Can Afghan Reconstruction Surge After Latest Violence?

Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun like most of the deposed Taliban militia, became president with the Bush administration's endorsement in December 2001 and gained a mandate from Afghans in a special council in June 2002. All along, experts have warned that the United States and other countries that had deposed the Taliban would have to patiently and amply fund Afghanistan's construction workers, bureaucrats, and especially its security corps. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. The United States-led military coalition has shifted security tactics in recent weeks, and soldiers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took over the peacekeeping force guarding the capital on August 11. Recent statements from the Bush administration suggest that officials hope to bolster Karzai's credibility by bolstering improvements in security and infrastructure, without delineating priorities.

"As you start building the infrastructure, it will help the Karzai government to unify the country politically. We have to help them develop basic infrastructure, including transportation, energy and communications. These are pre-requisites to longer-term and sustained economic development," says Daniel D. Stein, regional director for Eurasia at the US Trade and Development Agency. Stein's agency provides funding to private businesses to study opportunities in developing countries. It has committed around $485,000 for field and market research to telecommunications, hotel and extractive companies.

Afghanistan certainly needs economic development, to create jobs for citizens and to counter the surging heroin trade. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. But it is not clear how stably the economy can grow, especially outside Kabul, when basic security systems show large holes. The Bush administration is reportedly due to ask Congress for an additional $1 billion aid package for Afghanistan's reconstruction soon. However, it is not entirely clear where the money is going to come from, and government sources say that experts at the Office of Management and Budget are trying to "pull pots of money from different agencies to get the money together before the end of the year." If this money does not arrive promptly – and does not fund visible, widely useful services – the risk of instability will probably remain or intensify. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives].

Experts stress that Afghanistan's security systems must grow in tandem with its infrastructure. "It's not going well, and not very much has changed in the past year. It's not just money, it's security," says Alina Labrada, spokesperson for CARE, the international relief agency. She said her group will be issuing a report in September that will detail the serious problems that are plaguing Afghanistan's development. United Nations and Afghan officials have said they believe Afghanistan will need at least $15 billion to $20 billion over the next five years. And several reports say security woes may force more reconstruction delays, potentially ballooning the need for aid. The United Nations has delayed work on road projects in the country's eastern provinces twice since May, both times in response to bomb attacks.

The Bush administration, heading into an election campaign, is clearly sensitive to critics that claim its Afghan reconstruction policy has been a failure. "There are tremendous risks operating in Afghanistan. The security situation isn't the greatest, and it's not a place for the faint of heart," says Stein, adding the assistance to date "isn't as much as they need, and not as much as anyone would like them to have, but we are making progress." On July 10, William B. Taylor Jr. became Coordinator for Afghanistan at the State Department. Taylor, who has steered aid to Eurasia for the department earlier in his career, will reportedly arrange to match American advisors with Afghan ministers.

It is unclear, though, how much ministers can do to achieve stability in provinces as long as the country lacks a stable currency, a credible army or a functioning bureaucracy. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Karzai stripped powerful warlord Ismail Khan of one of his military titles on August 14 but allowed him to remain a provincial governor. Experts say that after more than a year as president, Karzai has not persuaded Afghans to think of him as a national authority.

Economic development projects have begun, to be sure, and the Afghan National Army is slowly beginning to assemble. The Berger Group, a mammoth infrastructure-engineering firm, has started work on a highway from Kandahar to Kabul, with plans to extend the road to the west. But without coordination and visible results, projects like this cannot necessarily protect Karzai's image or secure his job.

The International Crisis Group, in a report issued August 5, warned that Karzai's government needs massive support, especially in security planning and staffing, for Afghanistan to weather its transition. "Insecurity in the south and east, impediments to trade and continued competition for influence by the neighboring states present a set of conditions dangerously close to those prevailing at the time of the Taliban's emergence," said the report. "Senior Taliban commanders are ready to capitalize on popular discontent, and [their] long-time allies now govern the Pakistani provinces bordering Afghanistan." Whatever changes the Bush administration makes to its funding, it will probably also have to change the pace at which money converts to projects.