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KAZAKHSTAN’S CRITICAL CHOICE
Aldar Kusainov: 1/13/03
This is the fifth in a series of reports on opposition
movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Read
more about this series.
Introduction
At the end of 2001 and throughout 2002, Kazakhstan witnessed
a struggle between invigorated opposition groups, whose leaders
include disgruntled business executives, and an increasingly
authoritarian government. The ongoing battle, punctuated by
the recent convictions of two prominent opposition leaders
and a law on political parties that heavily favors pro-government
factions, will exert significant influence over the country’s
development.
Kazakhstan is perhaps unique in Central Asia in witnessing
the emergence of a powerful political opposition along with
a rise in prosperity. Those entrepreneurs who managed to quickly
accumulate wealth during the first decade of independence
are now showing greater interest in establishing a stable
political framework to facilitate further economic development,
especially in Kazakhstan’s lucrative oil and gas sector.
Although many tycoons served in government earlier in the
decade, by the late 1990’s most of the so-called "New
Kazakhs" had joined the ranks of the opposition, providing
key financial backing to efforts to keep President Nursultan
Nazarbayev’s power in check.
The infusion of new individuals, influence and funding has
emboldened the opposition. A deep split among the power elite
replaced the previous imbalance, in which the authorities
could handily defeat any challenge made by an opposition group.
As the opposition’s influence has grown, Nazarbayev has
responded with increasing pressure on independent media and
freedom of expression, culminating in the arrest, trial and
sentencing of two key figures in the new political movement.
Today Kazakhstan is at a critical crossroads: the leaders
and citizens of the country will have to make a decision between
allowing a higher degree of tolerance for alternative voices
or accelerating the recent trend of authoritarianism and possible
radicalization of politics. Kazakhstan’s democratic and
economic development may hang in the balance.
Background
Early Independent Political Movements
Kazakhstan gained its independence on December 16, 1991.
As in many of the former Soviet republics, the years just
before and after the Soviet Union’s collapse saw a flowering
of Kazakh culture and political assertiveness. However, these
promising beginnings faded in the face of the increasing dominance
of Nazarbayev’s administration and a growing intolerance
of dissent.
The first wave of opposition figures emerged before the country’s
independence, during the era of former Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms. Major players included
the Party People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (PPCK),
led by writers and public figures Olzhas Suleymenov and Mukhtar
Shakhanov, and two branches of the Communist Party,
one recasting itself as the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan
(SPK). Nationalist movements such as Azat and Zheltoksan
also played a critical role in the push for independence,
although their influence waned as the 1990’s wore on.
Initially, despite (or perhaps because of) Nazarbayev’s
high popularity, authorities tolerated some political debate
and free exchange of ideas. Mass meetings became an important
venue for the discussion of reforms. In late 1990, after a
series of meetings with the major movements and parties, a
threatened Nazarbayev was able to negotiate a moratorium on
these meetings. This move seriously undermined the influence
of the new movements at their earliest stages of development.
Efforts to nominate an opposition candidate (Hasan Kozha-Ahmet
of Zheltoksan) for the 1991 presidential elections failed,
and Nazarbayev took the presidency in an uncontested race.
In late 1993, the pro-presidential Union of People’s
Unity of Kazakhstan (UPUK) and the PPCK carried out a
joint effort to dissolve the Soviet-era Council of People’s
Deputies. Elections to the newly formed Supreme Council of
Kazakhstan occurred March 7, 1994. Non-presidential parties
won a considerable number of seats in the new body, with the
PPCK and SPK the largest opposition groups represented. The
opposition continued its consolidation in preparation for
presidential elections the following year, forming a coordinating
council of parties known as Respublica.
Nazarbayev’s Power Play
Before long, Nazarbayev’s administration would take
steps to stem this budding plurality. On March 12, 1995, not
long before the presidential elections, the Constitutional
Court of Kazakhstan declared the parliamentary powers of the
new Supreme Council illegitimate on a technicality. The Court
conferred provisional legislative authority upon the president,
giving Nazarbayev the ability to issue decrees of statutory
force.
Shortly beforehand, Nazarbayev had signed a declaration creating
an Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. This was a deliberative
body with many of the characteristics of a parliament, but
with the crucial difference that it was largely subordinated
to the executive branch. Not long after its first session,
this new Assembly called for a referendum to prolong Nazarbayev’s
term until December 1, 2000. The referendum was passed on
April 29, 1995 amid accusations of widespread irregularities
by local and international monitors, such as representatives
of the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Subsequent
presidential decrees gave Nazarbayev exclusive power to propose
constitutional amendments, dissolve Parliament, appoint and
dismiss the government, call referenda and appoint regional
and municipal governors.
The Opposition in the Late 1990’s
Within the context of Nazarbayev’s rapidly expanding
authority, the next wave of opposition leaders was drawn from
the ranks of disillusioned high-ranking government officials.
