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GEORGIA’S MOUNTING OPPOSITION
Irakly Areshidze: 1/21/03
This is the sixth in a series of reports on opposition
movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Read
more about this series.
Introduction
A struggle between three political forces – pro-government
factions, the moderate opposition and its more uncompromising
counterpart – will largely determine Georgia’s political
future. President Eduard Shevardnadze is expected to step
down once his term expires in 2005. The first major battle
in the building political succession struggle will be the
parliamentary elections set for November 2003.
For much of the 1990s, Georgian politics was dominated by
one party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), Shevardnadze’s
power base. The opposition that existed was weak and failed
to mount a challenge to Shevardnadze’s political dominance.
After parliamentary elections in 1999, however, various splits
developed within the CUG, and Shevardnadze’s formerly
dominant party rapidly lost influence. The weakening of the
CUG gave birth to three distinct political forces: a group
of Shevardnadze loyalists, a radical opposition loosely classified
as the Reformers Team and the New Rights Party,
a more moderate opposition that views Shevardnadze as a guarantor
of international stability, but which is also critical of
the government’s domestic policy.
Background
Politics After Independence
Eduard Shevardnadze became Georgia’s second president
in 1992, following the violent ouster of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
The latter, who swept into office in 1990 in the first free
elections ever held in a Soviet republic, saw his support
erode as his behavior became increasingly erratic. For three
years after Gamsakhurdia’s ouster, Georgia teetered on
the brink of failed-state status as Shevardnadze’s administration
struggled to extend its authority across Georgia. Only in
1995, with the adoption of a new Constitution and the strengthening
of Shevardnadze’s authority outside of Tbilisi, did Georgia
regain a measure of stability. Even today, however, Tbilisi’s
authority remains weak.
During the civil war that broke out after Gamsakhurdia’s
ouster, the principal opposition to Shevardnadze’s authority
came from Gamsakhurdia loyalists known as Zviadists. Most
other political forces – the intelligentsia, recently formed
political parties and the former Communist elite – supported
the new president. However, when Georgia joined the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, Shevardnadze lost the
backing of many pro-independence politicians, who felt that
the CIS represented an attempt by Russia to reassert its influence
across the former Soviet Union.
Politics in Georgia during the 1990s were turbulent. President
Shevardnadze suffered two assassination attempts, in August
1995 and February 1998. It is widely supposed that Igor Giorgadze,
the former Georgian National Security Minister now residing
in Russia, was the mastermind behind these attacks. By killing
Shevardnadze, the theory goes, Giorgadze hoped to install
a pro-Russian regime in Georgia.
Emergence of the CUG and Other
Parties
In an attempt to reinforce his authority, Shevardnadze formed
the CUG, a political medley composed of various elements of
the intelligentsia, regional ex-Communist leaders and leftist
political groups, including Zurab Zhvania’s Green
Party. The CUG triumphed in the 1995 legislative elections,
and Shevardnadze’s ally Zhvania assumed the post of parliament
speaker. With his deputy in this essential position and a
comfortable parliamentary majority, Shevardnadze came to dominate
the legislative process. As Shevardnadze’s government
enacted major legislative changes in 1995 and 1996, a number
of individuals closely associated with the president, including
Zhvania, Mikhail Saakashvili, and Lado Chanturia, gained prominence
as reformers eager to establish Western-style laws and institutions.
Meanwhile, the center-right National Democratic Party
(NDP) led a marginalized opposition. The NDP may have
had some potential to become a significant anti-government
force, if not for the 1994 assassination of its popular leader,
Gia Chanturia. Members of a militant group that helped overthrow
Gamsakhurdia in 1991, known as the Mkhedrioni, were prosecuted
for the killing. Some analysts have alleged, however, that
Shevardnadze himself was indirectly involved in the killing.
By the 1995 parliamentary elections, a new force, the Revival
Party, had emerged in the autonomous republic of Adjaria
in southwestern Georgia. Its support was built around the
region’s authoritarian leader, Aslan Abashidze. While
technically in opposition, Revival’s true intentions
on the national political scene have always been to preserve
Abashidze’s Adjarian fiefdom (in which he wields near-absolute
power), rather than to lay a claim to national political role.
