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KYRGYZSTAN: ORGANIZED OPPOSITION AND CIVIL UNREST
Alisher Khamidov: 12/16/02
This is the second in a series of reports on opposition
movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Read
more about this series.
Introduction
The government of Kyrgyzstan, once considered Central Asia’s
most reform-minded, has in recent years taken steady steps
in an authoritarian direction. A concurrent rise of opposition
to President Askar Akayev’s administration combines elements
of both traditional political protest and underground activity,
punctuated in 2002 by violent confrontation and large-scale
protests in the economically depressed and politically marginalized
South.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan
staked a claim as the most reformist of the Central Asian
states. However, Akayev’s moves to gain broad control
over mass media and the political apparatus in the mid-1990s
began to tarnish the country’s image as "an island
of democracy." The traditional opposition a bloc of
political parties, civil society groups and human rights organizations
has built support by seizing on popular discontent over
such issues as economic stagnation and regional and economic
exclusion. As Akayev has moved away from democratization,
Kyrgyzstan has experienced a rise in Islamic radical activity,
most notably the incursions made by the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000.
In 2002, the Kyrgyzstani opposition’s rise to prominence
accelerated, surging on a wave of public protest over a border
treaty in which Kyrgyzstan ceded China nearly 100,000 hectares
of territory. Kyrgyzstan finds itself at a crossroads. After
the violent clashes in March 2002 between protestors and police,
the opposition has intensified pressure on Akayev’s government.
Some opposition politicians have managed to associate themselves
with the broader protest movement, but their ongoing challenge
is maintain their position as the standard-bearers for anti-Akayev
sentiment, while maintaining an approach that is both politically
constructive and democratic. The deepening division between
the moderate and hard-line segments of the opposition underscores
the difficulty of this task. Some seek accommodation with
the government and others claim that the only way to move
forward is to bring about Akayev’s ouster. The government’s
decision in late November 2002 to allow Russia to establish
an air base on Kyrgyz territory further antagonized Akayev’s
opponents, who portray the move as a violation of the country’s
sovereignty.
Background
Kyrgyzstan Since Independence
In the early years of Kyrgyzstani independence, Akayev fostered
ties with neighboring nations and launched an ambitious program
of free-market reforms, making him a favorite of the international
donor community. By the mid-1990s, however, Akayev started
to back away from democratization.
On February 10, 1996, a constitutional referendum was approved
greatly expanding presidential powers. At the same time, plummeting
living standards and steady economic decline continued to
mark daily life and resulted in widespread popular discontent.
Trouble on the borders echoed the grave domestic situation,
as IMU insurgents operated in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000,
facing little resistance from government forces. Akayev secured
reelection as president in an October 2000 vote that international
observers including Human
Rights Watch, the US
Department of State and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) characterized
as marked by intimidation and ballot fraud. Feliks Kulov,
Akayev’s chief political rival and former vice president,
was subsequently jailed on abuse of power charges.
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Kyrgyzstan
built strong security ties with the US-led anti-terrorism
coalition, which established an air base at Manas airport
near the capital, Bishkek. Increased US-Kyrgyzstani cooperation,
together with Akayev’s intensifying campaign against
independent voices, led to accusations
of an informal quid pro quo between the countries, in
which the US restrained its criticism of Kyrgyzstan’s
human rights record in return for military access to Kyrgyzstani
facilities.
As Akayev raised his profile abroad, the country’s domestic
conditions continued to deteriorate. In spring 2002, thousands
of people took to the streets in the South to protest the
controversial border pact with China and the jailing of opposition
parliament member Azimbek Beknazarov. The deaths of six demonstrators
in clashes with police in the Ak-Sui region provoked a public
outcry and forced Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev’s government
to resign in May 2002. These most recent events continue to
exert significant influence over developments. Ongoing protests
have demanded the prosecution of central government officials
who opposition leaders accuse of giving security forces the
order to shoot at Ak-Sui. Akayev has so far resisted such
pressure. Nevertheless, his handling of the fallout over the
Ak-Sui events has reportedly alienated hardliners within the
government who favor a crackdown on opposition activity.
The Opposition Since 1990
In 1990, the revitalized Kyrgyz intelligentsia formed the
Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DMK), which became
the main force in the newly independent country’s first
parliament. The initial harmony between Akayev and parliament
began to sour in 1993 amidst growing legislative resistance
to government corruption and mismanagement. The president
held a public referendum of approval for his presidency on
January 30, 1994; the results announced by the government
(96 percent in favor) were widely seen as rigged. Regardless,
the referendum forced the parliament to dissolve. It was replaced
by a new bicameral legislature known as the Jorgorku Kenesh.
The DMK’s leader, Topchubek Turgunaliev, was subsequently
imprisoned on charges of fraud.
