Human Rights:
GEORGIA’S MOUNTING OPPOSITION
Irakly Areshidze:
1/21/03
Introduction
A struggle between three political forces – pro-government factions, the moderate opposition and its more uncompromising counterpart – will largely determine Georgia’s political future. President Eduard Shevardnadze is expected to step down once his term expires in 2005. The first major battle in the building political succession struggle will be the parliamentary elections set for November 2003.
For much of the 1990s, Georgian politics was dominated by one party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), Shevardnadze’s power base. The opposition that existed was weak and failed to mount a challenge to Shevardnadze’s political dominance. After parliamentary elections in 1999, however, various splits developed within the CUG, and Shevardnadze’s formerly dominant party rapidly lost influence. The weakening of the CUG gave birth to three distinct political forces: a group of Shevardnadze loyalists, a radical opposition loosely classified as the Reformers Team and the New Rights Party, a more moderate opposition that views Shevardnadze as a guarantor of international stability, but which is also critical of the government’s domestic policy.
Background
Politics After Independence
Eduard Shevardnadze became Georgia’s second president in 1992, following the violent ouster of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The latter, who swept into office in 1990 in the first free elections ever held in a Soviet republic, saw his support erode as his behavior became increasingly erratic. For three years after Gamsakhurdia’s ouster, Georgia teetered on the brink of failed-state status as Shevardnadze’s administration struggled to extend its authority across Georgia. Only in 1995, with the adoption of a new Constitution and the strengthening of Shevardnadze’s authority outside of Tbilisi, did Georgia regain a measure of stability. Even today, however, Tbilisi’s authority remains weak.
During the civil war that broke out after Gamsakhurdia’s ouster, the principal opposition to Shevardnadze’s authority came from Gamsakhurdia loyalists known as Zviadists. Most other political forces – the intelligentsia, recently formed political parties and the former Communist elite – supported the new president. However, when Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, Shevardnadze lost the backing of many pro-independence politicians, who felt that the CIS represented an attempt by Russia to reassert its influence across the former Soviet Union.
Politics in Georgia during the 1990s were turbulent. President Shevardnadze suffered two assassination attempts, in August 1995 and February 1998. It is widely supposed that Igor Giorgadze, the former Georgian National Security Minister now residing in Russia, was the mastermind behind these attacks. By killing Shevardnadze, the theory goes, Giorgadze hoped to install a pro-Russian regime in Georgia.
Emergence of the CUG and Other Parties
In an attempt to reinforce his authority, Shevardnadze formed the CUG, a political medley composed of various elements of the intelligentsia, regional ex-Communist leaders and leftist political groups, including Zurab Zhvania's Green Party. The CUG triumphed in the 1995 legislative elections, and Shevardnadze’s ally Zhvania assumed the post of parliament speaker. With his deputy in this essential position and a comfortable parliamentary majority, Shevardnadze came to dominate the legislative process. As Shevardnadze’s government enacted major legislative changes in 1995 and 1996, a number of individuals closely associated with the president, including Zhvania, Mikhail Saakashvili, and Lado Chanturia, gained prominence as reformers eager to establish Western-style laws and institutions.
Meanwhile, the center-right National Democratic Party (NDP) led a marginalized opposition. The NDP may have had some potential to become a significant anti-government force, if not for the 1994 assassination of its popular leader, Gia Chanturia. Members of a militant group that helped overthrow Gamsakhurdia in 1991, known as the Mkhedrioni, were prosecuted for the killing. Some analysts have alleged, however, that Shevardnadze himself was indirectly involved in the killing.
By the 1995 parliamentary elections, a new force, the Revival Party, had emerged in the autonomous republic of Adjaria in southwestern Georgia. Its support was built around the region’s authoritarian leader, Aslan Abashidze. While technically in opposition, Revival’s true intentions on the national political scene have always been to preserve Abashidze’s Adjarian fiefdom (in which he wields near-absolute power), rather than to lay a claim to national political role.
Before 2000, Shevardnadze faced little in the way of opposition, with the exception of the rebellious Zviadists. The CUG again performed well in the October 1999 parliamentary elections, although reports of voting irregularities marred the party’s victory. In all likelihood, at least two groups – the Labor Party and the Third Way alliance – surpassed the seven-percent barrier necessary to enter parliament. However, ballot stuffing and other electoral fraud engineered by the CUG reduced the vote count of these movements.