Before 2000, Shevardnadze faced little in the way of opposition,
with the exception of the rebellious Zviadists. The CUG again
performed well in the October 1999 parliamentary elections,
although reports of voting irregularities marred the party’s
victory. In all likelihood, at least two groups – the Labor
Party and the Third Way alliance – surpassed the
seven-percent barrier necessary to enter parliament. However,
ballot stuffing and other electoral fraud engineered by the
CUG reduced the vote count of these movements.
In addition to the CUG, two other parties entered parliament
in 1999: second-place finisher Revival, which dominated the
vote in Adjaria through Communist-era electoral tactics, and
the Industrialists Party, created by beer magnate Gogi
Topadze, whose support was particularly strong among younger
voters. Neither of these two parties had the inclination or
backing necessary to mount a serious challenge to Shevardnadze’s
dominance. Consequently, in April of 2000, Shevardnadze easily
won reelection as president. Former Communist leader Jumber
Patiashvili provided the only serious opposition in the race,
but garnered little support, due largely to his role in Soviet
troops’ killing of pro-independence demonstrators in
1989. International monitoring groups strongly criticized
the elections, noting widespread ballot fraud and a significant
media bias.
The Opposition
Weakening of the CUG and Emergence
of New Parties
In its dominance of the 1999 elections, the CUG relied on
the financial support of Georgia’s business community,
which by the turn of the millennium had become a powerful
force in Georgian social and political life. In return for
the business community’s backing, the CUG included on
its electoral lists a number of prominent entrepreneurs. This,
in hindsight, sowed the seeds for the party’s implosion.
While many of these businessmen-turned-politicians obtained
leadership posts in parliament, they chafed under Zhvania’s
total dominance of the legislative agenda. In November 2000,
under the pretext of requesting an investigation of budgetary
shortcomings, this entrepreneurial faction rebelled against
the CUG’s leadership. When Shevardnadze and Zhvania refused
to meet their demands, the businessmen left the CUG, launching
the New Rights Party soon thereafter.
This rebellion significantly weakened Zhvania’s influence
in parliament and caused a split within the CUG. Over the
next six months, numerous other erstwhile Zhvania supporters,
including former State Ministers Niko Lekishvili and Vazha
Lordkipanidze, began to voice their opposition to his leadership.
At the same time, Shevardnadze began facing growing opposition.
Zhvania himself, partially to shore up his eroding support,
took steps to distance himself from Shevardnadze. The parliament
speaker criticized Shevardnadze’s failure to contain
widespread corruption in Georgia. Zhvania’s ally Saakashvili
challenged the president even more directly, often appearing
on television to denounce public officials as corrupt. As
the political unrest intensified, Zhvania and Saakashvili
staked out positions as opponents of corruption and critics
of Shevardnadze’s rule.
In May of 2001, in an incident seen by many as the formal
break between Zhvania and Shevardnadze, the former wrote an
open letter to the president urging him to fight corruption.
Shevardnadze resigned his post as chairman of the CUG in September
2001, sparking a struggle between the party’s dominant
pro-presidential contingent and a smaller group of Zhvania
supporters. The CUG collapsed under the strain of the internal
struggle that fall. A formal party split was ratified in May
2002.
The two related events – the challenge to the CUG by well-funded
businessmen and the split between Shevardnadze and Zhvania
– provided the strongest threats to Shevardnadze’s political
dominance since he assumed Georgia’s presidency. No single
party or coalition enjoys a legislative majority in parliament,
and several are in opposition: the New Rights Party, Revival,
Zhvania’s United Democrats and Saakashvili’s
National Movement (the latter two collectively known
as "the Reformers"). Outside the legislature, the
Labor Party, which appeals to the disadvantaged and elderly
with socialist policies, also saw its support rise in 2001-2002.
Each of these groups tested their electoral appeal in local
government elections in June 2002. In Tbilisi, the Reformers
(led by Saakashvili) and the Labor Party, rivals competing
for the same constituency, received about 25 percent of the
vote each. However, due to a lack of organization and regional
capacity, both parties fared poorly across the rest of the
country. The New Rights emerged as the strongest party countrywide,
winning a fourth of all available seats, with the Industrialists
coming in second. The CUG, still embroiled in the power struggle
between Zhvania and the pro-Shevardnadze wing, could not compete
under its traditional name. However, a vast number of pro-Shevardnadze
CUG officials campaigned successfully as independent candidates.
