Afghanistan: Talking to the Taliban Unlikely to Succeed at Present

The Obama administration has inherited a war that is going badly in Afghanistan. Many voices -- including the Karzai government in Kabul, pro-Obama foreign policy advisers, and even President Barack Obama himself -- have suggested that now may be the time to talk with the Taliban. Doing so, they argue, could take advantage of divisions among the Taliban, and "peel off" moderates from the extremists within its ranks. But while "talking to the rebels" has served to defuse insurgencies in other countries (including recently in Iraq), it is doubtful that this strategy can work with the Taliban -- at least, not at present.

In order for talking to the rebels to succeed, there have to be strong incentives for a significant portion of the rebels to defect to what is often an unpopular government that is being backed up by an unpopular foreign presence. The fact that the Bush administration succeeded in converting Iraq's Sunni tribes from enemies into allies of US forces offers proof that insurgents are co-optable. But the Iraqi case is very different from the Afghan one.

The reason why Iraq's Sunni tribes were willing to be wooed was because at the height of the Iraqi insurgency, when US troops appeared to be losing the war, al Qaeda in Iraq and other foreign jihadis -- filled with hubris by what they saw as their impending victory -- turned against the Sunni tribes for being insufficiently Islamic. In so doing, the jihadis broke up a united front against foreign occupation. While the United States was willing and able to exploit this division between the Iraqi Sunni tribes on the one hand and the foreign jihadis on the other, Washington did not create this division. Had it not arisen, the war in Iraq may not have gone nearly as well for American forces and its allies as it has recently.

And, of course, al Qaeda in Iraq and the foreign jihadis in general have not defected to the US-backed side. Nor are they likely to. America's working with the Sunni tribes and other allied forces in Iraq, though, has served to weaken the jihadis greatly. Finally, even though they face less of a threat from the jihadis, the Sunni tribes still have a strong incentive to cooperate with American forces: The Sunnis are eager for the United States to take action that moderates how Iraqi Shi'as -- who dominate the US-backed government in Baghdad -- behave toward them.

The problem for the United States in applying the Iraqi model to Afghanistan is that a key element is lacking. While Iraq's Sunni tribes saw al Qaeda in Iraq and similar movements as dominated by outsiders (i.e., non-Iraqis), the Taliban are drawn largely from the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Taliban, then, are not seen as outsiders by many Afghans, but are viewed an indigenous movement. Pashtuns in particular see the Taliban as their champions, not as a threat. The sharp split between indigenous tribesmen and foreign jihadis that the United States was able to exploit in Iraq does not exist in Afghanistan.

Some have suggested, though, that there might be other divisions that can be exploited -- such as one between the "fundamentalists" who cannot be won over and the "reconcilables" who can -- perhaps with money. But as Cynthia McClintock observed in her book, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America (1998), a revolutionary movement with access to drug money, and one that pays its foot soldiers more than the government can offer, is not just difficult to secure defections from, but also to prevent defections to.

Leadership struggles within an insurgent movement can result in the losers defecting to the government -- sometimes taking a significant number of men with them. Whatever their differences, though, nothing like this appears likely to occur within the current Taliban leadership structure.

Seizing its top leader can have a devastating impact on an insurgent movement -- both through removing the person with the most knowledge of its operations, as well as precipitating a power struggle over who will succeed him. Capturing -- not killing -- the top leader can also undermine an insurgent movement if this person, who previously sent thousands of foot soldiers to their deaths, confesses all he knows to save his own skin.

On the other hand, seizing the top leader can either have no impact whatsoever if he has delegated authority and the leadership remains united, or worse, turn him into a martyr who inspires even more to join the movement if he is killed in what can be portrayed as heroic circumstances. While the urge to remove Mullah Omar from the leadership of the Taliban is understandable, this is something that can backfire badly if mishandled. Of course, these considerations are moot unless and until the United States, or its allies manage to find him.

In short, talking to the Taliban in the hope of exploiting divisions within it is only likely to succeed if and when those divisions have already emerged. Simply talking, though, cannot be counted upon to create divisions within the Taliban. There is even a danger that the Taliban may be able to use talks to turn the tables on Washington by exposing and exploiting differences among the United States, other NATO members, as well as Afghan, and Pakistani governments.