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OPPOSITION IN EXILE: TURKMENISTAN
Rustem Safronov: 12/09/02
This is the first in a series of reports on opposition
movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Read
more about this series.
Introduction
Turkmenistan features one of Central Asia’s most repressive
political systems, but cracks in President Saparmurat Niyazov’s
authoritarian façade appeared in 2002. For much of
the last decade, Niyazov had been successful in crushing all
domestic challenges to his authority. However, several high-profile
defections over the past year or so stung Niyazov, and provided
a large boost to exile-engineered efforts to oust the Turkmen
leader. Niyazov responded by carrying out a series of government
purges, particularly in the country’s security apparatus.
These developments lent Niyazov’s regime an air of vulnerability.
The failed attempt to assassinate Niyazov on November 25 served
to heighten the possibility of a political confrontation.
Officially known as Turkmenbashi – Leader of the Turkmen
– Niyazov has likened himself to a prophet, as well as to
Turkey’s great modernizer, Kemal Ataturk. Since Turkmenistan
gained independence, Niyazov has built a personality cult
that evokes some aspects of the Stalinist era. At the same
time, the Turkmen leader has curtailed basic economic and
political rights, crushing any opposition and heavily censoring
the media.
Throughout 2002, faults in the authoritarian system became
evident. The National Security Committee (KNB), successor
to the KGB, which had previously been given carte blanche
when it came to enforcing Niyazov’s wishes, themselves
became the victims of purges throughout March and April. One
by one, those in KNB leadership positions, and even a few
in Niyazov’s innermost circle, fell into disfavor and
were dismissed. The purges continued through the fall. Additionally,
a number of high-ranking officials and business leaders fled
the country over the course of the year.
The personnel changes, combined with geopolitical shifts
and several outrageous proclamations – including a decree
renaming the months and days of the week – have brought increased
international attention to the various Turkmen opposition
groups.
The assassination attempt of late November – responsibility
for which has not been claimed by any group, opposition or
otherwise – highlights the more public nature of the conflict
between government and opposition. Authorities state that
they have incontrovertible proof of the complicity of some
members of the opposition. However, a number of exiled politicians,
such as Saparmurat Yklimov, who has been labeled a conspirator
by the government, claim authorities themselves orchestrated
the assassination attempt to legitimize a crackdown on the
opposition.
Background
Early Independent Political Movements
In 1991, when the republics of the Soviet Union gained independence,
Turkmenistan was the strongest voice for maintaining the status
quo, with 98 percent of the population voting to remain part
of the USSR. Niyazov, head of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan
since 1985, was subsequently elected president of the newly
independent state. From the start, Niyazov shunned reform,
instead maintaining tight state control over the country’s
civil life.
Organizations opposed to Niyazov emerged toward the close
of Gorbachev’s perestroika era. In 1989, Nurberdy Nurmamedov,
Babpa Gheoklen, Akhmuhamed Velsapar and other members of the
cultural elite created Turkmenistan’s first opposition
movement, Agzybirlik. Like similar groups in other
former Soviet republics, this intelligentsia-led movement
called for both democratic reforms and cultural revival. After
decades of state-sponsored Russification, they appealed for
the restoration of Turkmen as the country’s language
and advocated a revitalization of folk traditions. On January
12, 1990, Agzybirlik organized the opposition’s first
significant political demonstration. Held in the town of Geok-Teppe,
this important symbolic gathering commemorated the 110th anniversary
of the siege and defeat of the Turkmen garrison there by Russian
imperial forces.
In 1991, members of the Academy of Sciences created Paikhas.
Led by Shokhrat Kadyrov, a prominent historian and the country’s
leading demographer, this group endeavored to promote liberal
ideas and initiate public discussion of politics. Also in
1991, Murad Salamatov, a philosopher and journalist known
as "the Sakharov of Turkmenistan," published the
first independent journal Dayanch.
Given the tradition of rule from above that dominated Turkmenistani
and Soviet society, grassroots support for these early opposition
groups was limited, and membership consisted primarily of
representatives of the country’s learned elite. Meanwhile
Niyazov courted public opinion – to a certain degree – with
a tough stance on crime and a pledge to maintain state-subsidized
food distribution.
From 1991 to 1993, various opposition groups conducted limited
protests against the rapidly entrenching Niyazov regime, including
strikes, pickets, and attempts to introduce alternative candidates
during elections. Consolidating his power-base, Niyazov moved
to suppress his critics in the intelligentsia. Law enforcement
officials arrested leading Agzybirlik figure Shirali Nurmuradov
on accusations of fraud October 1, 1990 and closed Salamatov’s
journal March 11, 1992. Many other dissidents were repeatedly
taken into custody and questioned by the KNB.
