EurasiaNet Recaps - Behind a Desk, Georgian Official Promises War on Corruption

RECAPS

BEHIND A DESK, GEORGIAN OFFICIAL PROMISES WAR ON CORRUPTION

Ken Stier 12/19/03

Like most of Georgia’s interim government, internal affairs minister Giorgi Baramidze is young, intense and passionate on the subject of Georgia’s integrity. He happens to have battle scars to prove his commitment. In 1992, when he could have invoked his status as a member of parliament to gain cushy officer status, Baramidze fought on the front lines as a private against separatists from the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Today he still holds the rank of private � and calls himself "very much a crazy guy."

In his new job, Baramidze is again repudiating privilege. Having notably decided not to finagle a military promotion � a move he calls "immoral" in light of Abkhazia’s success in declaring autonomy � he has become the country’s effective general in a long-promised war on corruption. He is also doing so from within a ministry that many consider the country’s most corrupt institution. Baramidze, 35, still professes to be stunned by the ministry’s rampant ethical lapses, but insists that reform is "manageable."

"The system was 100 percent built on corruption," he told EurasiaNet in December, in his first interview with a foreign journalist. "Every single relationship inside this ministry and all relations between the ministry and the public were based on corruption." He does not hesitate to spell out what this means. "This ministry was involved in the drug business, weapons smuggling, protecting criminals, extortion, kidnapping. This has to be changed completely, absolutely."

He slapped a ruler into his palm as he spoke. "God has now given us this chance, to fight not on the frontline, but in sitting in warm offices. But we have to realize this is a real war," he said. "We should not wait until somebody invades us to prove we are patriots." [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives.]

The ministry has more precise matters to prove. Observers say that, during Eduard Shevardnadze’s decade-plus presidency, it became a clearinghouse for unethical payoffs of all kinds. Kahka Targamadze, one of Shevardnadze’s longest serving interior ministers, resigned in autumn 2001 after massive public protest of his reported crimes. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives.] According to many, including American intelligence officials in Georgia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs powered the country’s sizable drug trafficking.

Baramidze tries to convey that everything about his ministry has changed. In his first three weeks on the job, he replaced more than 30 key personnel, from department and divisional chiefs to lower level commanders. He says he needs to make these changes with near-surgical care. "If we push too much at once, without taking account of the realities, this [ministry] itself will blow up," he said. He hinted, smiling, that some ministry employees might want to kill him.

The minister fielded at least a dozen calls during an hour-long interview. He handled five desktop landlines and two cell phones and always spoke in moderate, if sometimes brusque, tones.

Traditionally, interior ministers have worked amid more lavish perks. The job’s official salary reportedly hovered around 200 lari (less than $200) per month, though Baramidze estimates that his predecessors took at least $100,000 each month. Baramidze has disclosed all his outside investments, which he says support his two children. And as he cuts his own pay, he is seeking to slash corruption down through the ranks.

Baramidze says he aims to terminate as much as 30 percent of the bloated police force within a year. Every officer has had to witness blackmail and most have condoned it, say experts. Morale in the national guard sank in the spring of 2001, to triggering a mutiny. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives.] To create a virtuous police force might require funding from international friends and the government’s own augmented budget. Presently, official salaries range from 40 to about 100 dollars a month. To make police salaries payoff-resistant, Baramidze estimates that these salaries will have to improve as much as tenfold.

Baramidze also hopes foreign assistance will improve officers’ equipment and training. There is no modern forensic laboratory, almost no patrol cars, and a tiny percentage of officers have bulletproof vests. In many instances, police have had to buy their own uniforms, after paying thousands of dollars to get their job. The administration of American president George W. Bush has already agreed to post an adviser to the ministry. [For background on the view from Washington, see the Eurasia Insight archives.]

Baramidze is also forming a committee of more than 30 representatives from a variety of civic groups to vet officers being considered for promotions. "Those who can’t change themselves will leave, but those who can dedicate themselves to the country and stay away from corruption, can stay," Baramidze said.

Baramidze is eager to appeal to Georgians’ patriotism and aspiration. "If we really do our job properly this would tremendously influence how Georgia will develop further," he said. "This ministry influences all other ministries because we are charged with fighting crime everywhere � that why it’s so important we clean up ourselves and do it publicly."

This is a hazardous, slow course � even with reliable staff in place �and the minister insists he has no illusions about the possible sacrifices ahead. "Once you start the real fight against mob people, criminals, there is a huge danger you will be killed," he told EurasiaNet. "But I am ready, in order to safeguard this course, to continue our reforms."

For all his patience, Baramidze knows that he must earn the public’s trust. He says his immediate priority is keeping crime at "manageable" levels to ensure the necessary conditions for presidential elections January 4, before confronting major criminal gangs more aggressively.

Editor�s Note: Ken Stier is a freelance journalist who has reported from throughout the Caucasus and from Asia.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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