EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Tehran Buys Itself More Time from U.S. Pressure

EURASIA INSIGHT

TEHRAN BUYS ITSELF MORE TIME FROM U.S. PRESSURE
Erich Marquardt 12/07/04
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from PINR

Tehran’s announcement on November 14 that it would fully suspend all uranium enrichment-related programs has damaged the ability of the United States to push for United Nations economic sanctions on the country. The United States, which considers the policies of the regime in Tehran to be against U.S. interests, has pushed for measures that will weaken the power and influence of the Iranian government. The ultimate goal of the Bush administration is to replace the regime in Tehran with one more favorable to U.S. interests.

Brief History of Iran’s Nuclear Research Program

While impossible to confirm, there is a high probability that the leadership in Tehran is attempting to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. By achieving a nuclear weapons capability, Iran would be better insulated from foreign threats and this capability would help to stabilize its regional power. While a nuclear-armed Iran would assist in securing Iranian interests, it would be a dangerous development for the interests of the United States and Israel -- two allies that cooperate to preserve the present balance of power in the Middle East.

If Iran were not attempting to acquire nuclear weapons immediately, it is at least clear that the country is attempting to control the nuclear fuel cycle, an important step necessary for any future attempts at developing nuclear arms. As Hassan Rohani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, explained, "We want to be recognized as a member of the nuclear club, that means Iran be recognized as a country having the nuclear fuel cycle, and enriching uranium. This is very difficult for the world to accept." Rohani continued, outlining Iran’s agenda, "We have two goals ahead of us that we must achieve. One is closing Iran’s nuclear dossier with the I.A.E.A. and bringing the board of governors to take it out of their agenda, and the other is to have Iran recognized globally as a nuclear country."

Tehran’s Decision to Fully Suspend its Uranium Enrichment Programs

Tehran’s November 14 decision to fully suspend its uranium enrichment-related programs comes in the face of mounting pressure by the United States to refer the question of Iran’s nuclear research program to the United Nations Security Council for the desired outcome of instituting international economic sanctions on the country. The Bush administration’s foreign policy strategy in dealing with Tehran has been to convince the three European Union countries of Great Britain, France and Germany to help Washington move the issue to the Security Council.

The European states have been reluctant to pressure Iran since they share good trade relations with the country and do not perceive it to be the same threat as does the United States. Furthermore, the Europeans are not part of the U.S.-Israeli alliance that aims to preserve the present balance of power in the region; the Europeans are far more interested in establishing strong trade ties in the Near East.

Therefore, the Europeans have remained hesitant to the idea of placing international economic sanctions on Iran, while Russia and China -- two states that would hold a veto over any proposed resolution -- are brutally opposed to that outcome. Indeed, Russia has been the very country assisting Iran to build the nuclear reactors that could give it the ability to develop nuclear weapons. While it is possible for the United States and the three European Union countries to bypass the U.N. and place multiparty economic sanctions on Iran, it is highly doubtful that the Europeans are willing to do this.

Nevertheless, the European states have called for more transparency in Iran’s nuclear research program. Because so many questions about Iran’s nuclear program remain, the United States has successfully used the Europeans to push Iran toward a settlement involving the suspension of its uranium enrichment-related activities. Even though Iran had made repeated comments that it would not give up its quest to enrich uranium regardless of the pressure it received, when it came down to the breaking point, Tehran decided to comply with European demands by suspending its uranium enrichment-related programs. While the suspension is only temporary, it is intended to give the European states negotiating power in relaxing Washington’s tone on the issue.

For example, shortly after the announcement, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw announced, "We believe that the conclusion of this agreement can both allow for confidence-building in respect of Iran’s nuclear program and represent a significant development in relations between Europe and Iran." Shortly after Straw’s statement, the I.A.E.A. released a report that said, "All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities (such as weapons). The Agency is, however, not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran."