Fragmented and weakened, opposition groups took a less direct
approach, channeling criticism through private media outlets
and civil society organizations. Soon thereafter, the authorities
moved to consolidate all printing presses into government
hands and closed three newspapers entirely, including the
popular Svobodniye Gory, the official organ of the parliament,
which dissolved on September 5, 1994. Government officials
also began the practice of filing suit against newspapers
as private individuals, thereby exposing them to charges of
defamation and slander.
In later years, the opposition turned to the international
community as the administration continued to backtrack on
democratization. Despite pressure from abroad, allegations
of police abuse, religious persecution, trafficking of women
and violations of the right to free expression by organizations
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International began
to wear away at Kyrgyzstan’s international reputation.
Akayev retained the presidency in 2000 by a landslide, in
elections that the OSCE, the National Democratic Institute
(NDI) and other international monitors regarded as rigged.
Foreshadowing later events, the news of Akayev’s reelection
triggered public protests among supporters of Kulov and Omurbek
Tekebayev, two other presidential hopefuls. Protesters blocked
the main north-south highway in Jalalabad province for several
days, and in the village of Baitik supporters picketed a number
of government buildings.
The Opposition
The Kyrgyzstani political opposition falls into three general
categories. The official opposition parties and their leaders
compete for the presidency, parliamentary seats, and local
posts. The second group is a more nebulous and unofficial
amalgamation of anti-Akayev human rights groups, media outlets,
and NGOs. Finally, there are the banned Islamist organizations
that seek a total overhaul of the government. While there
are clearly connections between these branches and their ultimate
goal of ousting Akayev is the same, their different characteristics
and methods of operation deserve separate attention.
Political Parties
In 2000, the number of political parties in Kyrgyzstan had
reached 27, according to Ministry of Justice statistics. However,
lack of funding, an absence of grassroots support and numerous
re-registration procedures imposed by the authorities leaves
only a handful of politically active groups. Among the most
influential opposition parties is Kulov’s Ar-Namys,
created in 1999. Having a charismatic leader and an appealing
political program, Ar-Namys quickly gained a solid reputation
among students, unemployed youth, and the rural population.
The Communist Party, led by Absamat Masaliev, a former
General Secretary of the party during the Soviet era, retains
its political appeal, especially among the elderly and among
residents of southern Kyrgyzstan, where memories of a heavily
subsidized life remain fresh. Many supporters of Tekebayev’s
Socialist Party Ata-Meken also come from rural areas
in the South. The party’s main goal is to gain southerners
a more prominent role in the political and economic life of
the country.
In the fall of 2001, amidst the political scandal surrounding
the Kyrgyzstani government’s secret land transfer agreement
with China, four major parties (Ata-Meken, Erkindik,
El and Ar-Namys) formed an influential political alliance
called the People’s Congress, with the imprisoned
Kulov as its nominal leader.
Kulov and Beknazarov: Two Major
Players
Earlier in his career, Kulov, a former Soviet police official,
was one of Akayev’s most trusted political allies. Having
played a significant role in ending the 1990 ethnic violence
in Osh and having providing strong military support to Akayev’s
regime during the fall of the Soviet Union, Kulov was made
Akayev’s vice president in 1992. Later, he served as
Minister of National Security, during which time he was accused
of participating in an aborted coup attempt. Meanwhile, much
of the equipment allocated to a special task force set up
by Kulov, including electronic eavesdropping devices, mysteriously
disappeared. The president, already doubtful of Kulov’s
loyalty, demoted him in 1998 to the post of mayor of Bishkek.
In late 1999, Kulov resigned and set up his own party to oppose
Akayev in the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections.
In January 2001, as his split with Akayev grew deeper, a Bishkek
court found Kulov guilty of fraud and abuse of power, giving
him a seven-year prison term.
As Akayev applied pressure to the opposition, differences
over the settlement of a border dispute between Kyrgyzstan
and China prompted a power struggle between the executive
and legislative branches of government. Kyrgyz nationalists
and opposition parliamentary deputies assailed the agreement,
in which Kyrgyzstan gave up 95,000 hectares of territory.
Beknazarov, chairman of the parliament’s Judicial and
Legal Reform Committee, was the leading critic of the border
agreement. On January 8, 2002, authorities charged him with
various violations in connection with his handling of a 1995
murder case while serving as a district prosecutor. Outraged
supporters, including civil society leaders and his colleagues
in parliament (especially from the People’s Congress,
with whom he has close ties), staged hunger strikes and other
protests.
On March 17, security forces clashed with Beknazarov’s
supporters in a remote section of Jalalabad province, leaving
at least six dead and 61 people injured. The bloodshed triggered
public riots in the Ak-Sui region, with crowds of people attacking
government buildings and the police. The government responded
by releasing Beknazarov and sending additional troops to restore
order. Largely due to these events, Beknazarov has emerged
as one of the most popular public figures in Kyrgyzstan, despite
the fact that his base of support is mainly in the country’s
South.