Nurmuradov, Kadyrov, Velsapar, and other prominent dissidents
felt compelled to leave the country. Salamatov, Nurmamedov,
and a few others remain in Turkmenistan. The former remains
under constant surveillance, while the latter, in an event
reminiscent of the worst episodes of Stalinism, was only freed
from prison upon publicly repenting his opposition to the
regime and declaring his loyalty to Niyazov.
By 1993, the KNB had eliminated almost all traces of domestic
opposition, and Niyazov’s personality cult had begun
to take root.
Activity in Exile
Despite a common desire to bring about political change in
Turkmenistan, ideological differences helped keep leaders
of the first wave of Niyazov opponents from unifying. Open
protests or attempts by those remaining in Turkmenistan to
legally circumvent Niyazov’s edicts were quickly stamped
out by the KNB. Those living abroad were limited to publishing
anonymous letters and articles for fear of reprisals.
By 1994, Moscow had emerged as the unofficial capital of
Turkmenistan’s opposition, with attention centered on
the activities of Avdi Kuliev. Turkmenistan’s
first foreign minister, Kuliev left the government in 1992
in protest against Niyazov’s policy decisions and steadily
increasing power. Upon arriving in Moscow, he founded the
Turkmenistan Foundation, which was the nucleus for
the present-day United Democratic Opposition of Turkmenistan
(UDOT). Throughout 1994-1995, the Turkmenistan Foundation
gained momentum, bringing heightened attention to Turkmenistan’s
plight. Kuliev’s supporters talked eagerly of his triumphant
return to Ashgabat, and a real, if perhaps remote, possibility
of the overthrow of Niyazov seemed to exist.
Turkmenistan’s secret service, however, took measures
to neutralize the threat posed by Kuliev’s potential
return. On October 28, 1994, Khoshali Garayev and Mukhamedkuli
Aitmuratov, Turkmenistan Foundation emissaries on their way
to Ashgabat, were arrested in Tashkent and extradited to Turkmenistan.
Aitmuratov is still serving a long prison sentence for his
association with Kuliev, while Garayev died in prison in 1999
under circumstances deemed suspicious by international rights
groups such as Human
Rights Watch and Memorial.
In April 1998, during Niyazov’s official visit to Washington,
Kuliev himself attempted a return to Ashgabat, but was detained
at the airport upon arrival and ultimately deported.
Opposition activity was limited from 1998-2001. In 1999,
Niyazov restored the system of entry and exit visas, according
to which any person wishing to leave the country was required
to apply to the authorities for permission. In addition to
restricting freedom of movement, this policy made it difficult
for Niyazov critics in exile to maintain ties with opponents
inside the country. Ultimately, Kuliev’s activities dwindled
as his movement struggled in the face of increased persecution
of activists within Turkmenistan and a funding shortage.
The opposition began to reassert itself in November 2001,
following the defection of Boris Shikhmuradov, Turkmenistan’s
Ambassador to China. Shikhmuradov, who had served as Kuliev’s
Deputy Foreign Minister and eventually replaced him, had been
considered a staunch Niyazov loyalist. A long-time member
of the ruling elite and the architect of Turkmenistan’s
vaunted neutral status, Shikhmuradov’s defection dealt
a serious blow to Niyazov’s image of absolute ruler.
Rather than align himself with Kuliev, however, Shikhmuradov
soon established his own opposition group, the People’s
Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan.
The Opposition
Within Turkmenistan itself, the opposition has effectively
been silenced since the mid-1990s. Occasional articles have
surfaced, which many believe to have been written by Salamatov.
A small number of NGOs operate in semi-secrecy, struggling
to keep their activities beyond the security service’s
notice. With such stringent limits placed on political activity,
many observers’ attention has turned to exiled political
figures.
Kuliev
Shikhmuradov’s defection polarized the opposition in
exile, with most falling into two distinct camps. Critics
from the first wave of opposition émigrés regard
Shikhmuradov with suspicion, given his long association with
and previous support for Niyazov’s regime. Many perceive
him to be corrupt, or at the very least severely compromised
by his past. Avdi Kuliev remains the focal point for the first
wave of opposition exiles.
Initially, Kuliev believed changes to Turkmenistan’s
one-party rule would evolve naturally. Thus, Kuliev’s
Turkmenistan Foundation initially billed itself as an apolitical
organization representing the Turkmenistani diaspora in Russia.
As the nature of Niyazov’s rule became clearer, however,
Kuliev concluded that the development of a multi-party system
could only be accomplished through the creation of an extensive,
vocal opposition movement to push for political change.
