Vladimir Putin captured an outright majority in Russia’s March 26 presidential election, thus eliminating the need for a second round of voting. The election majority, although narrower than hoped for by Putin, nevertheless provides him with a mandate to press forward with a program based on the reestablishment of strong, centralized authority in Russia, and the restoration the country’s faded ‘great power’ status. Putin has revealed few details about precisely how his administration plans to realize its goals. The Central Eurasia Project spoke to Sergei Kovalev, Russia’s leading human rights activists, about his personal views on Russia’s ‘great power’ ambitions, and the potential impact on CIS states. [For background consult the Eurasia Insight Archives]. The CEP interviewed Kovalev last month in New York.

CEP: How, in your opinion, does Russia’s ‘great power’ ambitions influence the way Russia interacts with CIS countries, especially those in the Caucasus and Central Asia?

Kovalev: I believe there is no clearly formulated strategic standpoint on this. The role of Russia in politics of the CIS provinces is being dictated by the current situation in those countries, their current state of affairs. That doesn’t mean, however, that there are not constant factors influencing Russia’s position. Let’s recall the role Russia played in Abkhazia – a terrible, bloody role. When it comes to Georgia [today], on the one hand, Russia is ready to establish partnership relationships. On the other hand, it wants to keep its military bases there no matter what. Wherever it can, Russia is trying to maintain fragments of the Soviet power. Of course, it is easier for Russia to deal with Armenia – Armenia is interested in Russia’s help in its resistance to Azerbaijan. It is different with Georgia. No matter how much policymakers talk about recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity, no matter how much they insist that they are not interested in Abkhazia’s separation from Georgia, the old Soviet instincts keep working. …

As far as Central Asian countries are concerned, we maintain a friendship with them. In a way, we are kind of repeating [the maxim] that some American observers use concerning American foreign policy: ‘A particular leader may be a scoundrel, but at least he is OUR scoundrel." As a result, we are supporting those in Central Asia whose authority we believe to be relatively stable, irrespective of the fact of who they are. It is hard to overestimate Russia’s role in Central Asia – we brought Soviet power there, using blades and bayonets, and they still remember that only too well. Currently we are supporting repressive regimes for the sake of stability. … Look, does the situation in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or even in Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan even remotely remind one of democracy? In Soviet times there were virtually no political prisoners from Central Asia in labor camps, and at present there are hundreds of them in their native countries.

CEP: Do you believe Russia possesses the resources to quickly achieve [President Vladimir] Putin’s aim of restoring Russia’s great power status?

Kovalev: Does Russia want to recreate the Soviet Union to some extent? Does it want to dictate to the CIS what to do? Well, it has always wanted it, but this is something it can’t achieve. ... [It cannot do so] because although the republics of the former Soviet Union are grateful, albeit cautious, to accept the Russian aid, including military aid, they will not allow Russia to interfere in their internal affairs. And, by the way, they have been quite energetically, and, I would say, cynically forcing out ethnic Russian population from their countries. [See CEP Daily News Digest for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan]. They are very afraid of the Russian influence that could be gained locally through ethnic Russians.

CEP: Isn’t this a violation of human rights?

Kovalev: Certainly. But who thinks about human rights in Central Asia? For them it’s merely words.

CEP: How does the war in Chechnya influence relations between Russia and CIS states. Is Chechnya part of an attempt by Russia to reassert its authority over the CIS?

Kovalev: I believe that the war in Chechnya not only does not slow down the centrifugal forces, but, on the contrary, accelerates them. … It is a perfect lesson to all our neighbors and closest satellites – you’ve got to be wary of Russia. The best thing is to have independence from it. Now tell me please, why is Eastern Europe so anxious to join NATO? I can understand why they would want to join European Union, because this will give them economic benefits in the future. Why join NATO? They simply want to have a guarantee against the restoration of the socialist bloc.

CEP: Could you comment on what is happening inside the Russian Federation in this respect?

Kovelev: Inside the Russian Federation, there are distinct separatist moods in very many places. … In our federal structure we still hold on to the obsolete Soviet principles. The so-called vertical lines of power in a normal federal state cannot even exist. There exists a law that determines the sphere of competence, say, of the state and the US. No vertical lines of power will allow President [of the US] to dictate anything to the governor of the state if it is within the state’s sphere of responsibility. On the other hand, no governor of the state will allow himself to break federal law: that law is active on the whole territory. It is different with us. Even if they say that it is indeed this way, these are mere words, and we can give examples of horrible violations of federal legislation.

CEP: How do contemporary ideas concerning the ‘great power’ idea differ from the philosophy of national bolshevism, which helped guide the formation of the Soviet Union in the 1920s?

Kovalev: It is different in the way it manifests itself. What happens is people who think alike are the first to vilify each other. The toughest opponents usually belong to the same school. … I believe the problem is that many of those politicians who have been connected in public thinking with the word ‘democracy,’ are currently trying to become leading patriots, and attract the support of nationalistic, chauvinistic, great power mentality strata of the population. … As a result, we currently know of many democrats who, judging by their comments on the war in Chechnya, or on the pernicious influence of the West, cannot even be distinguished from communists…

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Posted March 27, 2000 ©Eurasianet
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	The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, politcal and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.