The U.S. Agency for International Development's recently unveiled strategy for assistance to Central Asia (2001-2005) is a sober and cautious plan, apparently born of disappointment in regional governments' records on democratic and economic reform.

The democracy and governance component of the strategy narrows or reduces involvement in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Support for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, is maintained largely at existing levels. Congress will determine actual allocations this fall.

The disappointment implicit in the report is well-founded. Civil and political freedoms are protected unreliably (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), are virtually absent (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), or are entirely absent (Turkmenistan). Despite eight years of international development assistance, civil society is in a profound crisis in Central Asia.

In the face of this crisis, USAID's strategy has been modified to marginalize or eliminate some longer-term strategies for instituting a rule of law, such as in the areas of human rights, election reform, and legal reform. The message seems to be that until authoritarian leaders – including President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan and Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan -- leave office, the United States holds out little hope that assistance can do much to promote civil society over the near term. This message can only be distressing to residents of the region, and possibly to other donors, who may be more inclined to start down that same slippery slope.

Following is a summary of the USAID strategy for each regional country:

In Kazakhstan, USAID will continue its "deep support for a broad range of partners and efforts." Support for democratization will focus on "advocacy and sustainability of a broad range of citizens' organizations, on expanding civic education and information dissemination, and… building capacity of parliamentarians and local governments, with particular emphasis on reducing opportunities for corruption."

Kyrgyzstan will receive "similarly broad level assistance" as does Kazakhstan, with emphasis on economic and financial reform. "Democratization… will continue as a priority with considerable assistance for local government, selected parliamentarians, media and civic organizations, including anti-corruption efforts." Funding will also emphasize health-care reform and unidentified projects in the Ferghana Valley.

USAID involvement in Tajikistan will be constrained by security concerns, so the programs identified may be expanded if the security situation improves. The report notes that "USAID is shifting from short-term humanitarian assistance to a broader effort to include small and medium enterprise development; business and economic education; training for new Parliamentarians; (sic) community and civic organizations; information dissemination; and selected help for elements of health care… Special attention will be given to reconciliation of former combatants, and to the Khojand area of the Ferghana Valley."

In Turkmenistan, assistance "will likely remain quite limited because of pervasive government control and the lack of commitment to any real economic or political reforms by the current regime." In the civic sector, however, USAID is committed to offering assistance in the area of health care, especially for infectious disease control, and to "build foundations for the private sector and civil society through education and organizational assistance."

In Uzbekistan, USAID proposes to provide "a modest level of assistance due to the pervasive control by a massive governmental structure." In the civic sector, it will support "active and informed, (sic) citizens and community organizations; healthcare decentralization and infectious disease control; [and] river basin and wetlands management. Youth, gender, conflict prevention and activities in the Ferghana Valley and Nukus will be particularly important."

On the whole, the regional strategy emphasizes initiatives that are geared for the longer term, such as student exchanges and health care. It also emphasizes initiatives that could balance central government control, such as sub-regional programs for the Ferghana Valley, Atyrau (Kazakhstan), Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan), and Nukus (Uzbekistan). Largely overlooked in such programs are immediate civil society needs of older generations of Central Asian residents.

The USAID strategy is careful to preserve and even expand at least two initiatives that stand to bear fruit in the short term. It will maintain its current programs to strengthen independent local media, but will emphasize legal assistance, support to professional organizations, and liaison with international advocacy groups.

It will also give greater prominence to women's issues. This change may be more of a response to the increased visibility of women's issues on agendas at the White House and Department of State in recent years than to the actual scope of the problem. This type of assistance, if properly implemented, may help address entrenched problems faced by women in Central Asia, including exercising their right to equal treatment before the law.

But, in the relative absence of assistance for broader civil and political rights in Central Asia, support for "women's issues" has a cynical ring. Human Rights Watch's Cassandra Cavanaugh, who recently concluded an investigation into domestic violence issues in Uzbekistan, suspects that USAID is backing women's groups at least in part "because they are seen as a less challenging way to promote ways of empowering [civil society]." Stranger still is that the strategy paper does not identify specific projects for achieving this goal.

It is axiomatic that a little money well spent can go as far as a lot of money poorly spent. One important and laudable step toward better accountability was the USAID decision to channel virtually all democracy assistance to the non-governmental sector, bypassing notoriously corrupt government agencies. More aggressive streamlining of, and accountability for the success of programs could maximize the revised USAID programs' impact on civil society in Central Asia. Money saved might then be applied to allow for a more patient, bold, and principled approach to building democracy -- something Central Asia appears to need.

By putting fiscal responsibility first, the new USAID strategy for Central Asia may have started down the slippery slope toward abandoning those now struggling to foster civil society in Central Asia. Once one international donor begins to narrow its engagement in democracy building, others may follow. Moreover, the new strategy is ill-timed: now is precisely the moment when current civic activists in Central Asia need the most visibility and support. "First-generation" beneficiaries stand to suffer from USAID's revised plan for assistance in Central Asia. Sadly, they are the sector of society that the "second generation" must build on.

Editor’s Note: Erika Dailey works for the Central Eurasia Project, covering human rights-related issues in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Between 1992 and 1998, Ms. Dailey worked as a researcher and human rights advocate for Human Rights Watch, based in New York and Moscow, covering principally the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation. Since 1998, Dailey has worked as a human rights advocate for Human Rights Watch, the International League for Human Rights, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. She has a BA in Slavic Studies from Princeton (1986) and an MA in Central Asian Studies from Columbia (1991). She has lived in and traveled to the Caucasus and Central Asia regularly since 1987.

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Posted September 21, 2000 © Eurasianet
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