The International League for Human Rights recently released a report detailing government rights abuses in connection with the trial of Feliks Kulov, Kyrgyzstan’s leading political opposition figure and a former vice president and minister of state security in Kyrgyzstan. According to OSCE observer reports, opposition leaders, including Kulov and Danyar Usenov, were deprived of legitimate victory in Kyrgyzstan’s February parliamentary elections, due to government manipulation. Shortly after announcing that he would be a candidate in the October presidential election, Kulov was detained on March 22. He has been in custody since that time, and is currently being tried in a military court on charges related to abuse of power and forgery. The ILHR report criticized the government’s handling of the case, saying that the charges against Kulov "do not in any event appear to form a plausible basis for criminal law claims." The report also asserts that Kulov was detained improperly under Kyrgyz law and was denied proper access to legal representation. "The timing facts and circumstances of the investigation and prosecution … strongly suggests that the case was launched for political reasons," the ILHR report states. "These legal actions have been carefully coordinated for the purposes of discouraging the participation of viable opposition-oriented candidates in the electoral process." EurasiaNet interviewed ILHR President Scott Horton to examine the potential outcomes of the Kulov trial, as well as its impact on the democratic development of Kyrgyzstan. The text of the interview follows:

EurasiaNet: What does the Kulov case say about the state of democracy in Kyrgyzstan?

Horton: Kyrgyzstan has been up to this point the country where prospects for democracy were brightest … The Kulov case suggests that we really have to reassess the situation, and particularly pare back optimism about the prospects for democracy in this country. In particular what Kulov shows us is that this [Akayev-led] government will take extraordinary steps to strike against its opposition – to disqualify and remove its opposition. The tactics used in the Kulov case, and those that were used in other cases, including that of Danyar Usenov, are essentially identical to what has transpired in Kazakhstan during the last two to three years. So I think we are seeing a conscious application of a Kazakh strategy and policy in Kyrgyzstan.

EurasiaNet: What prompted the move against Kulov and others?

Horton: To me, it is very puzzling. … The government, and in particular president [Askar] Akayev, is relatively popular domestically. Most independent polling suggested that the president enjoyed strong support throughout the country and it thus seems reasonable to infer that candidates supporting the president would have done well in the [February parliamentary] elections. But authorities seem to have been afraid to take a risk. They decided to do a number of things – they simply dictated to local election officials what the results of the parliamentary elections would be. … Pro-government candidates were certified as the winners in areas where they did not win, where opposition candidates captured the most votes. … In addition, a decision was taken to strike out against the most prominent opposition figures, and that was principally designed to tarnish their reputation so that they would no longer be effective politicians on the national stage. Again, if we look at the case of Kazakhstan, there we saw the same sorts of steps being taken against the head of the National Republican Party, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, and several other major opposition figures. So there are close parallels of strategy in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

EurasiaNet: Do you have any information that Kazakhstan exerted pressure on Kyrgyzstan?

Horton: A number of people that I spoke with in the Kyrgyz government told me that they had been under instructions to do things, as they put it, "po Kazakhskii" – that is to follow Kazakh policies and strategies. Now is that because authorities in the Kyrgyz White House considered the Kazakh model to be a successful model, or is there some other reason, I do not know.

EurasiaNet: What are the options for Kulov?

Horton: Interestingly, an official in the presidential administration said recently that once the trial is finished, Kulov might be permitted to stand in the forthcoming presidential election. That statement struck me as quite bizarre considering all the things that are going on. … There is no doubt about the outcome of the trial. There is no pretense of impartiality being made by the court there. There is a question, however, as to what will be the sentence handed down, and how severe it will be. We have heard quite a range. But people in the government that we have spoken to expect a five-year sentence to be imposed. Then, our expectation is that there will be some sort of amnesty. The goal is to tarnish Kulov, damage his reputation, but if he is kept in prison for five years he could become more and more of a martyr, presenting the government with even a greater threat over time.

EurasiaNet: What are the chances for a fair presidential election in Kyrgyzstan?

Horton: There is no particular reason to closely monitor these elections. The major opposition candidates have been effectively been eliminated. There will still be opposition candidates, but it is hard to consider them as serious candidates, or view the election as a seriously contested election.

EurasiaNet: Can Western nations do anything to help get Kyrgyzstan back on a more democratic path?

Horton: I am rather encouraged by a number of statements that have already come out from Western nations about the Kulov trial. I am quite impressed with the way US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright handled herself on her recent trip to Central Asia, and the way in which she presented her position. The tougher issue is going to be -- how will this impact the provision of technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan? Will Western nations begin to put the brakes on assistance programs? My expectation is that there will be a reduction in the level of assistance to Kyrgyzstan. In part that is viewed as something already on the horizon because the major push in support of reform programs is over. The focus will probably shift to the OSCE. The OSCE will be expected to operate more critically and more effectively as an observer, and as a mechanism to support the development of civil society.

EurasiaNet: Will Western nations nevertheless retain interest in the region because of a variety of security issues, including Islamic radicalism and narcotics trafficking?

Horton: Again, if we look back to the Albright visit, we can probably see what kind of posture will be taken. To a certain extent, security concerns will be dealt with on a separate level from these other issues. There is a perception that the security threat that the region feels -- from Afghanistan in particular, from narcotics trafficking and from terrorism – is a legitimate threat, a legitimate concern, and there is going to be support given to all the governments of the region to address these threats. A key concern, of course, will be to make sure that that support is not channeled into repression of legitimate domestic political opposition.

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Posted July 24, 2000 © Eurasianet
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