By the time of Shikhmuradov’s defection, Kuliev’s
political stance had shifted from moderate ethnic nationalism
to a vaguer, social-democratic platform that allowed him to
effectively absorb various factions. In 1997 the Turkmenistan
Foundation evolved into the UDOT, a broad alliance of exiled
groups including: the Russian Community of Turkmenistan,
headed by Anatoly Fomin, the Communist and Social-Democratic
parties of Turkmenistan, and a number of smaller groups.
If Niyazov were to fall, Kuliev has stated that he would call
for immediate, internationally monitored elections. He has
often stated his support for democratic principles and a mixed
economy of state and private property.
By many accounts, prior to leaving Turkmenistan Kuliev enjoyed
strong popular support. His fluent Turkmen and personal charisma
endowed him with considerable backing in the smaller cities
and rural areas. However, Kuliev’s current appeal is
extremely difficult to gauge, given that he has been in exile
for a decade, his funding restricted to grants from non-governmental
donors and human rights groups.
Shikhmuradov
Shikhmuradov is a politician with more than twenty-five years’
experience in both the Soviet and Turkmenistani diplomatic
corps, primarily in Pakistan and India. He claims to have
been covertly opposing Niyazov since the mid-1990s, despite
his high-profile government positions. Shikhmuradov particularly
disapproved of Niyazov’s isolationist policies, and says
he was strongly opposed to Niyazov’s decisions to close
cultural venues such as theaters, the ballet and the circus.
On November 2, 2001, the Turkmenistani authorities brought
criminal charges of embezzlement and unlawful arms sales against
the former foreign minister. He left Beijing for Moscow the
next month, moving on soon thereafter under threat of extradition.
In the months following Shikhmuradov’s defection, a
number of other high-ranking officials joined his new opposition
movement, leading Kadyrov to classify them as the "nomenklatura
opposition." The Provisional Executive Council of Shikhmuradov’s
movement claims twenty-three members. The eleven publicly
known members are former political and business figures such
as ex-Central Bank chief Khudaiberdi Orazov, former Ambassador
to Turkey Nurmuhammed Hanamov, and a number of other former
diplomats and officials. The identities of the remaining twelve
members of the Executive Council are concealed, as they are
purportedly still inside the country.
Shikhmuradov, a liberal pragmatist, publicly favors closer
ties with the West and believes that he and his supporters
are more likely to attract support from the international
community than Kuliev. Like Kuliev, Shikhmuradov advocates
democratic principles; however, in the event of a regime change
Shikhmuradov’s group would declare an eighteen-month
"transitional period" in which no elections would
be held. This would be a period of intensive economic reform,
involving the privatization of a number of state-owned industries.
Despite accusations that he used his governmental positions
for personal enrichment, Shikhmuradov’s platform is popular
with pro-Western intellectuals and educated youth in Ashgabat.
He also claims to have the support of many officials remaining
in Niyazov’s government that are allegedly fed up with
Niyazov’s extremes.
Strategies
As interest in Turkmenistan increased this year, both Shikhmuradov
and Kuliev have made active use of the international press
– a likely explanation for Niyazov’s recent crackdown
on non-Turkmen media. Russian newspapers are no longer distributed
in the country, supposedly because the country cannot afford
them. Additionally, authorities are reportedly planning to
remove from people’s homes any satellite dishes capable
of receiving Russian television signals. At present, Radio
Liberty continues to play an important role as one of the
few alternative opinions reaching the public. Kuliev has been
particularly effective in reaching a broader swath of the
population via the Turkmen language service.
Many observers feel that the United States and Russia, two
powers with some hope of influencing Niyazov’s behavior,
have done little to pressure the Turkmenistani president into
opening up society. In spite of a history of documented human
rights abuses, and the regime’s unofficial support for
the Taliban, Niyazov has thus far silenced external criticism
from both states by playing his energy pipeline card. Russia
wants Turkmenistan’s abundant natural gas to be sent
through its territory to the West, whereas the United States
desires the pipeline to go through Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In addition, both countries have an interest in a stable regime
in a region already fraught with more than its share of unrest.
The US decision on August 27, 2002 to increase technical assistance
to the Turkmenistani Border Guards attests to the importance
of this task in the minds of US policymakers. While there
may be cracks in the regime’s foundation, Niyazov has
thus far been able to neutralize international pressure through
a mixture of fortuitous placement and clever diplomacy.
However, Niyazov’s balancing act may not last for long.
American military action in Afghanistan has sparked political
processes in the region that may yet affect Turkmenistan’s
internal politics. This, paired with the element of unpredictability
added by the recent assassination attempt, may further complicate
Niyazov’s delicate position.