In addition to the CUG, two other parties entered parliament in 1999: second-place finisher Revival, which dominated the vote in Adjaria through Communist-era electoral tactics, and the Industrialists Party, created by beer magnate Gogi Topadze, whose support was particularly strong among younger voters. Neither of these two parties had the inclination or backing necessary to mount a serious challenge to Shevardnadze’s dominance. Consequently, in April of 2000, Shevardnadze easily won reelection as president. Former Communist leader Jumber Patiashvili provided the only serious opposition in the race, but garnered little support, due largely to his role in Soviet troops’ killing of pro-independence demonstrators in 1989. International monitoring groups strongly criticized the elections, noting widespread ballot fraud and a significant media bias.
The Opposition
Weakening of the CUG and Emergence of New Parties
In its dominance of the 1999 elections, the CUG relied on the financial support of Georgia’s business community, which by the turn of the millennium had become a powerful force in Georgian social and political life. In return for the business community’s backing, the CUG included on its electoral lists a number of prominent entrepreneurs. This, in hindsight, sowed the seeds for the party’s implosion.
While many of these businessmen-turned-politicians obtained leadership posts in parliament, they chafed under Zhvania’s total dominance of the legislative agenda. In November 2000, under the pretext of requesting an investigation of budgetary shortcomings, this entrepreneurial faction rebelled against the CUG’s leadership. When Shevardnadze and Zhvania refused to meet their demands, the businessmen left the CUG, launching the New Rights Party soon thereafter.
This rebellion significantly weakened Zhvania’s influence in parliament and caused a split within the CUG. Over the next six months, numerous other erstwhile Zhvania supporters, including former State Ministers Niko Lekishvili and Vazha Lordkipanidze, began to voice their opposition to his leadership. At the same time, Shevardnadze began facing growing opposition. Zhvania himself, partially to shore up his eroding support, took steps to distance himself from Shevardnadze. The parliament speaker criticized Shevardnadze’s failure to contain widespread corruption in Georgia. Zhvania’s ally Saakashvili challenged the president even more directly, often appearing on television to denounce public officials as corrupt. As the political unrest intensified, Zhvania and Saakashvili staked out positions as opponents of corruption and critics of Shevardnadze’s rule.
In May of 2001, in an incident seen by many as the formal break between Zhvania and Shevardnadze, the former wrote an open letter to the president urging him to fight corruption. Shevardnadze resigned his post as chairman of the CUG in September 2001, sparking a struggle between the party’s dominant pro-presidential contingent and a smaller group of Zhvania supporters. The CUG collapsed under the strain of the internal struggle that fall. A formal party split was ratified in May 2002.
The two related events – the challenge to the CUG by well-funded businessmen and the split between Shevardnadze and Zhvania – provided the strongest threats to Shevardnadze’s political dominance since he assumed Georgia’s presidency. No single party or coalition enjoys a legislative majority in parliament, and several are in opposition: the New Rights Party, Revival, Zhvania’s United Democrats and Saakashvili’s National Movement to Save Georgia (the latter two collectively known as "the Reformers"). Outside the legislature, the Labor Party, which appeals to the disadvantaged and elderly with socialist policies, also saw its support rise in 2001-2002.
Each of these groups tested their electoral appeal in local government elections in June 2002. In Tbilisi, the Reformers (led by Saakashvili) and the Labor Party, rivals competing for the same constituency, received about 25 percent of the vote each. However, due to a lack of organization and regional capacity, both parties fared poorly across the rest of the country. The New Rights emerged as the strongest party countrywide, winning a fourth of all available seats, with the Industrialists coming in second. The CUG, still embroiled in the power struggle between Zhvania and the pro-Shevardnadze wing, could not compete under its traditional name. However, a vast number of pro-Shevardnadze CUG officials campaigned successfully as independent candidates. The mixed results of the local elections in 2002 point to the vastly different playing field that will confront Georgian voters as they go to the polls to elect a new parliament in 2003.
The Reformers
For many years, whether in government or the opposition, Zhvania and Saakashvili were seen as a unified, pro-Western influence in Georgian politics. However, in 2001, the two politicians challenged each other for the mantle of the country’s top reformer. In particular, Saakashvili, who in the past had deferred to Zhvania, seemed determined to stake out his own place on the Georgian political map.
