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LITTLE TO LOSE: OPPOSITION IN AZERBAIJAN
Daan van der Schriek: 2/03/03
This is the eighth in a series of reports on opposition
movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Read
more about this series.
Introduction
Azerbaijani domestic politics are characterized by increasingly
limited pluralism, as President Heidar Aliyev’s administration
exerts a dominating influence over both mass media and grassroots
activity. In addition, opposition parties are hampered by
their own limitations.
The referendum of August 24, 2002 labeled by opposition
partisans and international observers alike as flawed has
served to curtail the ability of Aliyev’s domestic critics
to participate in politics. It has altered the system for
parliamentary elections from one of partial proportional representation
(which gives some voice to the typically smaller opposition
parties) to an exclusively majoritarian ("first past
the post") system. This new structure provides an additional
advantage to the well-financed and larger pro-government parties.
The referendum has also made it possible for the elderly
Aliyev to appoint a temporary successor should he be unable
to continue fulfilling his duties as president. This chosen
substitute would be well positioned to win an election for
the vacated post. Political analysts say this may offer Aliyev
an opportunity to engineer his own political succession, installing
his son, Ilham, as president after he leaves the political
stage.
Ultimately, the new system may end up encouraging a greater
level of protest outside the extant political framework. Some
political observers believe 2003 could be a turbulent year
for Azerbaijan, with presidential elections scheduled for
October and social unrest on the rise.
Although a host of opposition parties are allowed to operate
in Azerbaijan, few of them have any influence over policy-making.
Many political observers say that opposition parties have
yet to formulate a message that can attract the support of
a substantial portion of the general population. Indeed, opposition
parties have had problems differentiating their policy stances
on many issues from those held by the Aliyev administration.
On those issues where substantial differences exist, the opposition
response to government policy has tended to be to organize
protest actions, rather than attempting to offer proactive
alternatives. In addition, opposition parties have often become
entangled in intra-mural squabbles and rivalries.
Due to the government’s attempts to stifle institutional
opposition and the opposition’s own failure to unite
and strike a chord with the Azerbaijani populace, the number
of spontaneous protests is likely to grow in the coming months
and years. The diversion of anti-government sentiment into
non-official forms of protest can already be seen in such
events as the violent clashes in the village of Nardaran in
June 2002 (and continuing unrest in the area), the protests
of cadets at Azerbaijan’s main military academy in September,
and other public demonstrations. Fundamental Islamist sentiment,
which offers an outlet for dissent outside of official structures,
may likewise be on the rise.
Background
Azerbaijan’s political development since its independence
in 1991 is inextricably linked to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
The status of this Armenian-inhabited enclave inside Azerbaijani
territory has long been a source of discord and tension in
the region, and the violence that flared up during the late
Soviet era quickly turned into full-scale war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. The Armenians were victorious, and now control
an estimated 15 to 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s Soviet-era
territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict further
created an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 internally displaced
persons in Azerbaijan (with many Azerbaijanis claiming the
figure to be as high as one million). No peace deal has been
concluded since the 1994 cease-fire, and the short-term prospects
for one seem dim.
In addition to its massive social and economic effect, the
war had a major impact on Azerbaijani internal politics. Popular
discontent over the handling of the conflict by the government
of former Communist Ayaz Mutalibov led to his ousting in the
spring of 1992, when the main opposition movement, the Popular
Front, took over. Further losses in the war, however,
as well as serious internal problems, led to the subsequent
dismissal of the Popular Front government. This paved the
way for the return of Aliyev, the veteran Communist Party
leader of Azerbaijan.
Aliyev succeeded in stabilizing the country, negotiating
a truce in the war, and securing Azerbaijan’s status
as an independent state. Internally, he consolidated his hold
over the country in a series of disputed elections, and his
New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) now enjoys a comfortable
majority in parliament.