The mixed results of the local elections in 2002 point to
the vastly different playing field that will confront Georgian
voters as they go to the polls to elect a new parliament in
2003.
The Reformers
For many years, whether in government or the opposition,
Zhvania and Saakashvili were seen as a unified, pro-Western
influence in Georgian politics. However, in 2001, the two
politicians challenged each other for the mantle of the country’s
top reformer. In particular, Saakashvili, who in the past
had deferred to Zhvania, seemed determined to stake out his
own place on the Georgian political map.
In August of 2001, Saakashvili launched a radical protest
against the president by resigning his post as minister of
justice. In September and October of 2001, both Saakashvili
and Zhvania led street demonstrations that peaked with protests
against the government’s illegal raid of popular independent
television station Rustavi-2. To quell the discord, Shevardnadze
sacked several of his top government ministers (including
Kakha Targamadze, a staunch enemy of the Reformers). In the
midst of their cooperation on the protests, however, Saakashvili
widened the gap with Zhvania by launching his own party, the
National Movement.
Meanwhile, Zhvania was intent on gaining control of the remnants
of the CUG, largely because of its property holdings and powerful
regional network, matched by no other party other than the
New Rights. However, in May 2002, a few weeks before Georgia’s
local elections, a Tbilisi court ruled that the pro-presidential
faction had the legal right to the CUG’s name and property.
The country’s highest court, headed by a former Zhvania
ally, Lado Chanturia, later upheld the decision. Unable to
use the CUG name, Zhvania launched a new party of his own,
the United Democrats, in June 2002.
While Saakashvili and Zhvania claim to share a common vision
for Georgia’s future, their political tactics and electoral
appeal are often at odds. Saakashvili’s popularity hinges
largely on his populist rhetoric, which includes a call for
Shevardnadze’s immediate resignation. This goes over
well with some residents of Tbilisi, where Saakashvili enjoys
the support of the popular station Rustavi-2 and a significant
portion of the professional classes. Saakashvili has recently
moved to form an alliance with two parties: the Traditionalists,
who have little political support currently but control 10
seats in Parliament, and Unity, Georgia’s most
pro-Russian party, led by Shevardnadze’s one-time opponent
for the Presidency Jumber Patiashvili.
Zhvania opposes Saakashvili’s more radical stance and
has pushed for a more moderate opposition alliance. While
most political parties have been willing to participate in
a political dialogue sponsored by the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), there has been little movement thus far towards
forming a grand coalition.
Their many differences notwithstanding, three factors may
push Zhvania and Saakashvili toward reconciliation. First,
it is unlikely that Saakashvili could build a regional network
– which he needs if he is to be a force in the parliamentary
elections – without the assistance of a strong organizer like
Zhvania. Second, both have so far failed to elaborate a positive,
unique vision for Georgia’s future. Since their left-of-center
political beliefs are quite similar, the stage would be extremely
crowded if they tried to stake out separate pieces of political
territory. Cooperating may assist them in developing a coherent,
popular platform. Third, an alliance could shore up the group’s
funding base, since the largest source of financial support
– the business community – is firmly in a different camp.
The New Rights Party
The New Rights Party has a number of characteristics that
set it apart from other Georgian political forces. First,
it is the only party that lacks a clear leader, being run
collectively by a group of prominent individuals. Second,
it is the only party in Georgia’s history, excepting
the NDP, to take a strictly center-right stance on policy
issues. Finally, the group is extremely well financed, as
its supporters include many of Georgia’s most successful
businessmen.
These unique characteristics represent specific benefits
and challenges for the party. Its pluralistic leadership model
has proven problematic in the past. The group lacks a charismatic
leading personality with whom the public can relate, and is
sometimes slow to reach policy decisions due to its reliance
on consensus. Similarly, while the party benefits from its
financial strength, New Rights leaders suffer at the polls
due to their image as "oligarchs" who benefited
unfairly from the economic chaos of the early years of independence.
In its favor, the party’s image makes it especially popular
with younger voters and Georgia’s business class.
Key party leaders include David Gamkrelidze, longtime head
and founder of Aldagi, an insurance company that grew to be
one of Georgia’s biggest businesses. Gamkrelidze is viewed
as the ideological inspiration of the party and serves as
its leader in parliament. Levan Gachechiladze, the party’s
chairman and head of the successful exporter Georgian Wine
and Spirits, is probably the most popular politician among
the group. Other prominent figures include Pikria Chikhradze,
who alongside Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burdjanadze is one
of Georgia’s few influential female legislators.
