AMERICAN AID COULD WORSEN INTERNET RESTRICTIONS IN UZBEKISTAN
A EurasiaNet commentary by David Stubbs

During his mid March visit to the United States, Uzbek President Islam Karimov signed an agreement that secured $55 million in credits from the United States' Export-Import Bank. One can think of this commitment as a show of support for Karimov's participation in the US-led anti-terror coalition. There is a danger, however, that the aid will be used to restrict the development of civil society in Uzbekistan. The Ex-Im Bank component in particular could assist Karimov in curtailing Uzbeks' access to information.

The bank characterized its commitment as economic support for small and medium Uzbek businesses. That sounds like the stuff of economic freedom. But the credits may be bad news for Uzbek internet service providers (ISPs), as a portion of the money may be used by the Uzbek government to consolidate an online monopoly and support a national content-filtering and monitoring program.

Ex-Im Bank has recently received a proposal to fund a $5 million credit to Belam Communications, Inc., a New Jersey-based company with offices in Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia, to provide Internet design and integration assistance to UzPak, the Uzbek government's ISP.

If the proposal is approved, Ex-Im Bank's $5 million credit has the potential to consolidate UzPak's monopoly and to extend UzPak's Internet filtering program to all Uzbek Internet connections. Already, the government-controlled network meddles with citizens' access to Internet sites that originate inside Uzbekistan. With more sophisticated filtering technology, it could seal Uzbeks off from international sites.

This would, politics aside, waste American resources devoted to democratic development in Uzbekistan. The same $5 million in aid could help create up to 40,000 construction jobs that would strengthen the nation's infrastructure, build and renovate schools in poor districts near Afghanistan and support small and medium businesses. But by pledging money to tighten the government's Internet monopoly, the proposed Ex-Im Bank credit will reward and reinforce Karimov's preference for security over stability. The State Department should stop the credits, or change its terms. Helping UzPak strengthen its ability to control information contradicts American principles and existing efforts.

In February 1999, the government passed Resolution 52, which gave UzPak the monopoly on international Internet connectivity. The initial rationale for Resolution 52 was that UzPak should "maintain Uzbekistan's information borders," to quote an UzPak director. This confounds the Internet, which should function as a transnational, unfiltered forum for ideas and expression. The Global Internet Policy Initiative (GIPI) has been working for over a year to counter UzPak's monopoly. If the State Department stands aside while $5 million in American credits help UzPak block other international connections, the US government would be thwarting GIPI and other government-funded efforts to liberalize Uzbek law.

The credit would also reinforce a pattern. Immediately after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, UzPak's staff argued that information security required their monopoly on international connectivity. By the end of 2001 there was a sense that Resolution 52 might be repealed in early 2002, but then UzPak insisted that it could not help its American supplier repay its loan without the law. Apparently, the provider has built its business model around collecting compulsory fees from Uzbek ISPs for international Internet service.

The Ex-Im Bank credit would also quash a growing competition in the Uzbek Internet market. Today, consumers can choose from among 44 ISPs - many of them get their connection through UzPak, while a few ignore Resolution 52 and have their own international satellite connections (which give better service than UzPak for lower fees). Until early this year, Internet cafés were springing up around the country, offering unlimited international access. However, less than 2 weeks after UzPak's deputy director threatened publicly to begin enforcing Resolution 52, cafe patrons have begun to complain about sites becoming unavailable. Presumably, UzPak has begun forcing major ISPs to connect with its network, and cafes and other clients are now subject to UzPak's filtering system.

In May 2001, Karimov spoke in Parliament about the need to promote the Internet for Uzbekistan's future growth. He even produced a new resolution, Number 230, which urges measures to facilitate the growth of Internet use in Uzbekistan. If he really recognizes the role the Internet can play in attracting labor and capital to his landlocked country, Karimov can probably be flexible about how he governs it. And if the United States really wants to prove that it will demand broader democracy and free speech from its new partner, it can withhold Internet funds until Resolution 52 disappears.

It would be hypocritical and counterproductive for the United States to condone and fund enforcement of a national Internet monopoly. Expert organizations like the International Crisis Group have been arguing for months that Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan represents a backlash against Karimov's crackdown on non-sanctioned expressions of religious belief. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbek dissidents report that Karimov's police still routinely round up and torture peaceful opposition members, despite having registered one organization and punished four police officers shortly before his Washington trip. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Ex-Im Bank would be foolish and shortsighted to fund the extension of Karimov-style repression into Uzbek cyberspace.

Editor's Note:David Stubbs is the NIS Coordinator for the Global Internet Policy Initiative in Almaty.

Email this article
Posted March 30, 2002 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org

	The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, politcal and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.