Afghanistan: The Challenges Facing the Next US Presidential Administration

During the US presidential campaign, both candidates have endorsed the idea of deploying more troops to Afghanistan to help the embattled country surmount its present stabilization challenges. While the candidates may think they are being generous with this offer, they would do well to take a hard look at the nature and details of the deployment, as well as how it would dovetail with a larger Afghan strategy that includes humanitarian relief, reconstruction programs and civil society development.

In Afghanistan there is no public demand for more troops, but rather growing scrutiny of military conduct. Indeed, an increasing number of Afghans seems to want the Afghan government to exert greater control over foreign troops in the country. Such a desire, of course, is not likely to be met. But it reflects building resentment among Afghans.

A major cause for the shifting attitudes is civilian casualties resulting from ongoing military operations. Foreign forces appear to be increasingly resorting to air strikes, resulting in a growing number of civilian deaths and injuries. Of the 1,500 civilian killed in 2007, the UN estimates that 629 were killed by pro-government elements, while 700 were attributed to anti-government elements. (The remainder could not be attributed conclusively to either side). Human Rights Watch noted in a September report that the number of civilian deaths "nearly tripled from 2006 to 2007, with recent deadly airstrikes exacerbating the problem and fuelling a public backlash." Most airstrike casualties were connected to missions carried out under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom -- the codename for the campaign carried out by US-led coalition forces -- rather than the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force, the rights group found.

The Afghan parliament and government have echoed increasing public anger at civilian deaths. The anger has been exacerbated by the seeming reluctance of US forces to grapple with the issue.

Seven years into the reconstruction of the country, Afghans are less tolerant of the presence of the international community and less forgiving about the inefficiencies of aid delivery. Despite figures of double-digit growth, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line is rising. So is food insecurity. While internationals may lament the corruption in Afghanistan, a survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan showed that 92 percent of Afghans would like international aid to be funnelled through their own government, warts and all.

To many Afghans it is inconceivable that the petty corruption of local officials is considered a greater crime than the hundreds of thousands of dollars paid in salary and expenses to expatriates -- not all of whom demonstrate a commensurate skill and capacity -- or when millions of dollars are absorbed by the sub-contracting process.

Afghans are growing increasingly disenchanted with their perceived second-class status in their own country. Afghans are paid a fraction of the salaries given to international experts, and it is disgruntling for well-educated locals to see foreign aid workers frequenting restaurants and shops that they themselves cannot afford. The Taliban have skilfully exploited this rising discontent as a force multiplier in their favor, a fact documented effectively by the International Crisis Group in its July report on Taliban propaganda.

As Afghanistan prepares for its own election cycle -- presidential elections are scheduled for 2009, with parliamentary elections to follow in 2010 -- it is likely that this resentment will become a rallying point for politicians and administrators alike. Anti-foreigner jingoism stands to increase in the coming months, and politicians will likely pander to the conservative sensibilities of many Afghans. There have been growing indications of this from President Hamid Karzai's administration. But the international community's response remains unclear. Increasing talk of "Afghan-led" projects or "Afghan culture" suggest that many members of the Western coalition, tiring of the long slog, are willing to abandon quietly their limited support to basic human rights and rule of law issues.

Indeed, the last few years have seen increasing compromises on issues related to women's rights, human rights and rule of law, while the international community pursues the chimera of "stability first."

The United States needs to undertake a hard-headed reassessment of the political realities in Afghanistan and address local concerns. Otherwise the incoming administration may find that its changes in strategy may be quickly overtaken by shifting realities on the ground.