In April 1996, ex-Ministers Peter Svoik and Galim Abilsiitov
created the new Azamat movement, along with Kazakhstan’s
former envoy to China, Murat Auezov. The movement registered
officially as a party on March 27, 1999. However, while prominent,
this group lacked the funding and connections to pose a serious
political threat to the regime.
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a former prime minister, joined the
opposition in mid-1998, and his rhetoric calling for the enactment
of democratic ideals in the country quickly gained him a relatively
broad following. Kazhegeldin was also media-savvy, bringing
under his control and utilizing for political ends a number
of small periodicals and TV stations. (He was less successful
in his attempts to gain control of the popular local newspaper
Karavan and the television station KTK, which owner Boris
Giller allegedly sold in June 1998 to Nazarbayev’s son-in-law
Rakhat Aliev.)
In the face of increasing pressure, many earlier opposition
members rallied around Kazhegeldin’s newly founded Republican
People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RPPK) in early 1999.
Hastily-passed amendments to the country’s election legislation
forbade Kazhegeldin from participating in the presidential
elections of January 1999. This was followed by electoral
fraud, widely documented by groups such as the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in the
parliamentary elections in October of that year. As a result,
not a single member of the RPPK won a seat in parliament.
Opposition members formed the new Forum of Democratic Forces
of Kazakhstan (FDPK) in October 1999, presided over by
Kazhegeldin, with the goal of intensifying the struggle against
Nazarbayev’s growing power. However, governmental obstruction
and the group’s own organizational shortcomings stymied
its rise, and the opposition lay dormant for almost two years.
The Opposition
Major Players
In autumn 2001, leading representatives of the Kazakhstani
business elite – some of them holding posts in Nazarbayev’s
administration – founded a new political movement, the Democratic
Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK).
Most of the influential members of this group had benefited
from the privatization of state property in the early 1990’s.
As in many privatization efforts following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, a small number of financial partnerships
seized control of some of Kazakhstan’s most profitable
and strategic industries. From the outset, this new business
elite was closely integrated with the government due to the
size and influence of the companies it controlled. Moreover,
some of the most prominent "New Kazakhs" themselves
held key governmental posts. Among the New Kazakhs in government
were: Mukhtar Ablyazov, energy minister and head of the Astana-Holding
investment group; Zeinulla Khakimzhanov, the minister of state
revenues, who was at the same time well connected with the
Kazkommertsbank financial group; and Nurlan Kapparov, the
former president of the Kazakhoil state oil monopoly and a
leader of the Accept financial group.
In addition to the competition between these technocrats
for control of various enterprises, they often came into conflict
with the upper echelons of the old Communist nomenklatura.
In such an atmosphere, Nazarbayev had the luxury of playing
one group off another and thereby balancing rival claims to
protect his own political authority.
As Nazarbayev’s administration asserted greater control
over the country’s economic life (an event all the more
significant as foreign investment in the oil sector had begun
to flow into the country), Kazakhstan’s emerging tycoons
grew uncomfortable over their decreasing ability to safeguard
their interests. If these businessmen needed further proof
that Nazarbayev did not intend to leave well enough alone,
a report by the Kazakhstani Agency for Strategic Planning
was released that laid out the government’s plan to consolidate
major industries into large system-wide conglomerates under
state management. This plan would have the effect of strengthening
the position of Nazarbayev’s family and close associates
at the expense of other influential business interests.
At the time, Nazarbayev’s relatives and close associates
already exerted considerable influence over several crucial
economic sectors and government services. His elder son-in-law,
Aliev, headed the special services, tax police and customs,
while the president’s daughter, Dariga, controlled a
broad number of print and broadcast media outlets in partnership
with her husband. Another Nazarbayev son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev,
was influential in the oil, gas, and banking sectors. In the
late 1990’s the family gradually strengthened and broadened
its control, always at the expense of other powerful industrial
groupings.
The Revolt of the Business Elite
The catalyst for the consolidation of these rival business
clans into an anti-Nazarbayev alliance was a series of related
events of autumn 2001. In late October and early November
of that year, Nazarbayev’s son-in-law Aliev, in his role
as head of the special services, attempted to strip Ablyazov
of some of his holdings. The ensuing power struggle quickly
embroiled other prominent business figures. Nazarbayev’s
intervention effectively ended the struggle. Although Nazarbayev
rebuked Aliev and removed him from his post, the president
gave his son-in-law a new position in the administration and
publicly derided the restive "new Kazakhs" in a
speech on November 17.