A number of influential politicians looked poised to join
the New Rights Party in early 2003. Soon after the New Year,
Niko Lekishvili, the chairman of the Taxpayers Union of Georgia
and a former state minister, announced that he had switched
his allegiance. In addition, there were indications that Giorgi
Targamadze, leader of a 10-person parliamentary faction and
former head of the Revival Party’s Tbilisi branch, would
be joining the party as well. Finally, Tbilisi newspapers
printed a number of stories on Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze’s
alleged interest in the New Rights Party.
From its inception, the party has been strongly pro-Western
in its rhetoric, a stance that has won it some significant
support in parliament. (Recently, legislators unanimously
endorsed Gamkrelidze’s plan to make a bid for eventual
NATO membership the main priority of Georgian foreign policy
for the next decade.) On the domestic front, the party calls
for a flat tax and other economic reforms.
The Labor Party
Labor, along with the New Rights Party, is one of the few
groups in Georgian politics to articulate a clear ideological
platform. Its vision of a socialist Georgia, with free health
care, education and social services, is particularly appealing
to the elderly, who have seen their standard of living drop
significantly since independence. The party is strong in Tbilisi,
which has a large elderly population. It also enjoys support
in scattered pockets outside the capital, such as the area
around Dusheti, hometown of Labor’s leader, Shalva Natelashvili.
The party’s popularity is tied closely to that of Natelashvili
himself, a charismatic if mercurial former state prosecutor.
After the party’s founding in 1997, its leaders adopted
a number of pro-Russian stances, including supporting Georgian
neutrality, a move calculated to exclude future membership
in NATO. In recent years, Natelashvili has shifted his stance
and, while still calling for neutrality, now has given his
blessing to Georgia’s eventual bid for NATO membership.
Domestically, Natelashvili supports an investigation of the
chaotic post-Soviet privatization process and calls for a
highly progressive tax system with which to fund his proposed
social policies.
Labor’s relations with other political parties have
always been tense. In recent months, Natelashvili has sparred
with the Reformers, particularly because both Zhvania and
Saakashvili have tapped into the sector of the electorate
that used to be strongly pro-Labor. It was thus surprising
to many political analysts that Natelashvili helped Saakashvili
secure the chairmanship of the Tbilisi City Council in October
2002. When asked to justify his move in a private interview,
Natelashvili stated that "we wanted to give Saakashvili
a chance to do what he promised . . . and show what he was
and was not capable of doing." Given the magnitude of
the problems facing Tbilisi and the resources available for
solutions, it seems that Saakashvili will be hard pressed
to fulfill campaign promises. As the elections approach, Natelashvili
may hope to gain electoral points by calling Saakashvili to
task for not fulfilling these pledges.
It is difficult to predict what role Labor will play during
the forthcoming parliamentary elections and afterward. Natelashvili
sees himself as presidential material, but his provincial
style, lack of contacts with the West and strong opposition
within the business community and political elite create substantial
obstacles to a successful presidential bid. In addition, Labor
is in dire financial straits. However, barring any major changes
to the current political environment, Labor will likely gain
enough votes to cross the seven-percent barrier and enter
parliament.
Natelashvili is said by some analysts to be nurturing a behind-the-scenes
relationship with the New Rights Party; he has so far pointedly
failed to criticize this group despite his consistent slamming
of the other major players in Georgian politics. Some analysts
speculate that following the parliamentary elections, the
two parties could form an influential voting bloc, assuming
both win seats in the legislature. Labor could in theory secure
some role in governing the country, while the New Rights could
gain political cover among the older generation to pursue
their unpopular program of free market reforms.
Other Forces
Two other parties, the Industrialists and Revival, will also
play an important role in determining Georgia’s political
future. The Industrialists emerged during the 1999 parliamentary
elections, when Topadze and other older-generation businessmen
joined forces to launch a political movement. The party succeeded
in winning enough votes to form a small faction in the legislature,
and since the elections has consistently hammered at the government’s
financial policies, criticizing the tax code in particular.
