US Officials Relying on Engagement Strategy to Promote Change in Central Asia

A National Security Council official, speaking on background, recently told policy experts and foreign diplomats that the Bush Administration views the policy challenge in Central Asia as a balancing act between internal reform, security and energy. "The focus on security is overriding, but not exclusive," the official said.

The US assistance budget for the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – has more than doubled from fiscal year 2001 to the current year – from $230 million to $595 million. Despite the dramatic increase, some experts say the aid outlays are woefully inadequate to fulfill Washington's stabilization aims for Central Asia, a region beset by extreme poverty and exploding population growth.

The geopolitical imperative and military dimension of the US presence in Central Asia dictate engagement with regimes, even though the United States has cited these same countries for human rights violations. [For background see the EurasiaNet Human Rights archives]. State Department officials believe that these governments can be transformed. "We have very, very frank discussions with them," a senior official said. "Sometimes it works. However, we should not overestimate our influence."

"The measuring stick should not be Latvia, which sees itself as an integral – and integrating – part of Europe, but rather East Asian countries," says a senior US official with vast experience in Asia, and who is now shaping US Central Asian policy. "Thirty years ago, three out of five ASEAN members had not recognized each other. Today, they are trading and cooperating," he says.

Others with considerable experience in Central Asia disagree that the engagement strategy can bring about the desired results. Existing social dilemmas, including overpopulation and poverty, are sufficiently dire that they must be immediately addressed. Giving gradual change a chance greatly heightens the risk of social upheaval, they contend. Given the existing conditions, the United States should adopt a tougher stance towards Central Asian governments in an attempt to compel better behavior. For example, they add, the United States should condition aid on improved performance in the human rights sphere by Central Asian governments.

As time goes by, radical Islam is becoming an increasingly potent force in Central Asia, analysts say. "The main threat in Central Asia is the growth of Salafi Islam, which preaches total rejection of modernity, of culture and the arts," said Olivier Roy, Research Director for Humanities and Social Studies at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris. Salafi beliefs are advocated by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network. They are also closely linked with other radical Islamic movements, including Wahhabism.

Roy, who spoke recently at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced and International Studies, warns that the challenge of radical Islam in Central Asia needs to be examined through the prism of Wahhabi militancy worldwide. However, when challenged, US officials admit that they have yet to develop tactics to win hearts and minds of discontented Muslims in Central Asia and elsewhere. If and when such a multi-faceted approach is ready, Central Asia, no doubt, will be one of its first testing grounds.

In the meantime, State Department officials see no viable alternative to engagement with incumbent Central Asian leaders. "We did not assign a high enough priority to the region, including Afghanistan, and see what happened – 9/11!" explains a senior policy maker.

Outside of military cooperation, the US stabilization strategy is focusing on several areas, including promoting independent judiciaries and law enforcement agencies; enhancing drug interdiction capabilities; encouraging more efficient usage of water resources and more stringent environmental standards; and expanding higher educational opportunities.

A State Department official in charge of assistance coordination believes that well targeted projects, executed together with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, can produce improved macroeconomic conditions in Central Asia. However, the official said the ultimate success of such initiatives will depend on private investment. At present, many foreign investors are wary of doing business in Central Asia, citing concerns about corruption and the uncertain legal frameworks.

The Bush Administration hopes the development of Central Asia's abundant natural resources will serve as the engine that drives living standards higher. Accordingly, US officials are eager to assure that a significant share of oil and gas development proceeds, along with export transit fees, are channeled to poverty-eradication programs.

With this goal in mind, a trans-Afghanistan pipeline has reappeared on Washington's foreign policy radar screen. [For background see the EurasiaNet Business and Economics archive]. "Turkmenistan can do better than to sell gas to Gazprom and Itera for half-price," one official says.

Administration officials are enthusiastic about a pipeline via Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, citing the huge potential energy market in South Asia. However, many remain skeptical about the viability of such a pipeline route, citing numerous geopolitical obstacles. "All that is needed is to get rid of the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, a more democratic regime in Ashgabat, and peace between India and Pakistan," quipped one former oil executive with extensive experience in Central Asia.