On the day of Nazarbayev’s speech, an auction was held
for the state’s share of the country’s largest bank,
Halyk Savings. From the beginning of 2001, powerful interests
such as Kazkommertsbank and an investment group led by Ablyazov
had publicly contended for a controlling stake. In the context
of this strong competition, the emergence of a latecomer,
the financial group Mangistaumunaigas, as the auction’s
winner was viewed with suspicion. In addition to appearing
as a prospective buyer at the last moment, the group was reported
to have close ties to Aliev. If true, Nazarbayev’s extended
family would have almost complete control of the country’s
leading bank.
On the next day, November 18, apparently prompted by the
combined effect of Aliev’s actions against Ablyazov,
Nazarbayev’s response and the Halyk Bank auction, a press
conference announced the founding of the DCK. Main figures
in the new movement included Ablyazov, Deputy Prime Minister
Uraz Dzhandosov, Governor of the northern Pavlodar region
Galimzhan Zhakiyanov and the parliamentary deputy Tolen Tokhtasinov.
The DCK announced its commitment to the rule of law and democratization.
It advocated the direct election of regional governors, and
came out strongly against corruption. Such admirable goals
contained within them the self-interest of those promoting
them, as the members of the DCK were fighting for their economic
as well as political rights. The DCK’s platform was dedicated
to reducing the power of Nazarbayev’s associates in relation
to that of the movement’s own leaders. Some observers,
such as commentator Talgat Ismagambetov, suggested that for
the DCK, the language of democracy and inclusiveness was more
of a means than an end.
Regardless of intent, the founding of the DCK brought into
sharp focus the deep split among Kazakhstan’s ruling
elite. After a few days’ delay, the government’s
response came in the form of a widely broadcast speech by
Prime Minister Kasimzhomart Tokayev in which he demanded the
removal from power of all members of the DCK. A number of
major government officials resigned, including Dzhandosov,
Zhakiyanov, Labor Minister Alikhan Baymenov and Deputy Defense
Minister Zhannat Yertlesova. Other politicians suspected of
having ties to the DCK were also removed or transferred to
other posts.
Many members of the DCK appeared to be taken aback by the
harsh response from Nazarbayev’s regime. The movement’s
founders countered with a public relations campaign in which
they maintained that their primary aim was to establish a
level playing field for business in Kazakhstan rather than
to oppose Nazarbayev. This campaign mixed criticism of the
economic dominance of the president’s family with optimism
that the ejected DCK supporters would soon return to their
posts. When this began to appear unlikely, newspapers such
as Ablyazov’s Vremya Po intensified their criticism of
Nazarbayev’s regime.
Opposition Relations
Meanwhile, in December 2001, the RPPK’s Amirzhan Kosanov,
Azamat’s Peter Svoik and Gulzhan Yergaliyeva of the PPCK
announced the foundation of the United Democratic Party
(UDP), of which the influential Kazhegeldin was a member
of the governing board.
Kazhegeldin and members of the earlier opposition had responded
ambivalently to the formation of the DCK. While they welcomed
the anti-corruption and pro-democracy stance of the new movement,
the older generation of opposition leaders viewed with suspicion
the DCK’s ties to the administration, and its more moderate
position towards Nazarbayev himself. (The newly formed UDP
insisted on Nazarbayev’s ouster, while the DCK initially
expressed willingness to work with Nazarbayev to attempt to
broaden political participation.)
Despite differences in their levels of opposition, the two
movements did interact and cooperate to a certain extent in
the early days of their coexistence. Zhakiyanov and Ablyazov
in particular worked closely with the UDP as representatives
of the DCK. On January 19, 2002, when the theater venue for
a UDP-led opposition meeting was abruptly closed, Ablyazov
donated his own space, and together with Zhakiyanov participated
in the session. For its part, the DCK held a large meeting
only one day later, attended by an estimated five thousand
citizens of Almaty, including some major UDP leaders.
These events mark a reshuffling and further delineation of
the Kazakhstani opposition. The UDP continued to cooperate
with Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov, and much of the old opposition
rank-and-file joined the DCK. Meanwhile, moderate DCK leaders
split off and founded the Ak Zhol Party on January
29, staking out a more centrist course in an attempt to achieve
some level of understanding with Nazarbayev.
Government Reaction
In addition to marking the beginning of a tactical division
between opposition groups, the events of early January 2002
hardened the presidential administration’s stance towards
political opposition. The large turnout at the DCK rally apparently
shocked the authorities into action, and on January 25 Nazarbayev
gave a speech laden with criticism of the movement, demanding
that law enforcement agencies take steps "to stop the
buffoonery."
In March and April 2002 respectively, Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov
were taken into custody, each charged with abuse of power
during their tenure in government. The detention of Zhakiyanov
in particular garnered international attention, as he had
taken refuge to escape arrest in an Almaty building housing
several European embassies. The standoff ended April 4, when
the Kazakhstani authorities agreed that Zhakiyanov would remain
in custody in Almaty with full access to the national and
international press. After a few days of detention in Almaty
(by which time, observers note, the Western delegates from
the World Economic Forum’s Eurasia Summit had left the
city), Zhakiyanov was promptly flown to his former constituency
of Pavlodar and placed under house arrest. Despite widespread
reports of his deteriorating health and international criticism
of this violation of the diplomatic agreement, he remained
under house arrest until he received a seven-year prison term
in August.
