Outcome of Georgian-Russian Dialogue Unpredictable - Georgian Security Official

Geopolitical dilemmas loom over Georgia as the country prepares for parliamentary elections November 2. Georgian leaders continue to struggle to normalize relations with Russia. The two countries have haggled in recent weeks over such issues as Abkhazia and Chechen refugees. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Georgia's National Security Council Secretary Tedo Japaridze recently told EurasiaNet that the parliamentary elections are unlikely to produce a substantive shift in Georgian foreign policy. At the same time, Japaridze believes it is impossible to predict at this time how the Georgian-Russian normalization dialogue will end. The text of Japaridze's interview with EurasiaNet follows:

EurasiaNet: Could you review current Georgian-Russian relations? Is it possible to predict developments?
Japaridze: To come to the heart of the relations between Georgia and Russia, you have to take into account two fundamental and lasting trends. ... The first trend is due to the unprecedented speed of universal change, and the second is stimulated by the geographical expansion of these changes. I do not think that at present stage, after the Soviet collapse and the end of the bipolar world order, anybody can predict what outcome these developments will bring. ...

The normalization of relations between [Georgia and Russia] will depend upon policies that are able to correspond to new realities. The major and – until recently – most powerful nation [Russia] will have to overcome nostalgia for the past, and the smaller one [Georgia] should turn down its political romanticism. The first will have to submit to the principles of equality in its relations with the smaller countries. The second nation will have to master the art of the compromise.

The lack of strategy in Russian policy towards South Caucasus nations, including Georgia, – or let us say, the lack of policy based on cooperation and partnership -- demonstrates that this dilemma as still for from solution. The era when national interests were pursued at the expense of other (and especially neighboring) countries is a thing of the past. To reach rational compromises and establish close relations, you will have to observe to the maximum the principle of mutual interests.

We have to note the emergence of some positive trends in Russian behavior. At least, it appears so on the level of wishes and official declarations. ... [Nevertheless], the future of Georgian-Russian relations is too hard to predict. In any case, we must establish civilized relations, otherwise all vital issues will remain unsettled.

EurasiaNet: What is the current balance of forces in the South Caucasus? How strong are outside influences?
Japaridze: We face an interesting situation. The three South Caucasus nations are now passing through a difficult and painful transformation. ... The states that have vital interests in the region – I mean Russia, Turkey and Iran – are passing through the same thorny and fast transformation. So, processes of a similar kind are occurring both in the region and in the states that surround this region.

The Russian factor is by far the most important for Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. For quite a long time we were part of one country – the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. We are still much concerned about what is going on in Russia. We are interested in a well-developed, economically strong and democratic Russia, integrated into European structures.

Russia has its own interests in the Caucasus region, but an important nuance is that Russia has not yet decided what interests it should have. The ruling elites in Russia are struggling over the exact formulation of the country's interests in the South Caucasus, and are divided on the question of what should determine these interests; control and influence, on the one hand; or involvement in important regional projects, oil and energy development.

Russia has to choose the methods of promoting its interests, especially in Georgia. The policy of impulsive actions, to put it bluntly, will bring instability to Georgia, and will fetch only short-term results for Russia. Moreover, such an approach can have a boomerang effect. It has already happened in Abhazia. Certain groups in Russia tried hard to stoke the conflict and bring instability to Abkhazia. What has followed is the Chechen crisis. You have to understand – the Caucasus is a complex tangle of various historical, political, psychological, cultural and religious factors.

The alternative policy that Russia could assume is the building of long-term relations and starting a dialogue based on the principle of equality. You could say almost the same things about relations with Turkey. However, Turkey pursues a much more flexible regional policy, emphasizing economic interests. Russia has assumed a thornier course.

EurasiaNet: What do you think about the future of Tbilisi's relationship with Washington?
Japaridze: The relationship with Washington is based on independence and the progress that Georgia enjoys today. The future of Georgian-US relations will depend to a considerable extent upon the solution of several foreign policy issues and upon civil stability in Georgia. This is why Georgian citizens react so painfully when Russia tries to meddle in Georgia's internal affairs and destabilize the situation.

The prospects of Georgian-US relations include the issue of the future role of Russia. It serves as an additional factor in arranging Georgian-Russian relations. We are really perplexed by Russian irritation over Georgian foreign policy. Georgian officials have insisted, and I would like to stress it once again, that the Euro-Atlantic orientation of Georgia does not mean at all that we ignore Russian interests, or that any we are designing some actions against Russia. ...

EurasiaNet: Do you worry about potential obstacles to the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project?
Japaridze: The states that participate have invested lots of economic and geopolitical interest in this project. Naturally, guarantees have been provided to ensure the realization of the project, including security commitments. However, if you mean the negative stance of Russia, then one can say that such an obstacle does exist, though it would be a purely theoretical suggestion. Nevertheless, Russia does have levers that enabling it to foster a potential threat in [Georgian] areas of ethnic tension, where Georgian government control remains elusive.

The fact is that the project in already under way and, given that so many countries are interested in its implementation, any separate problems or issues caused by emotion will probably find their solution. The most important thing is that, in the long term, it would be unprofitable for Russia to use old-fashioned tactics of mounting obstacles to a project that is already underway.

EurasiaNet: Could the domestic struggle among various political forces during the parliamentary election campaign have any impact on Georgian foreign policy?
Japaridze: Georgian citizens have made their choice, and that is for Western values and Euro-Atlantic membership. Any party, and any authority that would ignore this choice of the people will have no future. Therefore, the core of the foreign policy course will not change whatever the results of the vote may be. The main question is somewhat different. We ought to ask who will ensure the implementation of the strategic interests of the country, and whether this course will be accomplished effectively.