In August of 2001, Saakashvili launched a radical protest against the president by resigning his post as minister of justice. In September and October of 2001, both Saakashvili and Zhvania led street demonstrations that peaked with protests against the government’s illegal raid of popular independent television station Rustavi-2. To quell the discord, Shevardnadze sacked several of his top government ministers (including Kakha Targamadze, a staunch enemy of the Reformers). In the midst of their cooperation on the protests, however, Saakashvili widened the gap with Zhvania by launching his own party, the National Movement.
Meanwhile, Zhvania was intent on gaining control of the remnants of the CUG, largely because of its property holdings and powerful regional network, matched by no other party other than the New Rights. However, in May 2002, a few weeks before Georgia’s local elections, a Tbilisi court ruled that the pro-presidential faction had the legal right to the CUG’s name and property. The country’s highest court, headed by a former Zhvania ally, Lado Chanturia, later upheld the decision. Unable to use the CUG name, Zhvania launched a new party of his own, the United Democrats, in June 2002.
While Saakashvili and Zhvania claim to share a common vision for Georgia’s future, their political tactics and electoral appeal are often at odds. Saakashvili’s popularity hinges largely on his populist rhetoric, which includes a call for Shevardnadze’s immediate resignation. This goes over well with some residents of Tbilisi, where Saakashvili enjoys the support of the popular station Rustavi-2 and a significant portion of the professional classes. Saakashvili has recently moved to form an alliance with two parties: the Traditionalists, who have little political support currently but control 10 seats in Parliament, and Unity, Georgia's most pro-Russian party, led by Shevardnadze’s one-time opponent for the Presidency Jumber Patiashvili.
Zhvania opposes Saakashvili’s more radical stance and has pushed for a more moderate opposition alliance. While most political parties have been willing to participate in a political dialogue sponsored by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), there has been little movement thus far towards forming a grand coalition.
Their many differences notwithstanding, three factors may push Zhvania and Saakashvili toward reconciliation. First, it is unlikely that Saakashvili could build a regional network – which he needs if he is to be a force in the parliamentary elections – without the assistance of a strong organizer like Zhvania. Second, both have so far failed to elaborate a positive, unique vision for Georgia’s future. Since their left-of-center political beliefs are quite similar, the stage would be extremely crowded if they tried to stake out separate pieces of political territory. Cooperating may assist them in developing a coherent, popular platform. Third, an alliance could shore up the group’s funding base, since the largest source of financial support – the business community – is firmly in a different camp.
The New Rights Party
The New Rights Party has a number of characteristics that set it apart from other Georgian political forces. First, it is the only party that lacks a clear leader, being run collectively by a group of prominent individuals. Second, it is the only party in Georgia’s history, excepting the NDP, to take a strictly center-right stance on policy issues. Finally, the group is extremely well financed, as its supporters include many of Georgia’s most successful businessmen.
These unique characteristics represent specific benefits and challenges for the party. Its pluralistic leadership model has proven problematic in the past. The group lacks a charismatic leading personality with whom the public can relate, and is sometimes slow to reach policy decisions due to its reliance on consensus. Similarly, while the party benefits from its financial strength, New Rights leaders suffer at the polls due to their image as “oligarchs” who benefited unfairly from the economic chaos of the early years of independence. In its favor, the party’s image makes it especially popular with younger voters and Georgia’s business class.
Key party leaders include David Gamkrelidze, longtime head and founder of Aldagi, an insurance company that grew to be one of Georgia’s biggest businesses. Gamkrelidze is viewed as the ideological inspiration of the party and serves as its leader in parliament. Levan Gachechiladze, the party’s chairman and head of the successful exporter Georgian Wine and Spirits, is probably the most popular politician among the group. Other prominent figures include Pikria Chikhradze, who alongside Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burdjanadze is one of Georgia’s few influential female legislators.
A number of influential politicians looked poised to join the New Rights Party in early 2003. Soon after the New Year, Niko Lekishvili, the chairman of the Taxpayers Union of Georgia and a former state minister, announced that he had switched his allegiance. In addition, there were indications that Giorgi Targamadze, leader of a 10-person parliamentary faction and former head of the Revival Party’s Tbilisi branch, would be joining the party as well. Finally, Tbilisi newspapers printed a number of stories on Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze’s alleged interest in the New Rights Party.
From its inception, the party has been strongly pro-Western in its rhetoric, a stance that has won it some significant support in parliament. (Recently, legislators unanimously endorsed Gamkrelidze’s plan to make a bid for eventual NATO membership the main priority of Georgian foreign policy for the next decade.) On the domestic front, the party calls for a flat tax and other economic reforms.