The Azerbaijani President was not always in such a dominant
position. The Popular Front, which can be regarded as the
ancestor of many of today’s opposition parties, played
an important role in the early years of independence. It was
formed in 1989 to promote perestroika in Azerbaijan, but soon
became an umbrella group for a broad spectrum of groups opposed
to the Communist regime. In early 1992, it led the protests
against Mutalibov that forced his resignation. The movement’s
chairman, Abulfaz Elchibey, captured the presidency in June
of that year with 60 percent of the vote. However, a series
of battlefield setbacks, beginning with the controversial
killing of hundreds of Azerbaijani soldiers and civilians
at Khojaly in February 1992 continued to erode public confidence
in Elchibey’s leadership. One year after taking power,
in June 1993, Elchibey was forced to step down following a
military uprising and nationwide antigovernment protests.
As speaker of parliament, Aliyev became acting president.
Elections later that year made that status permanent, despite
the widespread reporting of irregularities.
The Opposition
Major Parties
Azerbaijani political parties, according to the more critical
observers, are not necessarily representative of an association
of individuals who share common political values and objectives.
Instead, there is a tendency for them to be patronage structures
centered on powerful, charismatic politicians. In this respect,
opposition parties in Azerbaijan do not differ from the ruling
party. The personality- rather than platform-based style of
politics means that many of those in the opposition have extremely
limited organizational depth and a very narrow support base.
Although approximately 40 parties exist in all, only three
of the opposition groups have local branches throughout the
country and a constituency numerous enough to have any influence.
All three owe their existence largely to the disintegration
of the Popular Front.
Popular Front: This movement, which began to take
shape prior to the Soviet collapse, evolved into a large and
loosely organized protest group for any organization opposed
to the Communists. It was the leading political force in the
period just before and after independence, but the forced
resignation and internal exile of Elchibey shattered this
dominance in 1993. Afterwards, the Popular Front lost many
leading figures to other parties.
Elchibey’s return from banishment in his home province,
the exclave of Nakhichivan, in October 1997 led to a split
in the Popular Front. A younger group supporting liberal ideas,
led by Ali Kerimli, came to dominate, while a smaller, more
traditional group of nationalists remained clustered around
Elchibey. (Upon Elchibey’s death in August 2000, Mirmahmud
Miralioglu took over the leadership of the nationalist wing.)
Attempts to reunite the party have failed; in fact, in 2002
a second split appeared when a group led by Gudrat Hasanguliyev
left Kerimli’s wing. As its three branches and history
of infighting attest, the Popular Front remains an extremely
loose organization. It finds most of its support in Baku and
the isolated Nakhichivan region, and presently controls six
seats of a total 125 in parliament.
New Equality Party (Musavat): Musavat is the self-proclaimed
successor to the pro-Turkish party of the same name that figured
prominently in the first independent Azerbaijani republic
(1918-1920). In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, many of
the present Musavat leaders were members of the Popular Front.
They split with the Popular Front in 1992, originally distinguishing
themselves with an ideological mixture of nationalism, pan-Turkism
and pan-Islamism, but later becoming increasingly moderate
and secular in orientation. Recently Musavat, often described
as the party of Azerbaijan’s intelligentsia, has taken
over the Popular Front’s role as the most prominent opposition
party. Similar to the Popular Front, there exist within the
party disagreements over whether to emphasize nationalism
or a more Western, liberal stance, but in this case a split
has been avoided. Isa Gambar currently heads Musavat, which
enjoys support in Baku and the country’s central regions
and currently holds two seats in parliament.
Azerbaijan National Independence Party (ANIP): The
ANIP’s core constituency is made up of Azerbaijanis who
used to live in Armenia. Its leader, Etibar Mamedov, like
Musavat’s Gambar, is a former Popular Front member. Founded
in September 1992 on a platform of liberal market reforms,
the party blames Aliyev for the country’s widespread
poverty. Mamedov, who has at times cooperated with Aliyev’s
regime in return for influence, was nevertheless its strongest
opponent in the 1998 presidential elections. The ANIP has
two deputies in parliament.
