Opposition, Fundamentalism and Human Rights in
Kyrgyzstan
Simon Churchyard: 5/1/00
On April 26, a court case opened in the southern Kyrgyzstani
city of Osh in which several members of an opposition part,
Hizb ut-Tahrir, faced charges of inciting interethnic hatred.
The trial marked the latest stage of the Kyrgyz government's
intense campaign against its political opponents.
The government effort to neutralize the northern-based opposition
alliance, which centers on the El and Ar-Namys parties, has
received considerable attention in the international arena.
The arrest of Feliks Kulov -- the head of the Ar-Namys Party
who was detained on March 22, and has been dubbed a "criminal
abuser of power" by the government -- has developed into
a cause celebre in the West, as highlighted by Madeleine Albright
during her recent visit to Bishkek. [For
background see Eurasia Insight Archive] In sharp contrast,
the crackdown on the southern-based political party Hizb ut-Tahrir,
including the arrests and intimidation of dozens of people
over recent months, has attracted little international and
domestic concern.
The Hizb ut-Tahrir members have been charged with inciting
ethnic hatred under section 299 of the Kyrgyz criminal code.
The wording of the law leaves it open to broad interpretation
and manipulation. The charge stems from the distribution of
leaflets that call for the restoration of the Caliphate, the
Pan-Islamic institution abolished by Turkish nationalist leader
Kemal Ataturk in 1925. The leaflets distributed by Hizb ut-Tahrir
also have been critical of state-supported Islamic clerics
in Uzbekistan, and of Uzbek President Islam Karimov's heavy-handed
policies.
The Hizb ut-Tahrir movement spread in the early 1990s throughout
southern Kyrgyzstan following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
helped by the work of foreign missionaries. Initially, Hizb
ut-Tahrir activists concentrated their efforts on building
a grassroots support base amongst common people, proselytizing
during the winter months when farmers and craftsmen were idle.
More recently, the movement has been distributing printed
matter, including political critiques of western-supported
Islamic states. Uzbekistan’s human rights practices have been
a particular target.
The movement, which sprung up in the 1950s in Palestine and
Syria is trans-national in character. Its aim, stated in its
official literature, is "to change the situation of the corrupt
society so that it is transformed into an Islamic one" under
a restored Caliphate. Intellectually, it represents an anti-colonial
critique of nationalism as an alien ideology imposed upon
the Islamic world by the West. Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology is
essentially non-violent. It rejects the use of force, identifying
the weapons of what it calls its "intellectual and political"
struggle as the use of "thought, conviction and proof."
In its campaign to discredit Hizb ut-Tahrir, Kyrgyzstani
officials have engaged in the arbitrary interpretation of
the country’s legal code, and have grossly misrepresented
the group's aims, describing its members as 'fundamentalists.'
The term "fundamentalist" has come, in common parlance,
to represent a dogmatic religious bigot who refuses to accept
change. Within a strictly Central Asian context, the term
conjures up a picture of a bearded, gun-totting Muslim terrorists.
Incumbent authorities not only in Kyrgyzstan, but also in
other Central Asian regions, have not hesitated to tar opponents
as fundamentalists. They have used the alleged fundamentalist
threat as justification for state repression of individual
liberty. In this spirit, Kyrgyz authorities have attempted
to conflate the Hizb ut-Tahrir with the guerrillas who instigated
the Batken hostage crisis of 1999. This has been done in speeches
which cleverly switch between the terms 'Wahhabi', 'terrorist',
'religious extremist,' 'fundamentalist' and Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Because the term has developed such strong resonance by playing
on certain North American and European fears and prejudices,
the West has been cautious about opposing human rights abuses
committed by Kyrgyzstan under the cover of combating fundamentalism.
The lack of attention given in the West to the persecution
of the Hizb ut-Tahrir has potentially harmful implications
for the development of civil society in Kyrgyzstan. The attacks
may be a precursor to an assault on the freedom of other groups.
For example, a recent article in the leading government ideological
newspaper 'Kyrgyz Tuusu' combined a polemic against these
two movements into an attack on Christian, Bahai and Krishna
groups in Kyrgyzstan. In describing leaders of these peaceful
faiths as' criminal abusers of power' and 'religious extremists'
it combined both the discourses it has used to delegitimize
Hizb ut-Tahrir and Ar-Namys. It ended with a chilling call
to bring these people to criminal prosecution. Even though
they have broken no laws, their labeling as 'fundamentalists'
and 'religious extremists' may well prove enough for the state
to justify persecuting them. One can only speculate with alarm
at who will be the next target after them.
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Posted May 1, 2000 ©Eurasianet
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