagapsh received 50.08 percent of the vote, enough (by a tiny fraction) to give him victory in the first round and well ahead of the 35.60 percent that Khajimba received.

Many observers believe Russia continues to back Khajimba simply because it is unwilling to acknowledge that it bet on the losing horse.

Bagapsh sees it differently. “If Khajimba won, everything would be the same,” and Russia, he believes, “[wants] everything to be as before.”

THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE

Why it might want everything to remain unchanged begins to become clear in conversations with members of Bagapsh’s camp.

Bagapsh campaigned vigorously on an anti-corruption ticket, portraying Abkhazia as a country without the rule of law and asserting that many around the president were failing to pay taxes. “As far as internal affairs are concerned, if we come to power we will establish order in the country,” Bagapsh says. “We will combat crime and corruption.”

Leonid Lakarbaia, the leader of Aitaira, one of three main movements backing Bagapsh, explains, “We are talking about power. I think [Khajimba’s team] has a lot to be afraid of.” He points to the privatization of beach resorts and state property amounting to “tens of millions of dollars.”

“Privatization and ‘rents’ [lucrative sinecures] were portioned out with no tenders,” he continues. “As a rule, it all went to people surrounding the president.”

The attack on Ardzinba struck a strong cord. “The people are fed up. Ardzinba’s clan was telling us lies for years,” I was told by the commander of a contingent of reservists defending Abkhazia state television.

Many Bagapsh supporters claim that “Russians” pulled the strings. Lakarbaia himself is cautious, but it may not matter what he thinks or whether the claims are true; what perhaps matters more is that Russia’s role over the past decade has roused some strong anti-Russian sentiment among Bagapsh’s supporters.

Oleg Gagulia, an avid activist on the Bagapsh campaign, says, “Officials are selling Abkhazia off.” He claims that Ardzinba’s relatives are linked to Russian officials with corrupt business interests in Abkhazia. Gagulia says he fears that if Khajimba came to power that Russian politicians and governors would “loot the country and fill their pockets.”

He supports Bagapsh because his government “will arrest those who steal from the country, not those who steal chickens.”

Bagapsh fuels such sentiments, though he speaks in more measured terms. Asked why the Russians refuse to accept his victory, he explains, “They have vested interests in Ardzinba and Khajimba.”

Stanislav Lakoba, Bagapsh’s designated vice president, believes Russia persists with its line because it wants a return on its political investment. “They spent millions on his election program,” he says. “What would you do if you went to a shop to buy chocolate, and they took your money but did not give you the chocolate? It’s the same case here. But it’s not about chocolate. It’s about millions of dollars.”

At the same time, Bagapsh has been careful to distinguish between official Russian policy and an unspecified group of Russians backing the Khajimba-Ardzinba team. “These are separate power structures that do not reflect Russian policy,” he says.

He believes Putin “was not even aware” that people are feeding him “twisted facts.”

Raul Khajimba has no qualms about admitting he enjoyed Russian backing. “I do not see anything wrong with Russia supporting my candidacy,” he says. “The United States and Europe paid attention to the presidential elections in Georgia and supported [Mikheil] Saakashvili.”

Saakashvili, the figurehead of Georgia’s rose revolution in November 2003, took the presidency this January with 96 percent of the popular vote.

But Khajimba rejects the numerous accusations against him and the government. “When I was prime minister for one and half years, nothing could be shown as evidence that we were selling Abkhazia,” he insists. “Most of my opponents were in power when they say I was selling land,” he asserts.

“They say they will combat crime, but they stand alongside criminals.”

The team around Bagapsh, himself a former prime minister, insists they would not try to cut business ties with Russia; rather, they would like to strengthen them.

“We cannot improve our economy without Russian business,” Bagapsh says, adding, however, “We need a positive environment for Russian investment.” That, in his view, requires economic reforms.

“We are only against dirty Russian business here,” he says. “We will promote a process that allows Russian businessmen to operate here on a legal basis. No other option can be considered.”

They also hope their anti-crime and corruption campaign will attract Western investment, adding to fears that Bagapsh’s team are aiming to reduce Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia.

A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH GEORGIA?

Abkhazia is in desperate need of that investment. Its infrastructure is dilapidated, and its main sources of income, including the sale of mandarin oranges to Russia, are tiny compared with the money that could be attracted by a stunning 240-kilometer Black Sea coastline, snow-covered mountains, strategically important ports, and a strong agriculture base.

Despite its close relations with Russia, Abkhazia has failed to capitalize significantly on its natural assets. The frozen conflict with Georgia is a major reason why, and a major obstacle to Bagapsh’s plans for economic development.

It is a point that is not lost on Bagapsh’s would-be prime minister, Aleksandr Ankvab.

“Money loves silence. It loves order,” he says. “It does not have either when there is a conflict.”

Running mate Lakoba says the Bagapsh government would support “economic development as a means to conflict resolution with Georgia.”

Such a statement alone might be enough to concern Russian officials. Many analysts believe the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have remained unresolved partly because they provide Moscow with leverage over Georgia.

But Bagapsh’s supporters go further still. They generally agree that, by focusing all their attention on protecting themselves against Georgia, they lost their independence to Russia--and did not realize it until too late. They blame Ardzinba’s government for this. And they believe the Bagapsh team will not stand for it any longer.

They generally no longer view Georgia as an imminent threat, despite Saakashvili’s reassertion of authority over the semi-independent region of Ajaria and his so-far-unsuccessful pressure on South Ossetia.

Gagulia, the Bagapsh supporter, portrays Russian power as overweening, especially in the past year. “Russia has geopolitical interests in Abkhazia,” he says. “It lost Georgia and now it is trying to preserve Abkhazia. Russia implemented a policy of force here—divide and rule. Our land is a paradise compared with Russia. But this land belongs to Abkhazia.”

