EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Georgia: NATO Membership, Not MAP, Is the Goal

EURASIA INSIGHT

GEORGIA: NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT MAP, IS THE GOAL
Molly Corso 12/02/08

In a sharp reversal from earlier statements, Georgian officials are now playing down hopes that Georgia will receive a Membership Action Plan at the December 2-3 meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization foreign ministers in Brussels.

Since taking office in 2004, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had made receiving such a plan, known as MAP, a central goal for his administration. On November 20, in a veiled reference to Russia, Saakashvili warned that not granting Georgia an action plan -- the last step before full membership in the alliance -- would send "the wrong signal to the wrong people," Deutsche Welle reported.

With Georgia’s strongest allies in NATO now indicating that a pro-MAP decision may not occur at Brussels, Saakashvili’s closest supporters are reacting accordingly. In an interview with EurasiaNet, Nicholas Rurua, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, affirmed that Georgia is not fixated on receiving an action plan.

"MAP as such is nothing more than tough reforms, a long list of reforms that a country has to fulfill. It just sounds very sexy -- Membership Action Plan," Rurua said. "We don’t need . . . this kind of final result because it has already been decided in Bucharest. We don’t need MAP to ensure that we will get into NATO . . . because it has been decided. The political will has been expressed." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

At an April 2008 summit in the Romanian capital of Bucharest, NATO expressed a firm resolve that both Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become alliance members. According to Rurua, the most important task for Georgia is that it continues to prepare "technically" for NATO membership. "It is not a question of if, but when," he said. "[T]here are some technical requirements that probably Georgia needs to do more on."

Georgia’s "technical requirements" span nearly every part of the country’s development, from reforming the judiciary system to promoting government transparency. Georgia received its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2002 and was offered the next step -- Intensified Dialogue (ID) -- in 2006. Both the IPAP and ID are non-binding agreements between the alliance and Georgia that specify reforms that Georgia must complete in order to meet NATO standards.

Before the August war between Russia and Georgia, the Georgian military was considered one of the country’s IPAP/ID successes. Reforms had focused on training and the Defense Ministry’s structure. The country had also prepared its own Strategic Defense Review, a complex document that analyzes the country’s defense capabilities and identifies weaknesses.

Despite the good reviews, political analyst Tornike Sharashenidze, the former head of the Center for NATO in Georgia, noted that the disastrous August war highlighted major weaknesses in the Georgian military.

"I think it put a big question mark . . . [over] civil-military relations in the Georgian armed forces under the Ministry of Defense definitely," he said, noting that "personnel issues" in the armed forces have been a concern in the past, especially when the ministry lost scores of experienced officers under former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili.

But Sharashenidze contended that losing the war to Russia should not present any obstacles for Georgia’s NATO membership plans. "No NATO candidates except Georgia, had to fight in a war," he said. "Of course, there were problems, but I think many countries will have problems with this. It is war."

Irakli Menagarishvili, a former foreign minister, noted that NATO reforms were never intended to turn the Georgian army into a battle-ready machine capable of defeating Russia. Rather, he continued, the object of the reforms was to create a force that could fight against narrowly focused objectives alongside other NATO members.

"[W]e have to prepare our military machine for playing an acceptable role as a partner in the alliance - not fighting with Russia or another country," Menagarishvili said.

Military analyst Irakli Aladashvili noted that despite the reforms and NATO oversight, the Georgian government still made the same mistake as previous governments -- confusing new equipment with a new army.

The army still lacked a good combat strategy in its August war with Russia, Aladashvili said. "The Georgians were concentrated in [the South Ossetian capital of] Tskhinvali," he said. "They should have been on the side roads leading to [the northern South Ossetian town of] Java [if we were going to fight the Russian tanks]." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Rurua agreed that some "strategic rethinking" would likely take place after NATO members complete their post-war damage assessment of Georgia’s armed forces, but he added that "no one" has expressed any disappointment in the Georgian army’s wartime performance.

"Our military managed to protect our sovereignty," Rurua said. "It was impossible really to create a super-effective and super-modern military in five years. And whatever we have done is impressive because we have got very good reviews from NATO review teams."

Analyst Sharashenidze noted that the reform process is now taking second stage to the question of NATO’s own political will to accept Georgia into the alliance. "Georgia is more advanced in terms of development than Albania, but Georgia has to accept the reality that it is in a much more difficult position due to its location," he said. In the end, Sharashenidze said, it is "going to take time" for the military alliance to make up its mind.

Editor's Note: Molly Corso is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi.

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