In recent months, Russia has asserted itself in a geopolitical sense via its incursion into Georgia, its retaliatory threats against the Czech Republic and Poland connected with US intentions to deploy missile-defense systems in those two countries and a show of military support for Venezuela. The chief question that Western experts are wrestling with is: Are these moves the precursor to more aggressive Russian foreign and military policies generally? Or do they have more limited, opportunistic aims?
Moscow certainly chose its moment well -- when America is preoccupied with its interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the War on Terror generally -- in each of these instances to achieve specific aims at minimum risk.
In Georgia, Russia intervened to seize control over two territories -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- that it had mainly been in control of for many years anyway, and where the local population preferred Russian to Georgian rule. This was not the case for Moscow's intervention into Georgia proper, but Moscow's actions here were far more limited than they could have been. Russian forces, after all, did not overrun the entire country or forcibly attempt to oust President Mikheil Saakashvili's administration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At the same time, they have caused international displeasure by keeping troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and recognizing the two territories as independent states.
While Russian intervention in Georgia provoked criticism from the European Union and the United States, the conflict's limited nature -- combined with growing questions about Georgian President Saakashvili's actions at the outset of the conflict -- caused a decrease in enthusiasm among some European governments for Georgia's admission into NATO. This constitutes an important diplomatic gain for Russia.
Beyond Georgia, Moscow has threatened to aim missiles at Poland and the Czech Republic, and more recently to deploy missiles to Kaliningrad, if Warsaw and Prague go through with deployment of the US missile-defense systems (which would ostensibly be aimed at Iran). These threats may be aimed at encouraging the incoming Obama Administration to scuttle the planned deployment, or at exacerbating tensions between the US and important European audiences if Washington insists on going ahead with the plan. Either aim, of course, could be achieved without Moscow actually firing any of its missiles (which it is highly unlikely to do in any event).
Moscow's increased cooperation with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez can be seen as simply too good an opportunity for Russia to pass up. Moscow can make money selling arms to Venezuela, perhaps even more money from Chavez's willingness to allow Russian petroleum firms into Venezuela at the same time as he is pushing Western ones out, and retaliate for America's increased military activity in Moscow's vicinity by obtaining Russian military access in America's neighborhood.
It should be noted that all three of these moves (and others) are broadly supported by Russian public opinion.
In all these cases, Moscow has sought limited objectives, seeking significant diplomatic and domestic political gains at a low geopolitical cost, involving only limited risk. So far, Moscow has given no indication of a willingness to act outside of this low cost, low risk formula. It might well, though, undertake similar moves if it perceives that it can keep on relying on the low cost, low risk formula. Such moves could hypothetically involve regaining other territories on Russia's periphery that have a significant Russian population. Such areas include Crimea, Transdniestria, northern Kazakhstan, and possibly all of Belarus. Moscow also may threaten to aim its missiles at other countries contemplating military cooperation with the United States if it believes that having done so over the Bush administration's plan to deploy ballistic missile defenses to Poland and the Czech Republic yields (from Moscow's viewpoint) positive results. And if other anti-American governments in Latin America (and elsewhere) besides Venezuela are willing, Moscow may send naval contingents to pay visits to them -- or even establish naval or other military bases there.
The problem for Russia is that the initial success of the low cost, low risk mode of operation could create problems that policy makers in the Kremlin have not anticipated. For example, if Europe comes to see Abkhazia and South Ossetia not as isolated incidents that could have been avoided if President Saakashvili had acted with greater self-restraint, but as part of a larger pattern, this may result not just in heightened European fear of Russia, but also in a renewed European demand for American protection against it.
In addition, Hugo Chavez might not be a particularly reliable partner for Russia. If a lower oil price environment remains in effect, he might become so desperate for cash that he begins to treat Russian energy firms in the same arbitrary manner that he has treated Western ones. He may also be unable to pay for more Russian arms -- or perhaps even the ones he has already ordered. Allying with Chavez's shaky regime at a time when Russia's own energy income is taking a big hit will not turn out to be the profitable venture that Moscow initially hoped for. On the other hand, if petroleum prices rebound and the Russian-Venezuelan relationship increasingly appears to be an alliance, other Latin American countries -- particularly Brazil (which Moscow has sought to cultivate) -- may come to see Russia as more of a threat and thus seek American protection against it.
In other words, if Moscow continues to behave in the manner that it recently has done with such apparent success, it may well find that the costs and risks of doing so increase while the benefits decline. Moscow's recent moves, then, may end up being more of a threat to Russia's own interests than they are to American and Western ones.
Editor's note:
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.