Democratic Party of Azerbaijan: Exiled former Chairman
of Parliament Rasul Guliyev leads the Democratic Party. An
ally of Aliyev’s in the mid-1990’s, the two later
fell out and Guliyev joined the opposition. By the late 1990’s
his party had attracted a large enough following to be considered
one of the key opposition groupings, although its level of
exposure and regional representation were not on par with
the three described above. In 1998, Guliyev was charged with
embezzlement and similar crimes and fled abroad. The party’s
electoral influence has declined since his departure, although
it is still quite active on the opposition scene.
Cooperation and Disagreement
All of the above-mentioned party leaders at one time or another
were members of the Popular Front and share many of the same
political beliefs. Their greatest disagreement is over which
of them is the best-equipped to lead a united opposition.
At times all three parties and other like-minded factions
have proven their ability to work together as a rule just
before elections but normally such cooperation fades as
soon as the event that brought them together has passed. This
lack of coordination has undoubtedly hurt their electoral
chances. More importantly, perhaps, the infighting has allowed
Aliyev to isolate each party politically and maintain his
dominance through a "divide and conquer" approach.
An organization called the Democratic Congress (DC)
represents the most durable form of opposition alliance. Established
in 1994, it unites a fluctuating number of parties usually
around 10 of which the most influential are the Popular
Front and Musavat. Even given such a longstanding multiparty
organization, though, until recently true cooperation remained
elusive. The DC does not present a united party list during
elections, and its small Baku office seems devoted primarily
to exchanging ideas and maintaining informal ties.
However, recent joint statements and rallies by key parties
in response to the August referendum have some observers predicting
that opposition cooperation will continue to rise in the face
of increasing pressure from Aliyev’s administration.
The informal coalition set up to contest the referendum, which
is both broader and looser than the DC, remains intact, issuing
a statement on October 9 calling for the removal of Aliyev
from power. Four opposition rallies followed over the course
of October, with high attendance. The core group opposing
the referendum, which has created an Opposition Coordinating
Center, is active on other issues as well, such as the
drafting of the new electoral code.
Alone or in cooperation, funding is a perennial problem for
opposition parties. The NAP, as the party of power, controls
a much larger war chest than these groups. There are four
main sources from which the opposition attracts financial
support, explained Leila Yunus of the Azerbaijani NGO Institute
of Peace and Democracy: membership dues, contributions of
Azerbaijani businessmen inside the country, donations from
businessmen that reside abroad and the finances of party leaders
themselves. Of all these sources, Azerbaijani businessmen
living abroad are the most significant contributors. These
businessmen often feel excluded from opportunities in many
lucrative domestic sectors, which tend to be controlled by
Aliyev’s relatives and political allies. These businessmen
hope that a change in leadership could provide them with new
commercial openings.
Relations with Government
Despite such tension, the main opposition parties agree with
the current government in a number of areas. They all promote
a pro-Western course and champion the extraction of Azerbaijan’s
natural resources as a means of developing the country as
a whole. Even here, however, the DC "worries about the
large compromises that the government made to foreign [oil]
companies." The DC shares the government’s wariness
of Iran, however. Both fear that Iran might try to foment
an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in the country; Azerbaijan
is, after all, one of the few other Islamic countries in the
world with a Shia majority. Instead of defining themselves
as such, however, both opposition and government see secular
Turkey and the United States as the country’s most important
strategic allies.
Similarities aside, opposition parties tend to be considerably
more nationalistic than the government, most notably on the
issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. The DC claims that "the humiliating
peace’ proposals of the international missions"
to solve the problem are "an unsuccessful result"
of the administration’s policies. Taking a more hard-line
stance than the government, the DC proposes offering the region
autonomy "according to European standards," a concept
that it has yet to define further.
Considering the paramount importance of the Karabakh issue
in Azerbaijani politics, existing policy differences make
dialogue between the two sides unlikely, despite their similarities
in other areas. The apparent ballot manipulation during successive
elections by Aliyev’s administration is another major
irritant in opposition-government relations. For example,
Human Rights Watch [for
additional information see the EurasiaNet archives], observing
the 2000 parliamentary elections, reported that local government
authorities were engaged in "widespread and systematic
interference in electoral procedures, principally by blocking
access to the ballot for opposition and independent candidates
in the country’s . . . single-mandate constituencies."