The Labor Party
Labor, along with the New Rights Party, is one of the few groups in Georgian politics to articulate a clear ideological platform. Its vision of a socialist Georgia, with free health care, education and social services, is particularly appealing to the elderly, who have seen their standard of living drop significantly since independence. The party is strong in Tbilisi, which has a large elderly population. It also enjoys support in scattered pockets outside the capital, such as the area around Dusheti, hometown of Labor’s leader, Shalva Natelashvili. The party’s popularity is tied closely to that of Natelashvili himself, a charismatic if mercurial former state prosecutor.
After the party’s founding in 1997, its leaders adopted a number of pro-Russian stances, including supporting Georgian neutrality, a move calculated to exclude future membership in NATO. In recent years, Natelashvili has shifted his stance and, while still calling for neutrality, now has given his blessing to Georgia’s eventual bid for NATO membership. Domestically, Natelashvili supports an investigation of the chaotic post-Soviet privatization process and calls for a highly progressive tax system with which to fund his proposed social policies.
Labor’s relations with other political parties have always been tense. In recent months, Natelashvili has sparred with the Reformers, particularly because both Zhvania and Saakashvili have tapped into the sector of the electorate that used to be strongly pro-Labor. It was thus surprising to many political analysts that Natelashvili helped Saakashvili secure the chairmanship of the Tbilisi City Council in October 2002. When asked to justify his move in a private interview, Natelashvili stated that “we wanted to give Saakashvili a chance to do what he promised . . . and show what he was and was not capable of doing.” Given the magnitude of the problems facing Tbilisi and the resources available for solutions, it seems that Saakashvili will be hard pressed to fulfill campaign promises. As the elections approach, Natelashvili may hope to gain electoral points by calling Saakashvili to task for not fulfilling these pledges.
It is difficult to predict what role Labor will play during the forthcoming parliamentary elections and afterward. Natelashvili sees himself as presidential material, but his provincial style, lack of contacts with the West and strong opposition within the business community and political elite create substantial obstacles to a successful presidential bid. In addition, Labor is in dire financial straits. However, barring any major changes to the current political environment, Labor will likely gain enough votes to cross the seven-percent barrier and enter parliament.
Natelashvili is said by some analysts to be nurturing a behind-the-scenes relationship with the New Rights Party; he has so far pointedly failed to criticize this group despite his consistent slamming of the other major players in Georgian politics. Some analysts speculate that following the parliamentary elections, the two parties could form an influential voting bloc, assuming both win seats in the legislature. Labor could in theory secure some role in governing the country, while the New Rights could gain political cover among the older generation to pursue their unpopular program of free market reforms.
Other Forces
Two other parties, the Industrialists and Revival, will also play an important role in determining Georgia’s political future. The Industrialists emerged during the 1999 parliamentary elections, when Topadze and other older-generation businessmen joined forces to launch a political movement. The party succeeded in winning enough votes to form a small faction in the legislature, and since the elections has consistently hammered at the government’s financial policies, criticizing the tax code in particular. Like the New Rights, Topadze’s group favors a simpler and flatter taxation scheme. However, the Industrialists’ popularity sharply declined from 1999-2002, largely because the New Rights movement won the support of many of its voters. In recent months, Topadze struck a deal with State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze – voting alongside the CUG on key legislation, including on the 2003 budget – leading to speculation that the Industrialists will ally with the CUG in the coming elections.
Revival is the only Georgian opposition party with an almost-guaranteed presence in parliament, as it regularly wins from 90 to 97 percent of the vote in Adjaria’s highly suspect elections. However, much of the rest of the Georgia population considers Abashidze to be pro-Russian and dictatorial, and his popularity outside his province is extremely low. Knowing this to be the case, Abashidze does not harbor national ambitions, and instead has sought to maintain absolute control of his southern province. Revival rarely stakes out a concrete policy position, and has often used its spoiler role in parliament to its advantage. After the split between Zhvania and Shevardnadze, Revival began taking its cues from the latter, partially because of the longstanding personal enmity between Abashidze and Zhvania. Shevardnadze and Revival strengthened their alliance when the president appointed Abashidze as his special representative to regulate the conflict in Abkhazia. This is widely considered a tradeoff through which Revival’s parliamentary votes were pledged to the government in exchange for a lucrative and prominent post for the party’s leader.
Future Prospects