EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - The Role of Iran and Afghanistan in US-Russian Relations

EURASIA INSIGHT

THE ROLE OF IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN IN US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
3/06/09
A EurasiaNet commentary by Mark N. Katz

The Obama administration has a very different vision from the Bush administration about what American foreign policy interests are. The Obama administration, though, inherits several of the Bush administration’s concerns about Russia.

These shared concerns include: Russia’s increasing authoritarianism; the fear that Russia is attempting to exploit European dependency on Russian gas for political leverage; Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion; Russia’s recent use of force against Georgia and the prospect that its success there will lead to similar actions elsewhere (especially Crimea); Russia’s grudging cooperation with the United States and the EU-3 on the Iranian nuclear issue; and Russia’s encouragement of Kyrgyzstan’s expulsion of US forces from Manas air base. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Many other concerns could also be mentioned.

The Putin/Medvedev regime, for its part, has concerns about US intentions. Moscow’s concerns about America are often the reciprocal of Washington’s concerns about Russia: Moscow wishes, for example, that Washington and Brussels would practice "non-interference in Russia’s internal affairs" -- i.e., simply accept and do business with the Putin/Medvedev regime and not concern themselves with democracy and human rights in Russia.

In addition, the Kremlin wants to retain its dominant position as the chief energy supplier for Western Europe, and seeks to stop NATO’s eastward expansion. It likewise wants Central Asia to be informally recognized as being in its "sphere of influence."

Moscow’s main problem with the United States, though, is that unlike during the Cold War, Russia has not been Washington’s main foreign policy concern -- especially since the September 11 terrorist tragedy. Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the "War on Terror" in general remain Washington’s top priority these days.

By contrast, Moscow continues to see America as its main foreign policy challenge. But Russia also faces other challenges. And some of these are ones that Moscow really cannot deal with on its own, and thus needs to act in concert with Washington.

This has led to Moscow pursuing contradictory and confusing foreign policy goals in some instances. Iran and Afghanistan are cases in point.

Concerning Iran, Moscow has taken advantage of Iranian-American hostility to improve Russian-Iranian relations. Moscow has provided crucial assistance to the Iranian atomic energy program, sold arms to Tehran, and (with China) has worked to delay and soften US and EU-3 proposals for UN Security Council sanctions against Iran.

Iran, though, has proven to be a difficult -- even ungrateful -- partner for Russia. Tehran has refused to accept Putin’s various proposals for resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis, under which Russia would serve as the supplier of enriched uranium for the Iranian atomic energy program. Tehran insists that it will enrich at least some of its own uranium -- which Russia, along with the West, fears could lead to Iran developing nuclear weapons.

In addition, while Moscow does not want the United States or Israel to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, it does not want to sell the S-300 air defense system that Tehran wants. Such advanced systems have could potentially help minimize the damage done by air strikes. Moscow’s reluctance is partly the product of worries that Iranian possession of the S-300 systems will embolden Tehran to accelerate efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and partly because Moscow does not want to harm the close cooperation that has developed between Russia and Israel, especially in the security field.

Finally, while Moscow fears the consequences of a conflict potentially involving Iran, Israel and/or the United States, Moscow also fears the consequences of an Iranian-American rapprochement. Moscow specifically worries that a US-Iranian thaw could lead to: Iran buying arms and nuclear technology from the United States instead of Russia; America approving and helping build pipeline routes for Caspian Basin oil and gas through Iran (which will result in declining transit revenues as well as influence for Russia in this region); and America needing Russia even less than it does now for "dealing with Iran."

As for Afghanistan, Moscow is greatly concerned about the growth of US influence in Central Asia, and continues to work to minimize, if not eliminate the American presence.

But Moscow also fears the possible spread of Islamic radicalism to Central Asia. Not only would this challenge Russia’s ability to maintain a sphere of influence there, but could also spill over into the Muslim regions of Russia itself. The fear of this was part of Russian political supremo Vladimir Putin’s motivation both for supporting the American-led intervention in Afghanistan that began in late 2001, and for allowing Washington to establish military bases in Central Asia. Moscow understands that the US/NATO military presence in Afghanistan very much serves to protect Russian interests in Central Asia.

These conflicting motives have led to conflicting policies recently.

The US/NATO supply lines through Pakistan to Afghanistan have come under increasing attack. Russia has responded to this by allowing the United States and NATO to increase the amount of "non-lethal" supplies they ship through Russia (and Central Asia) into Afghanistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

But after Uzbekistan closed down a US air base at Karshi-Khanabad in 2005, Moscow began squeezing Kyrgyzstan to expel American troops from Manas. It appears now that the Kyrgyz government definitely intends to do this.

Evicting the Americans from Manas would serve Moscow’s goal of reducing US influence in Central Asia. But since Manas plays an important role in the US/NATO effort to combat Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan, closing this base may only serve to strengthen the latter.

Moscow, then, must solve a dilemma: It does not want Washington to have a strong position in Central Asia, but does not want the Americans to be weak in Afghanistan. The more successful the Kremlin is in promoting the former aim, the more it undercuts the latter.

Putin has attempted to sway Washington’s actions by opposing the United States on various issues but then offering to cooperate with US leaders on selected issues, in return for American concessions in other areas. Putin, for example, has openly hinted that Washington’s acceptance of the result of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict would lead to greater Russian cooperation with the Washington vis-à-vis Iran.

Russian officials also intimated that if Washington "asked nicely," Moscow might be willing to use its influence to persuade the Kyrgyz government to reverse its Manas base decision -- in return, of course, for something like a US commitment to abandon planned ballistic missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The Obama administration, though, does not want to be seen as giving in to Russian pressure since this would only provide support for Republican charges that it is "soft" on national security. US officials also realize that the Kremlin often views compromise as an invitation to further mischief. In addition, no American administration -- whether Democrat or Republican -- would be willing to make serious concessions to Moscow in order to obtain its cooperation on what Washington regards as their common goals.

Both the United States and Russia want to have a good bilateral relationship. They have important common interests, including common opposition to Islamic radicalism. But as during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era up to now, differences over third countries, including Iran and Afghanistan, are likely to continue bedeviling Russian-American ties.

Editor's Note: Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. This commentary is an abridged version of a presentation made by Katz at the 25th annual defense seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, held in February in Ottawa, Canada.