asiaNet Q & A

EurasiaNet: Do you think the Taliban will be easy to oust?

Ghani: It depends what you mean by ousting them. If you mean [removing them from] a core series of governmental functions, yes. If you mean removing their control of territory as such, that's a different proposition. There is no political roadmap as to what would succeed them. Military action is proceeding in the absence of a political map and reconstruction map. And that would imply that, even if the Taliban's central leadership is eliminated, the second and third tier would have a territorial base. And a significant section of their top echelon – and their intelligence – are going to go underground to undermine the next government.

EurasiaNet: What are the potential pitfalls for US military operations?

Ghani: That they will take their own logic, become extended and become routine – like the 1991 Western campaign in Iraq. And that they would not take on a political and reconstruction logic that would win the Afghan population to the side of peace. [This] would give the Taliban the opportunity to pose as champions of the nation rather than as a minority.

EurasiaNet: Will US ground forces and a prolonged occupation be necessary to achieve state building aims?

Ghani: I hope not. Ground troops would be casting a very large shadow on the nation-building part of the effort. Reconstruction could proceed, but not nation-building. Nation-building has a symbolic part about identity. And given Afghan culture, a dependence on US ground troops would subvert the symbolic part.

EurasiaNet: What, then, is necessary for successful nation-building in Afghanistan?

Ghani: The following: first, a commitment to reconstruction. The best way is to create a trust fund to which everybody actually contributes in cash. We have a history of pledges made, and not honored, and there is an enormous amount of mistrust. A trust fund is necessary because organizations and institutions that would make use of [reconstruction aid] for the benefit of people do not exist. Corruption could become a major issue. This is not a problem you want to throw money at; you want to get accountable institutions. A trust fund would enable you to do this, because it would indicate that the international community has done its bit, and now it's up to Afghans and international civil society organizations.

The second part is this: no person or group [in Afghanistan] enjoys legitimacy, so arrangements can only be transitional. Legitimacy would be won through a process of demonstration that the role of government has changed from one of oppressing people to one of serving people. That requires consensus-building, and you cannot rush the building of consensus because each culture and society has its own mechanisms.

The third element, which is going to be extremely significant, is to learn from the experience of UN interventions in Cambodia, Kosovo and elsewhere. Large bureaucracies were parachuted with enormous differences in pay and orientation from local population, and you've got to avoid that at all costs. The next critical issue becomes a focus on building the capacity of Afghans who have been dispersed throughout the region and the globe. [You want them] to come together; so that building the economy is not dependent on the state. If you make the economy and voluntary organizations depend on the state alone for outflows, it's a recipe for patronage.

The other task, which is extremely important, is to get the voluntary sector organized and coordinated. There is enormous danger that the voluntary sector today will step in, and pull and push in very different directions. A whole series of cowboys with very little understanding of culture and its identity [could show up in Afghanistan and create problems].