Furthermore, "candidates, their campaign personnel, and
those voters who gave signatures in support of their candidacies
all faced harassment from local government authorities."
Amnesty International, meanwhile, noted a "completely
flawed counting process."
In addition, some observers say law enforcement and other
government agencies have been utilized by the administration
to intimidate opposition parties. For example, on October
2, 2002, police stormed the headquarters of the Democratic
Party, reportedly smashing furniture and discarding documents.
Only a day earlier, six Musavat party members had been rounded
up for arrest on unclear charges.
The media also comes under significant government pressure.
While there is officially freedom of the press in Azerbaijan,
in practice the government indirectly controls much of what
is broadcast and written in the country, political experts
say. As the National Democratic Institute writes, "despite
the formal abolition of censorship in 1998, reporters and
the print media continue to come under pressure. Journalists
have been subject to violence in recent years, and actions
by government officials . . . have fostered an atmosphere
of self-censorship." This was particularly true in late
2002 and early 2003, as court action against independent print
media increased and broadcast media faced the prospect of
continued state oversight, despite a Council of Europe-sponsored
initiative to encourage less government control.
The government further hinders the opposition by attempting
to attract independent parties or individuals into its camp
through offers of power-sharing or economic incentives. As
a local political analyst explains, the ANIP acted in accordance
with the government for a long period of the 1990’s,
and was for a time better funded than the rest of the cash-strapped
opposition. The uneasy alliance ended during the presidential
elections of 1998, as Mamedov, suspecting that Ilham Aliyev
was being groomed to succeed his father and therefore doubting
his own chances, parted ways with the ruling party and began
to campaign in earnest.
Future Prospects
An Underrepresented Populace
The opposition currently has little to no impact on Azerbaijan’s
mainstream politics. Like the government they oppose, opposition
politicians understand the problems of society, such as a
lack of employment and uneven development, but do no better
than the government at proposing constructive means to combat
them. Instead, many opposition leaders give the appearance
of pursuing individual agendas. This struggle leaves a majority
of the population politically alienated, a situation which
engenders great apathy, "and also a vacuum, which is
very dangerous," as put by Andreas Gross, one of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s (PACE)
rapporteurs for the country.
This apathy could lead to a situation in which dissatisfied
citizens, alienated from both government and opposition, decide
to circumvent the political process and take to the street.
The riots in the village of Nardaran beginning in June 2002,
prompted by appalling living conditions, might foreshadow
such a development. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. While some
argue that Nardaran is a case apart, as the village is very
close-knit, whose residents have a reputation for being devoutly
Islamic giving the government an opportunity to blame the
unrest on Iranian influence the fact remains that the village
is the site of ongoing protests that have occurred separate
from the political framework. Another, less explosive demonstration
occurred on October 2, as members of the Union of Baku and
Baku Villages picketed the Interior Ministry and prosecutor’s
office, demanding the release of their imprisoned leader.
For its part, both opposition and government failed to anticipate
or even adequately react to these events.
External Factors
Meanwhile, the United States seems more concerned with maintaining
Azerbaijani stability than promoting democratic processes.
As the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline begins to take form and oil flows
at an ever-increasing rate, Azerbaijan’s strategic importance
will similarly increase. Some political analysts believe that,
as in many of the countries of Central Asia, Azerbaijan will
become a state in which the commitment of the United States
and other major powers to human and civil rights becomes secondary
to perceived economic and security interests.
Russia and Iran are two other countries that can possibly
have considerable influence over domestic developments. Relations
between Baku and Moscow have improved over the past year,
[for
additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives],
although areas of tension remain, including the illegal migration
of Azeris to Russia in search of work. Balancing the often-different
strategic and economic objectives of Russia and the United
States in the Caucasus will remain an ongoing challenge for
Azerbaijani leaders. Forging better ties with Iran is also
an important task, not only in the religious sphere, but also
in the economic realm. Baku and Tehran continue to struggle
to find a mutually acceptable formula for the division of
the Caspian Sea [for
background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. A Caspian
pact is seen as a key to ensuring the stable development of
regional energy resources. However, given their strategic
interests and history of relations with the region, both Russia
and Iran cannot be expected to push for significant democratic
reform.