Commander Vitali Gorsanti, a leader of Amtsakhara, a veterans movement that claims up to 10,000 members, explains where Ardzinba went wrong: “For the last six years, Mr. Ardzinba has not been with the people. We have not been his supporters for a long time.”

(He also blames the unexplained murders of two of Amtsakhara’s leading members, Garri Aiba and Salibei Ardzinba, on President Ardzinba.)

Such comments and my meetings with veterans suggest that some Russian press reports claiming Ardzinba has the support of most veterans of the 1992-1993 are wrong. The veterans themselves say that a large majority in their ranks backs Bagapsh.

Despite this support from men who risked their lives against Georgia, Khajimba’s election campaign portrays Bagapsh as a pro-Georgia candidate and seeks to play on many bitter memories of the conflict and fears of a Georgian invasion.

The fact that Bagapsh’s wife is ethnic Georgian was frequently used to bolster Khajimba’s case.

This tactic clearly strikes a nerve with some partisans, even if it failed to secure Khajimba victory. “Bagapsh is oriented to Georgia,” says Petre Kaintaba, a demonstrator at a pro-Khajimba rally. “I don’t want to join Georgia again. Georgians are our enemies. We won’t forget what happened. The victims are our sons. Our daughters were murdered. [Bagapsh] is very dangerous.”

Another demonstrator echoes him, saying, “Georgians always exploited us. They deprived us of our language and culture.”

A third man enters the discussion. “A second war may break out!” he exclaims.

WAITING WITH APPREHENSION

At the moment, if another war is to break out, it looks more likely to pit Abkhazians against Abkhazians, with the Russians backing Ardzinba. Russian media reports are now portraying Khajimba as powerful and Bagapsh as aggressive. They are claiming that 1,000 commanders, representing 6,000 reservists, support Khajimba. (The reports quote government officials. How accurate these figures are is uncertain. Ardzinba's press secretary told TOL that about 800 people showed up for a meeting at which reservists declared their backing for Ardzinba. Many were not themselves reservists.) The Russian daily Izvestiya, which has been more tightly controlled since the Beslan disaster, has also quoted some uncharacteristically belligerent words from General Merab Kishmaria, a man widely expected to become Bagapsh's minister of defense.

Such claims are increasing the sense of fear in Abkhazia. The underlying purpose of the Russian blockade and other forms of pressure appears to be to drive home the message to Abkhazians that, without a Moscow-backed leader, they will be weakened, isolated, and defenseless from the Georgians. Increasingly, though, it looks as if Russia is prepared to go to the brink of civil war to ensure that it continues to control politics in the region.

The language may be becoming harsher, but Russia has been taking a hard stance for months. Days before the elections, at a 30 September parade to mark Abkhazia’s victory over Georgia, the Russian nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky urged Abkhazians to vote for Khajimba and warned that, if they did not, relations with Russia would be spoiled and the border closed.

Then the governor of the southern Russian region of Krasnodar, Aleksandr Tkachev, declared that Bagapsh and his supporters were heading toward an “armed seizure of power” and called on Abkhazians to “obey” their president and hold repeat elections. Calling Bagapsh a "direct threat to Russia's national security,” he threatened to close the border.

When asked if this reflected Russian policy, Roin Agrba, Ardzinba’s press secretary stated, “Of course. The governor would not make such a statement without agreeing with higher authorities first.”

But Tkachev’s threat, which is now a reality, and the other measures taken by Russia seem only to have strengthened the resolve of some Bagapsh supporters.

The Bagapsh activist Oleg Gagulia, for instance, never accepted a Russian passport and says he never will. He even seems glad that Russia has cut off pensions. The policy of subsidizing pensioners “brought Abkhazia to its knees,” he believes. “As long as we take pensions from Russia we owe them something,” he explains.

Politically, though, Bagapsh is stuck. Russia’s opposition to him seems implacable and he cannot turn for support to Georgia. Doing so would merely lend credence to Khajimba’s campaign allegations and potentially divide his own supporters.

But Russia too is in a difficult position, geopolitically and within Abkhazia.

Pointing to a way out of the crisis Bagapsh has said, “Russia needs to name the winner. It needs to say that Russia is a country that supports the law.” If it chooses to oust Bagapsh, resentment among Abkhazians would grow and they would know that Khajimba, if he were the new president, did not enjoy the support of the people.

And if Russia chooses to intervene with force, it may encounter armed resistance from many of the men who fought for Abkhazia’s independence and brought the region into Russia’s orbit. That would be a risky step with repercussions for Russia beyond Abkhazia and Georgia.

Lakarbaia, leader of a pro-Bagapsh group, hopes that Russia will not use force, seeing that “Abkhazia cannot be a threat to Russia.”

But he believes Russia would find it hard to impose its will. The elections were “the choice of a people who want to live in peace. And nobody can take this from us.” In his view, Khajimba does not have enough support to use violence, noting that about 80 percent of the population is behind Bagapsh.

“The army is saying that it is neutral,” he adds, though technically the army continues to take its orders from Ardzinba. Lakarbaia claims that 80 percent of the Interior Ministry and 90 percent of reservists support Bagapsh.

And if Russia did unseat Bagapsh, his supporters are prepared to respond with acts of civil disobedience.

For the time being, though, Bagapsh’s supporters are more concerned with ensuring that the inauguration takes place without any incidents that could provide Russia with a pretext to become involved.

Editor’s Note: Theresa Freese is a freelance journalist and political analyst who has been conducting research on unresolved conflicts in the south Caucasus since September 2003.