The leading presidential challenger, Mir Hussein Mousavi, appears to be gaining a head of steam leading up to Iran's election on June 12. Even though some polls now show Mousavi to be leading the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, some experts in Tehran maintain that political change in Tehran is unlikely. Some powerful forces in Iranian politics are unwilling to see Ahmadinejad lose.
With just over a week to go until election day, Mousavi would appear to be a plausible winner. He has attracted exuberant crowds at recent rallies and has exploited Ahmadinejad's propensity to make bombastic statements, such as his repeated denials of the Holocaust, to cast doubts on the incumbent's competence. Mousavi and Ahmadinejad prepared to hold a televised debate on June 3 that could shape the final week of the campaign.
Although he has been pressed harder than he expected, Ahmadinejad does not appear to be worried about the prospect of electoral defeat. A major reason for this is the fact that he is backed unequivocally by some of Iran's most powerful institutions, including the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the Basij Militia. These key pillars of support for the Islamic Republic have sent signals that they will go to great lengths to prevent the need for ultra-conservative forces, represented by Ahmadinejad, to cede power to a moderate like Mousavi.
In efforts to boost Ahmadinejad's popularity, ultra-conservatives are likely to turn to the Basij Militia, a paramilitary organization that acts as an enforcer of Islamic orthodoxy. In 2005, Basij zealots, acting in conjunction with Revolutionary Guards, were said to mastermind irregularities -- including ballot-box stuffing and voter intimidation -- that ensured Ahmadinejad's rise to power. The reformist candidate who lost out to Ahmadinejad in the first round in 2005, Mehdi Karoubi, sarcastically referred to the Basij's role in that vote as "divine intervention."
According to an Iranian political scientist who spoke to EurasiaNet on the condition of anonymity, the Basij Militia's loyalty to ultra-conservatives could be the factor that determines this election's outcome. "Up until now, conservative and hard-line forces have been in full control of the militia." He added: "This has meant that outside the militia's civil and national defense roles, it has often been used as a political instrument."
Basij Militia members are set to play important roles on June 12. As in 2005, militia members will lead a get-out-the-vote initiative, called the Basirat Program. Plans call for each participating Basij member to conduct 10 or more individuals to polling stations, where they will presumably vote for Ahmadinejad. In addition, for the first time in 30 years, Basij members are now part of the local election supervisory boards. And according to a report by the influential website Tabnak, a host of pro-Ahmadinejad lieutenants are quietly making the rounds to Basij meetings and seminars to coordinate election-day activities.
The first outward sign that ultra-conservatives were intent on updating their 2005 techniques came last March, when the Revolutionary Guards' top commander, Gen. Ali Jafari, denounced reformist politicians as traitors while heaping praise on the Ahmadinejad administration. He also implied that the armed forces could not remain on the sidelines of the electoral process. Other top military figures also made public comments on the need to be active in politics.
Soon thereafter, Karoubi, who is making another presidential run this year, issued a widely circulated letter criticizing the generals for flouting a pronouncement made by the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, which forbids military leaders from meddling in politics. Karoubi also asserted statements made by Jafari and other generals violated Iranian laws.
In the ensuing controversy, some generals retreated, but Jafari remained defiant. Citing the fact that the Basij Militia's responsibilities include some civilian functions, such as providing security in neighborhoods and work places, Jafari insisted that its members take an active part in the campaign. "Those sections of the Basij which have non-military functions are not considered members of the armed forces," Jafari claimed. "These [militiamen] must participate in political matters related to the Revolution and make active and effective contributions to them." Underlying Jafari's statements was Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution, which states that the Revolutionary Guards are duty-bound "to safeguard the revolution and its achievements."
When it became clear that reformists lacked the political heft to keep the Basij Militia and Revolutionary Guards on the sidelines of the presidential race, they developed a new strategy designed to neutralize military meddling in the campaign. While it may be too late to sway the outcome of the 2009 vote, the changes being pursued by the reformists could permanently alter the rules of the political game that govern subsequent elections.
Rather than revile the Basij's involvement, Mousavi's campaign is now attempting to co-opt the militia. On May 14, former Revolutionary Guards commander Alireza Rashid, now a top pro-Mousavi activist, announced that the moderate candidate welcomed the participation of Basij in the election. Rashid added that Veterans for Mousavi, the group which he heads, had opened a Basij division in his organization.
By trying to divide the militia's loyalties, the moderate-reformists are hoping to mitigate its ability to influence elections. There have been some initial signs of encouragement on this front. Most importantly, the Basij Militia's second-in-command, Hossein Hamedani, welcomed Rashid's announcement. Conversely, prominent Ahmadinejad partisans have reacted with alarm. Commander Masood Jazayeri, head of the cultural and propaganda section of armed forces general staff, described the Mousavi campaign's initiative as a "dangerous precedent" that had to be resisted at all cost. Jazayeri called upon the Armed Forces Judicial Organization to respond "in strongest terms possible." According to the Iranian political scientist, Jazayeri's vitriolic reaction was a sign that the reformists' plan was working. "This is a belated move (with regard to the Basij), but it has the potential to change the known [political] dynamics permanently."
Editor's note:
Kamal Nazer Yasin is a pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian affairs.