The statement by the I.A.E.A., and the positive endorsement by Great Britain, will make it highly unlikely that the United States will be able to push the issue to the U.N. Security Council for vote on possible sanctions.

Iran Follows Established Pattern of Evasion

Iran’s present course follows an established pattern of evasion. It was only one year ago in October that an almost identical situation occurred. On October 21, 2003, the countries of Great Britain, France and Germany negotiated with Tehran to place an extra protocol on its signed copy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allowing for more intrusive inspections by the I.A.E.A. and placing into effect a temporary halt on all uranium enrichment activities inside Iran.

At the time, it was clear that Tehran agreed to the additional protocol not because it planned on giving up its uranium enrichment programs, but because it considered signing the protocol to be the best available route toward the completion of those programs. By complying with the I.A.E.A.’s demands, and by forging a compromise with London, Paris and Berlin, Tehran hoped to secure greater assistance from trade partners in the form of modern technology, and hoped to insulate itself from aggressive U.S. policy. Outside support would also help Tehran build the necessary infrastructure to increase the country’s economic and military stability -- a path that it must follow due to the regional threats it faces.

Shortly after the decision in October 2003, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi made a statement highlighting Iran’s motivations behind complying with the European demands: "We suspended uranium enrichment voluntarily and temporarily. Later, when our relations with the I.A.E.A. return to normal, we will definitely resume enrichment." Early in 2004, Kharrazi continued this line, arguing that "it’s our legitimate right to enrich uranium."

Hassan Rohani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, also made a statement during this time, explaining how Tehran complied with the additional protocol only because it considered it the best route toward the country’s goal of controlling the nuclear fuel cycle. Rohani explained that Tehran agreed to a compromise with the three European states because "the pressures applied on Iran were so great that most of the world’s leading industrial nations conditioned trading with us to the signing of the protocol, as seen in the Azadegan oilfields that the Japanese refused to develop."

Also, by not compromising with the main European Union states, there would be a smaller chance that the Europeans would be able to restrain the United States’ aggressive foreign policy strategy. Rohani admitted as much, warning that had Tehran failed to comply with the I.A.E.A., "it would face the same fate as Iraq." Indeed, the threat that the United States poses to Iran is very real, and is one of the driving factors behind Iran’s possible quest for nuclear weapons.

Now, in November 2004, Iran has once again agreed to suspend uranium enrichment programs -- this time also agreeing to fully suspend all enrichment-related activities -- but has done so for the same reason offered in October 2003. In the words of Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi in November 2004, "Iran’s acceptance of suspension is a political decision, not an obligation," adding that the suspension was "the best decision under the current circumstances." Rowhani further emphasized this, telling reporters, "We should see whether Iran’s nuclear dossier is likely to be closed. Then we shall make judgment in December."

Washington’s dissatisfaction with this result is evident in the statement made by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who told CNN television on November 23, "It is still just in the eyes of the Iranians, a suspension. A suspension means they can turn it back on at any time. We want it turned off permanently."

Conclusion

While Iran’s recent decision highlights the success of the United States to push the Europeans to force Iran to comply with certain demands, the outcome is far from being ideal for the United States. The question of Iran’s nuclear program has not been resolved and Tehran has managed to buy more time before it is forced to either declare itself a nuclear power or to give up its desire to enrich uranium. The Europeans have been quick to support Iran’s limited concessions and have shown very little regard for Washington’s tact.

Therefore, the situation has not yet reached a breaking point. While the United States has managed to coax the Europeans into placing more pressure on Iran, Tehran has simply followed its past tactics of evasion, offering limited concessions to the Europeans, but enough to weaken Washington’s ability to point Iran out as an aggressor and as a threat to the international community. It is now up to the Bush administration to respond to Iran’s latest posturing. Its choice of action will be interesting considering the Bush cabinet is undergoing a major overhaul in light of Bush’s reelection, the first sign being the resignation of Secretary of State Colin Powell.

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