With one month to go before Iran's June 12 presidential election, incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's reelection chances seem high. But his candidacy is proving so polarizing that the election campaign could bring about lasting changes to Iran's political landscape.
A strange situation has emerged this election cycle, in which a significant number of mainstream conservatives are quietly rooting for reformists during the election campaign. The reason why is found in Ahmadinejad's management style. Over the course of his first term, the incumbent has alienated many conservative factions, such as traditionalist clerics, who feel he has ignored their interests or even encroached on them. Many erstwhile presidential allies say they now feel shut out of the decision-making process. And some go so far as to question Ahmadinejad's mental fitness for the job, citing his brinksmanship on the issue of Iran's nuclear program, as well as his mishandling of economic affairs.
Ordinarily, these dissident-conservative elements, which happen to constitute a majority in the conservative movement, would have tried to field a credible candidate to challenge Ahmadinejad. But to everyone's surprise, they have not done so. This is largely because Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has thrown his full support behind Ahmadinejad, and has taken steps to enforce solidarity among conservative factions. The incumbent is also receiving unstinting support from another key conservative institution - the Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Speaking live on television May 12, Ayatollah Khamenei virtually endorsed Ahmadinejad. Although he did not mention the incumbent by name, it was clear to all listeners who the Supreme Leader was referring to. "We need to elect an official who is a man of the people, who [lives] a modest life," Ayatollah Khamenei said.
Ayatollah Khamenei's unusual foray into domestic politics has succeeded in suppressing overt challenges to Ahmadinejad's candidacy from among most conservative factions. It is telling that of the nine prominent conservatives who, in late 2008, started to assemble campaign organizations, only one - Mohsen Rezai - has registered to contest the election. According to hard-line websites, another potential candidate, Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, was specifically told not to enter the race. Ghalibaf enjoys broad popularity among Tehran residents and is a former high-ranking officer in the Revolutionary Guards. Thus, he possessed the support base and credentials that could have made him a strong presidential challenger to Ahmadinejad.
Unable to run a strong candidate, and effectively barred from publicly criticizing government policy, some disgruntled conservatives have taken to cheering for reformist candidates, who have used the campaign so far to repeatedly skewer Ahmadinejad's performance. There are two reformist candidates running against Ahmadinejad: former parliamentary speaker Mehdi Karoubi and former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi. While neither candidate feels confident in his ability to defeat Ahmadinejad on June 12, they are skillfully using the campaign to air long-suppressed grievances. "What is coming out of their (Karoubi's and Mousavi's) electoral campaigns has not been heard in Iran in nearly four years," said a commentary published recently in the Etemad newspaper.
Despite heavy censorship of state-controlled radio and television, Karoubi and Mousavi, through their criticism of Ahmadinejad, seem to have altered the terms of public discourse in Iran. Ahmadinejad of late has found himself in the unusual position of having to defend his conduct. For instance, last month, both candidates took a strong stance against Ahmadinejad's highly controversial performance in the Anti-Racism Conference in Geneva, during which dozens of participants walked out of the meeting in protest of the Iranian leader's derogatory comments about Israel. Karoubi called Ahmadinejad's participation "totally misguided and against the country's national interest." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Publicly, conservative enemies of Ahmadinejad have declined to join in the criticism of the president's behavior. But privately, according to many insiders, several had expressed satisfaction with the reformists' attacks.
Ahmadinejad has also found himself under pressure on domestic issues, including the propriety of imposing death sentences on minors for criminal offenses. On April 28, a newspaper with close ties to Karoubi, Etemad Meli, published a commentary under a blazing headline: "Stop the Execution of Children." The commentary succeeded in stirring sufficient controversy that the head of the country's judiciary, Ayatollah Seyed Mahmood Shahroodi, ordered a review of the practice.
Having been on opposite sides of the political fence for so long, dissident conservatives and reformists are reluctant to publicly parade any tactical alliance against Ahmadinejad. An open association between them could have damaging political consequences for both. In the reformists' case, it would drive away core constituencies, in particular members of Iran's middle class and young students. In the conservatives' case, any clear link to reformists could be seen as a political kiss of death. There are some exceptions, such as a small group called Conservatives for Mousavi, but these cross-over groups are few and far in between.
Even so, reformists and dissident conservatives are maintaining regular contact, and occasionally are sending important, though discreet, public signals of their sentiments. For instance, in a highly symbolic gesture in April, a prominent rightist cleric, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, a failed presidential candidate himself in 1997, had his younger brother represent Mousavi in the northern province of Mazandaran. Similarly, last April, Ghalibaf, the Tehran mayor, had his deputy, Mohammad Reza Vaez Taghavi, resign from his post to work full-time for Mousavi.
For their part, both Mousavi and Karoubi have shown understanding for mainstream conservative concerns. For instance, to the surprise of many, Mousavi on May 9 endorsed the concept of Velayat-e Faquih, which forms the basis of Iran's theocracy. First formulated in a 1970 book written by the Islamic Republic of Iran's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the concept of Velayat-e Faquih calls for a respected Islamic jurist to serve as the protector, or guardian, of religious values in the political process. In practice, the concept underpins the office of the Supreme Leader. What made Mousavi's announcement so surprising is the fact that he and the incumbent Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, are bitter personal enemies.
The dalliance between dissident conservatives and reformists may not prevent Ahmadinejad from winning reelection, but it could end up changing the political dynamic in Iran. Reformists are trying to chip away at Ahmadinejad's support among ardently pious Iranians, and with the tacit assistance of dissident conservatives, they may make inroads that can perhaps restrain the Iranian president during a second term. It could also set the stage for change in the country's political direction in the 2013 presidential election.
Editor's note:
Kamal Nazer Yasin is a pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian affairs.