In contrast, the country’s accession together with
Armenia to the Council of Europe in early 2001 could potentially
lead to some encouraging developments. While Azerbaijan has
a long way to go to reach European standards in the areas
of human rights, civil liberties and press freedom, to name
a few, some observers express hope that constructive engagement
by European structures will push Azerbaijan along the road
to a truly representative democracy. So far, however, the
Council of Europe’s involvement has been limited to a
few key issues, such as advocating the release of Azerbaijan’s
political prisoners.
Opposition Chances
Given the triple hindrance of administrative obstruction,
low popular support, and a lack of international interest,
the chances for the opposition in future elections seem bleak.
This is true even without considering the constitutional amendments
adopted in the August 2002 referendum.
Aliyev has announced that he will run for the presidency
again in 2003, and there is little doubt that he will win.
Once the elderly president has secured another term, the recently
approved amendments to the Constitution allow him to virtually
appoint his successor. The changes stipulate that the prime
minister will take over from the head of state in the case
of the latter’s incapacity or death rather than the
parliamentary speaker, as in the past.
Most opposition leaders believe Aliyev will appoint his son
Ilham as prime minister. In the event of Aliyev’s retirement
or death, his son would then have a much smoother road to
the presidency if, as acting president, he had continued control
of the governmental bureaucracy, budget and media outlets.
While the opposition may have once hoped to take advantage
of the window of opportunity if Aliyev were to die or become
incapacitated, the August referendum appears to have considerably
limited the chances of ending the family’s dominance
over Azerbaijani politics.
With Aliyev making every effort to assure his continued control
of the political playing field, it seems unlikely that the
opposition will be willing to compromise with the government.
Rather, the already significant mistrust between these groups
and the administration will stiffen, as shown by both the
recent crackdowns by the authorities as well as the increased
coordination displayed by the opposition.
The ongoing clashes over a draft elections code underline
both these points. The Opposition Coordinating Center has
united in an effort to boycott discussions of the draft code,
on the grounds that the government will not allow opposition
parties to participate on an equal footing. The parties claim
that the proposed law does nothing to address Azerbaijan’s
continual problems with electoral corruption and vote-rigging.
PACE has expressed its own concern over the draft code, with
rapporteur Guillermo Martinez Casan stating that if the elections
of October 2003 are held under such provisions, the Council
of Europe will not recognize the results.
Alternative Protest
Alternative forms of protest and expression are likely to
gain ground as more citizens reject all groups in the traditional
political arena, whether pro-government or opposition. Islam
is one such outlet. The Azerbaijan Islamic Party, which advocated
the country’s development through Islamic laws and principles,
was banned in 1996. Its leaders were arrested and accused
of espionage for Iran. Despite rumors that the Iranians helped
to fund the organization, it seems likely that the government
was less afraid of Iranian intrigue than of the appeal of
alternative political views to an increasing restive populace.
While according to a 1997 survey only up to 6 percent of Azerbaijanis
consider themselves devout, Islam’s popularity seems
to be rising. During a demonstration in Baku in early 2002,
shouts of "Allahu Akbar" were heard for the first
time since 1989.
It is possible, therefore, that Islamist ideology may become
a rallying point for impoverished Azerbaijanis. However, regardless
of the form political protest takes, the ailing but still
powerful Aliyev holds the key to the riddle of Azerbaijani
politics. His abrupt departure from the scene could potentially
lead to widespread destabilization or the continuation of
rule by his son. Indeed, even in the way he exits from political
life, Aliyev seems set to retain the controlling influence
over Azerbaijan’s domestic political life.
Editors Note: Daan van der Schriek is a freelance
journalist based in Tbilisi.
Daniel Sershen is project editor for this series.
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Posted February 3, 2003 © Eurasianet
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