EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Azerbaijan: Russian 2008 Blitz against Georgia Eroded Ardor for NATO and EU in Baku

EURASIA INSIGHT

AZERBAIJAN: RUSSIAN 2008 BLITZ AGAINST GEORGIA ERODED ARDOR FOR NATO AND EU IN BAKU - EXPERT
4/09/09

The Georgia-Russia war last August has rendered Azerbaijan more wary of Russia and less likely to start a military conflict over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, according to a government-affiliated analyst. The Russian military’s performance in Georgia has also prompted a shift in public attitudes in Azerbaijan about the benefits of NATO cooperation, the expert added.

Baku was thrust into a difficult situation by the August war because public opinion and government policy were at odds, said Anar Valiyev, an analyst with the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Public opinion in Azerbaijan was strongly on the side of the Georgians, because people felt that Georgia’s struggle to recover its lost territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is similar to Azerbaijan’s attempt to regain Karabakh, Valiyev said. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

However, the government in Baku was disinclined to publicly support Georgia in the conflict because of a fear of angering Russia, Valiyev said. "If it was up to the government, the government wouldn’t do anything. But the pressure from the people, from the public forced the government to say something concerning the Georgia crisis, that they support territorial integrity," he said.

Valiyev spoke April 6 at a conference in Washington, DC, in a panel called "Internal Political Shifts in Azerbaijan and Ukraine in the Wake of the War."

The war’s outcome -- which left Russian troops on Georgian soil and prompted Moscow to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- affected how the public sees Azerbaijan’s geopolitical orientation. "The war significantly changed perceptions in Azerbaijan of Russia and the United States," Valiyev said. In particular, support for NATO has dropped.

In 2007, 58 percent of Azerbaijani citizens supported NATO membership, 35 percent were neutral and 6 percent opposed joining the alliance, according to public opinion data from the Caucasus Research Resource Center. After the war, only 48 percent supported NATO membership and 44 percent were neutral. (A similar effect was seen in Armenia, while in Georgia support for NATO membership did not significantly change, according to the CRRC data.) Similarly, faith in international institutions like the United Nations and European Union also dropped noticeably after the Georgia-Russia war.

A large part of the reason for that shift is fear of Russia, Valiyev maintained. Most analysts in Baku interpreted the conflict as "a war of ideologies," he added. "Because Georgia and Ukraine have ’orange’ or ’unmanaged’ democracies, that goes against the interests of the Russian government and that was the main reason for the Russian government to start this conflict [in Georgia]."

The outcome of the Russian-Georgian fighting produced no significant changes in attitude among Azerbaijani political institutions or parties because the opposition in Baku is so marginalized, Valiyev said. But within the government, the position of those who prefer economic tools to military methods as the primary means for recovering Karabakh gained the upper hand in internal policy debates, he said.

"If Georgia had succeeded to bring back South Ossetia and Abkhazia back to its own sovereign territory, Azerbaijan would have a really strong case to put forward before the international community on the Karabakh issue," Valiyev said. "Unfortunately, the defeat of the Georgians in South Ossetia disheartened many people in Azerbaijan. And it also helped to tone down the voices of the ’war hawks,’ who were hoping that a Georgian victory would help them to strengthen their position inside the Azerbaijan government."

"The war brought back the old fear that the Russians are coming back. And people started to believe that we won’t be able to solve the Karabakh conflict without Russian involvement, so we have to take into consideration Russian involvement," he added. "What would happen if Russia got involved in the conflict? Would we have enough forces to fight Karabakh, the Russians and the Armenians all together? So the perception has changed, people are becoming more cautious."

This has been seen, for example, in the declining influence of GUAM, the alliance of pro-western post-Soviet states Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Without a large power supporting GUAM, Azerbaijan is disinclined to become closely involved in the organization. "It’s a fear of the Russians," Valiyev said.