ANALYST URGES POSTPONED PARLIAMENTARY VOTE IN GEORGIA
12/05/03
A Q&A with David Zurabishvili
Conducted by Giga Chikhladze and Irakly Chikhladze

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with Georgian presidential candidate Mikhail Saakashvili and other members of the interim government December 5. Rumsfeld underscored American vigilance against Russian opportunism in Georgia. A day earlier, state Security Minister Valeri Khaburdzania reported detaining a suspect in connection with the discovery of "about 200 kilograms of TNT" at a military base near the capital.

Saakashvili and his allies must manage simmering conflict with breakaway provinces, visibly fight corruption, and conduct legitimate elections on January 4. David Zurabishvili analyzes politics at Tbilisi’s Liberty Institute, a free-speech organization. He spoke with EurasiaNet about the new leaders’ advantages and challenges.

EurasiaNet: There is talk about the threat of counter-revolution in Georgia. Do you think this threat is real?
Zurabishvili: There is a problem of counter-revolutionary forces, [from groups that] until recently formed the ruling elite. These forces are few, and they lack popular support.

EurasiaNet: Could Georgian people change their attitude towards the new government before presidential or parliamentary elections?
Zurabishvili: There is not much time left before elections, and if the authorities do not make serious mistakes, people will not get disappointed. But the danger of popular disappointment surely exists. Particularly if you remember that the unified opposition in fact consists of two parties – Saakashvili’s National Movement and Zurab Zhvania’s Democrats. Interim president Nino Burjanadze belongs more to Zhvania’s than to Saakashvili’s party. She is well known, but she doesn’t have a team of her own. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives.]

Sometimes the interests of the three leaders drift apart. We already saw cases when top government posts were filled with relatives of the new leadership team. That was certainly corrected afterwards, but it shows that not everything is going smoothly in upper strata. Nevertheless, for the time being, [widespread] popular disappointment is improbable.

EurasiaNet: Do you think financial clans and oligarchs can significantly influence the interim government?
Zurabishvili: This is one of the hardest issues the new authority will have to cope with – to overcome the clan system, which existed during Shevardnadze’s tenure. I really do not know.

EurasiaNet: Can we expect fraud during the presidential election?
Zurabishvili: I doubt there will be incidents of this kind. I know the new Central Election Commission chairman Zurab Chiaberishvili quite well; he is an honest and hard-working person. This became clear when he ran the Fair Elections monitoring group. He will surely cope with the technical tasks of conducting the election. Plus, there will be virtually no tension, as Saakashvili will have no serious rival.

EurasiaNet: Can any real opposition emerge in the near future?
Zurabishvili: In parliamentary elections on November 2, real opposition was represented mainly by Saakashvili’s and Zhvania’s parties. The Labor, Industrialists and the New Rights parties found themselves out of favor. [For background on these parties, see the Eurasia Insight archive.]

By the way, this is an additional reason to put off the second parliamentary election. To my mind, we should hold these elections in spring, when we may see outlines of a new opposition. If we hold elections now, Democrats and Nationals will gain 100 percent of the vote. The Georgian political system needs a wider representation of political forces.

EurasiaNet: What are your thoughts about Igor Giorgadze, a former security chief who left Georgia in 1995 after charges of trying to kill Shevardnadze? He is running for president, even though he lives in Russia.
Zurabishvili: I doubt that his candidacy is in any way real. He is being sought by police. He would scarcely gain five percent of the vote. He is simply used in a crisis by Russian political circles.

EurasiaNet: What will happen if [breakaway region] Ajaria refuses to take part in presidential elections?
Zurabishvili: For a presidential election to be valid no less than 50 percent of the voters should cast their ballots. It does not matter what region. The parliamentary election is more complex, as the vote is to be held by regions.

It is hard to say what shape the settlement between Ajaria and the new government will take: Probably, some talks will be held with [Ajarian leader Aslan] Abashidze, though I do not think they will bring results. It is up to the central authority whether Abashidze will confront serious economic trouble. Tbilisi can easily arrange it. They could file criminal charges against Abashidze. Some reports surfaced recently about the transfer of large lots of smuggled goods through Ajaria. For sure, they can choose to start talks, and make some concessions, and then to demand concessions from him, and so forth. But finally, you will have to resort to tough measures.

EurasiaNet: But the current authority is not yet in a position to take such measures…
Zurabishvili: Not yet. You need time to consolidate the government structures, to implement reforms, to win international support in politics, as well as in the economic sphere.

EurasiaNet: Does Abashidze have levers in Russia to influence the latter’s policy towards Georgia?
Zurabishvili: Abashidze is often cast as pro-Russian. But in fact his policy is exclusively personal. He prefers to be on friendly terms with Russia because he maintains some old-standing ties to this country. Abashidze has no acquaintances in the United States, and he has no idea what American policy is all about. It is most likely that Russia will use Abashidze as a means of political pressure on Georgia.

EurasiaNet: Tedo Japaridze, the new Foreign Minister, claimed that the top priority of Georgian policy would be to establish normal relations with Russia. Is Georgia turning toward Russia?
Zurabishvili: I don’t think so. Georgian politicians always talk about maintaining good-neighbor relations with Russia. However, it does not depend solely on Georgia. Russia [may] yield to Abashidze and demand to extend military bases in Georgia another ten or 13 years. But if we take into account that Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov [witnessed the transfer of power without intervening], then we could take Japaridze’s words as a courtesy towards Russia. I think Georgia will retain its pro-Western orientation.

Russia always spoke against Georgia’s joining NATO and against integration of Georgia into European structures as well. The Russian government is now trying to find a common language with the new generation of Georgian politicians. They did not take them seriously until recently. Saakashvili and Zhvania do not behave as inconsistently as Shevardnadze did. The latter’s supposed guile was a source of intense irritation in Russia. Most likely, Russian-Georgian relations will become more clear and coherent.

EurasiaNet: Can we say that Shevardnadze’s resignation suited both the United States and Russia?
Zurabishvili: Yes, to some extent. Shevardnadze was never quite pro-American, or pro-Russian. When he heard no words of support, he realized that everybody abandoned him. He was just like King Lear.

Editor’s Note: Giga Chikhladze and Irakly Chikhladze are independent journalists in Tbilisi.

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Posted December 5, 2003 © Eurasianet
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