Future Prospects
Increased Opposition Activity
Heightened attention to the region and Niyazov’s increasingly
repressive policies have spurred the opposition to increase
its activities. Both Shikhmuradov and Kuliev are of the opinion
that further steps can only be taken by moving the center
of opposition activity into the country itself.
Although reluctant to speak openly about future plans, Kuliev
is said to be working at establishing reliable means of communication
with groups of supporters inside the country. In addition,
the UDOT is attempting to distribute leaflets and copies of
their journal on floppy disks inside the country. Kuliev claims
that the coordination of formerly isolated groups opposed
to Niyazov has improved in recent months. He hopes that the
UDOT’s activities inside Turkmenistan, combined with
pressure from Western countries, Russia and international
human rights organizations, will create conditions allowing
the opposition to return.
Shikhmuradov, who had previously believed combined pressure
from the nomenklatura within the country and external pressure
from the West would force Niyazov to step down, has since
realized the necessity of garnering the popular support. He
and his supporters are presently looking for ways to influence
public thinking, and are hoping to organize protest actions
to topple the regime from inside. In late August, the Temporary
Executive Council of Shikhmuradov’s organization decided
to coordinate their eventual return to the country with members
of the Russian and Western media, in the hopes that such a
group action would limit punitive measures by Niyazov. Kuliev
has long advocated similar strategies. However, Niyazov’s
visa-tightening measures and newly implemented regulations
since the assassination attempt requiring mandatory interrogation
of all foreigners entering the country could create serious
obstacles to their future return.
In addition to the Shikhmuradov and Kuliev camps, there reportedly
are a number of less prominent groups that have been jockeying
for position, such as one led by former Deputy Prime Minister
Nazar Soyunov. In addition, another, less quantifiable,
influence is that of the narcotics cartels that control much
of the drug trade that flows through Turkmenistan. Some observers
say traffickers have the necessary funding, and possibly other
means – in the form of compromising information that can confirm
allegations of government involvement in smuggling operations
– to seriously damage Niyazov.
Recent Events
In June of this year, the International Helsinki Federation
(IHF) and the Russia-based organization Memorial convened
a conference in Vienna concerning human rights abuses in Turkmenistan.
For the first time, members of the Turkmenistani diaspora
were given an international platform to raise human rights
issues and make recommendations to the international community.
The dissident community had high hopes that both Kuliev and
Shikhmuradov would appear and present a unified opposition
front. Kuliev attended, along with many of his supporters
and representatives of the various factions of the UDOT.
Despite the raised hopes and high turnout, Shikhmuradov did
not appear at the Vienna conference, citing security concerns.
Although Kuliev and Shikhmuradov spoke by telephone, cooperation
has proven elusive. They initially agreed to establish a roundtable
of democratic opposition forces to create a common strategy
for opposing Niyazov, but it now appears that Shikhmuradov
has little interest in aligning with Kuliev. (A follow-up
meeting to the Vienna conference took place in November in
Moscow, again bringing together a broad array of human rights
defenders and opposition members, with the exception of Shikhmuradov
and his representatives.)
Despite recognizing that a unified front would enhance their
position, Shikhmuradov, Kuliev and their supporters remain
divided. The two groups have several substantial obstacles
to overcome before any talk of a merger can occur. Rivalries,
mistrust, and competing visions continue to keep the opposition
movements apart. Given Niyazov’s present crackdowns and
their anticipated intensification as the reaction to the assassination
attempt gathers steam, neither group seems likely to force
him from power in the near future.
However, there have been a number of recent reports of civil
unrest in the country in addition to the November attempt
on Niyazov’s life, such as the October 10 distribution
of anti-government leaflets in the northern town of Dashoguz
and the August 8 protests by women outside a session of parliament.
Both indicate that the general population, like the opposition,
may be entering a period of greater political activity. Such
actions, combined with the constant turnover of personnel
in the most loyal departments of Niyazov’s government
(including the March purges, which took down the Chair of
the KNB, Muhammet Nazarov, and the September 10 firing of
his replacement, Poran Berdiev) give the opposition some hope.
The recent assassination attempt on Niyazov’s life has
already changed the political atmosphere inside the country,
but it is too soon to predict what influence this will have
on the opposition’s strategic decisionmaking.
Editor’s Note: Rustem Safronov frequently contributes
to the BBC's Russian Service and Voice of America's Eurasian
Service. He has written a chapter on Islam in Turkmenistan
for the Center for Political & Strategic Studies and produced
two documentaries about Turkmenistan for Russian State Television.
Daniel Sershen is project editor for this series.
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Posted December 9, 2002 © Eurasianet
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