Like the New Rights, Topadze’s group favors a simpler
and flatter taxation scheme. However, the Industrialists’
popularity sharply declined from 1999-2002, largely because
the New Rights movement won the support of many of its voters.
In recent months, Topadze struck a deal with State Minister
Avtandil Jorbenadze – voting alongside the CUG on key legislation,
including on the 2003 budget – leading to speculation that
the Industrialists will ally with the CUG in the coming elections.
Revival is the only Georgian opposition party with an almost-guaranteed
presence in parliament, as it regularly wins from 90 to 97
percent of the vote in Adjaria’s highly suspect elections.
However, much of the rest of the Georgia population considers
Abashidze to be pro-Russian and dictatorial, and his popularity
outside his province is extremely low. Knowing this to be
the case, Abashidze does not harbor national ambitions, and
instead has sought to maintain absolute control of his southern
province. Revival rarely stakes out a concrete policy position,
and has often used its spoiler role in parliament to its advantage.
After the split between Zhvania and Shevardnadze, Revival
began taking its cues from the latter, partially because of
the longstanding personal enmity between Abashidze and Zhvania.
Shevardnadze and Revival strengthened their alliance when
the president appointed Abashidze as his special representative
to regulate the conflict in Abkhazia. This is widely considered
a tradeoff through which Revival’s parliamentary votes
were pledged to the government in exchange for a lucrative
and prominent post for the party’s leader.
Future Prospects
Predictions
Some analysts express concern that Jorbenadze and the rebuilt
CUG will resort to electoral fraud to secure victory in the
November 2003 parliamentary elections. They add that if the
elections are free and fair, no party is likely to win a governing
majority in parliament. In all, four parties today look certain
to be in the future legislature: the new CUG, Revival, New
Rights and Labor. Based on their current political standing
across the country, their financial positions and their ability
to affect the course of later elections through their positions
in local government, the first three will likely garner from
10 to 20 percent of the vote each. Labor’s share is more
difficult to ascertain but will probably be lower, due to
the party’s lack of financial resources and weakness
in the regions.
As for the Reformers, most analysts agree that separately
their two main parties will not surpass the seven-percent
threshold. They lack a regional network, so their support
must largely come from Tbilisi, where the playing field is
extremely crowded. The two groups have a far better chance
acting together, if Zhvania and Saakashvili’s relationship
proves to be cooperative rather than competitive. One factor
that will shape this relationship is what decision Zhvania’s
younger deputies, especially the prominent MPs Gia Baramidze
and Mikheil Machavariani, will make about their future. In
early January, 2003, the Georgian press was full of reports
that two of Zhvania’s older allies, Parliamentary Vice
Speaker Eldar Shengelaia and former Human Rights Committee
Chair Elene Tevdoradze, were preparing to abandon Zhvania
(the former to join Saakashvili). Meanwhile, Baramidze and
Machavariani are apparently upset about the United Democrats’
lack of group decision making. Should these two decide to
join Saakashvili, it will further weaken Zhvania’s standing
and perhaps even force him to join Saakashvili on the latter’s
terms.
The Process of Transition
The November 2003 parliamentary election will be the first
in Georgia’s recent history in which non-government parties
will play a critical role. To add to their significance, the
forthcoming elections will also be the first step in the transition
from Shevardnadze’s rule to new leadership. The leaders
of the dominant parties in parliament will form the core group
of potential successors to Shevardnadze, assuming the president
steps down in 2005 as expected.
In such an environment, various models for political succession
are evident. Should Shevardnadze’s successor emerge from
among his close allies, short- and medium-term stability would
be maintained, but likely at the cost of democratic development.
If the rule of the CUG continues beyond 2005 – especially
if undemocratic methods are the means for such an extension
– this will represent a further entrenchment of established
power and a step back for the development of a pluralistic
political system in the country.
Meanwhile, if a truly democratic leader with a broad support
base succeeds the current president, there will be a window
of opportunity to not only maintain stability but also promote
greater democracy. Which scenario will develop is dependent
on the choices President Shevardnadze will make over the next
9 to 15 months, but even more so on the outcome of the crucial
November elections.
Editor’s Note: Irakly Areshidze is a Visiting Fellow
at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns-Hopkins-SAIS.
The views in this piece are his and not those of the institutions
with which he is affiliated.
Daniel Sershen is project editor for this series.
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