This verdict came not long after the conviction of Ablyazov
for a six-year term July 18. Nazarbayev critics claim that
both trials were politically motivated and targeted at discouraging
the further development of the opposition.
Future Prospects
Obstacles and Assets
Continual pressure from the government makes immediate prospects
for the opposition’s future appear limited. In addition
to the alleged persecution of figures such as Ablyazov and
Zhakiyanov and a series of anonymous attacks against independent
media, a recent law on political parties is hampering the
opposition’s development. This legislation calls for
the re-registration of all political parties according to
new guidelines, which stipulate that parties must have nationwide
representation and at least 50,000 documented members. Since
none of these groups have such broad organizations in place,
the DCK and other, smaller opposition movements (with the
exception of Ak Zhol and the Communist party, which appear
able to independently cross the threshold) face the difficult
choice of uniting or moving underground.
Despite the obstacles that the authorities seem to be placing
in front of the new Kazakhstani opposition, the nature of
the movement and the level of the country’s development
may be in the opposition’s favor. The main opposition
movements in Kazakhstan enjoy access to funding and influential
supporters that may help sustain them in a prolonged struggle
against incumbent authority. The financial resources of the
DCK are significantly lessened by the imprisonment of two
of their most wealthy leaders – Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov. However,
the movement retains significant clout, including an important
alliance with the Communists, who have strong regional connections
and a presence in parliament. What is more, Ak Zhol remains
well financed, with a broad support base of its own.
If Ak Zhol or, more likely, the DCK decides to confront the
authorities directly, one key constituency that may prove
a deciding factor is the growing number of small- and medium-sized
business owners, many of whom are active in the country’s
oil and gas sector. Whether such a power struggle occurs depends
on a number of factors. Nazarbayev is again playing a balancing
act, and his next moves will be critical in determining Kazakhstan’s
political future.
Three Scenarios
The president and his associates may continue their hard-line
policy towards the political opposition. This would likely
take the form of increased harassment of non-state media outlets
and further prosecution of DCK activists. Such policies would
stand a good chance of radicalizing the opposition, while
at the same time forcing it underground. Concurrently, Nazarbayev
and his family would continue to expand their control over
the political and economic levers of power.
A direct confrontation with Nazarbayev’s government
would not be a foregone conclusion in favor of the administration,
however. As already noted, the leaders of the opposition have
resources and influence that opposition groups elsewhere in
the region lack. The DCK might be successful in using its
remaining economic connections and familiarity with state
structures to oppose Nazarbayev. Government corruption scandals,
especially the so-called "Kazakhgate" affair, in
which it was revealed that the government had concealed a
Swiss bank account with over $1 billion in oil revenues, keep
Nazarbayev in a potentially vulnerable position. This is particularly
true as inquiries by US prosecutors have brought the issue
to the international stage. [For
background information, see the EurasiaNet Business and Economics
archive]. Any new revelation concerning the Kazakhgate
affair could potentially do serious damage to Nazarbayev’s
domestic political position, even possibly prompting his resignation.
It is precisely Nazarbayev’s vulnerability that makes
a third variant most likely. In this scenario, the regime
and the less radical members of the opposition come to an
agreement in which power is redistributed and Nazarbayev’s
support base reinforced. The Ak Zhol party could play a critical
role if Nazarbayev in fact attempts to achieve compromise
with his opponents. By levying punitive measures against his
most outspoken critics and co-opting the more pliant ones
with lucrative and influential posts, Nazarbayev could attempt
to divide and conquer, thereby navigating his way out of the
crisis. The January 7 appointment of Ak Zhol co-chair Dzhandosov
as an aide to the president and the nearly-simultaneous summoning
of RPPK chairman Kosanov on tax charges may indicate that
this process has already begun. Perhaps even more troubling
for the opposition is the January
10 report on the Respublika news website alleging that
the DCK had been stripped of its registration and had its
bank accounts frozen.
If Nazarbayev does manage to come to an accommodation with
the moderate opposition while sidelining the rest, he will
survive only in a significantly weakened state, having opened
the door of compromise to a powerful interest group. It remains
to be seen whether this is the beginning of a much longer
struggle, or merely another bump in the road for the president
and his allies.
Editor’s Note: Aldar Kusainov is a Central Asia-based
reporter who employs a pseudonym out of fear of government
reprisals.
Daniel Sershen is project editor for this series.
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Posted January 13, 2003 © Eurasianet
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