The events of March 2002 produced more than disorganized
unrest, however. On August 14, a number of opposition groups
and NGOs all of which had been involved in two public forums
organized to discuss the clashes in Jalalabad formed the
Movement for the Resignation of President Askar Akayev
and Reforms for the People. This group, which included
parties such as the Communists, Erkindik and Asaba, a number
of opposition members of parliament and civil society activists,
embarked on a series of public demonstrations and protest
marches that ran sporadically through the end of 2002.
Civil Society as Opposition
As popular protests in the South accelerated, many opposition
groups and political parties seemed to be struggling to keep
up. Unofficial opposition groups also did their best to harness
southern discontent. These include groups that in Western
societies would not be considered to be of an overtly anti-governmental
nature. However, in Kyrgyzstan (as elsewhere in Central Asia),
the relatively weak official opposition and increasingly arbitrary
behavior of the central government often cause potential dissidents
to seek other outlets.
The civil society component of the opposition comprises several
human rights and non-governmental organizations formed in
the early 1990’s with the solid backing of international
donors. Prominent figures within this group are Ramazan Dyryldaev,
chairman of the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights (KCHR);
Tursunbek Akunov, head of the Human Rights Movement of Kyrgyzstan;
Nataliya Ablova, head of the Kyrgyz-American Bureau for Human
Rights; and Tolekan Ismailova, former President of the Kyrgyzstani
NGO Coalition and chairwoman of the non-profit group Civil
Society Against Corruption.
These groups and individuals maintain close ties with the
independent media. Despite authorities’ efforts at control,
several print outlets have preserved some level of economic
and political independence. Weeklies such as Delo No., Respublica,
Moya Stolitsa-Novosti, Litsa and Agym emerged as sources of
alternative viewpoints during the late 1990s. However, their
small circulation limits their audience mainly to Russian-speaking
residents in large northern cities. Among prominent figures
in the media group are Zamira Sydikova, editor of the weekly
Respublica; Rina Prijivoit, columnist and assistant editor
of Moya Stolitsa-Novosti; and Kuban Mambetaliev, head of the
journalist’s association.
Since the mid-1990’s, legal pressure against such independent
voices has steadily increased, especially after the presidential
elections in 2000. Moya Stolitsa-Novosti represents the most
recent and severe challenge to officials. This weekly emerged
in 2001 after the authorities effectively commandeered the
prominent Vecherniy Bishkek by buying up shares of the paper.
Employing staff from the co-opted Vecherniy Bishkek, Moya
Stolitsa-Novosti published a series of editorials and articles
exposing corruption in the upper echelons of power. The newspaper
further angered the administration by connecting illegal economic
activity to the ruling elite, including members of Akayev’s
immediate family.
Underground Movements
Recent developments have additionally served to strengthen
various underground religious organizations, in particular
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a group calling for the establishment of an
Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. Officials contend that
leaflet distribution and other activities by Hizb-ut-Tahrir
encourage the violent overthrow of the government. The group,
meanwhile, says it advocates peaceful change. During its 1999
and 2000 incursions, the IMU also met with a significant level
of popular support from the local Kyrgyz population.
Opposition Relations
Perhaps not surprising given the diverse nature of its components,
relations within the opposition have long been chaotic at
best and confrontational at worst. While vocally agreeing
on some basic domestic issues, various leaders of traditional
opposition movements and parties have been divided in the
areas of democratic and economic development, responsibilities
of government, foreign policy and domestic security. This
can be explained by a set of geographical, ideological, professional
and generational differences. While an increasing number of
young, pro-Western liberals are assuming prominent positions
within the opposition, the vast majority of leaders are representatives
of the older generation, which preserve some of the values
and ideals of the Soviet past. Another essential factor in
fostering differences among opposition leaders is the North-South
division. While many heads of civil society, media and human
rights organizations hail from the North, an increasing number
of prominent political and religious opposition leaders are
southerners.
The platforms of opposition groups vary, and the only universal
goal shared by all is a desire to have greater influence over
how the country is run. On economic issues, there is broad
agreement that direct foreign investment, elimination of corruption
and reforming key parts of the economy are needed to improve
the country’s economic prospects. (Here and throughout
the report it is important to make a clear division between
secular and religious groups. In this particular case, the
similarities in platform apply only to the secular opposition.
Religious groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU see the
construction of an Islamic state as the answer to economic
decline, as well as many other problems.)
Despite agreeing on general economic strategy, political
parties and civil society groups have sharp differences on
reform tactics concerning key issues, including land ownership,
rent subsidies and utility tariffs. Some leaders (particularly
the Communists and other populist parties) steadfastly oppose
drastic changes that may have a negative impact on their constituents,
while others feel that reforming these key areas is essential
to sustainable growth.
Geopolitically, there are likewise both similarities and
differences of opinion. While some segments see Western assistance
as a vital solution, others consider Russia’s role to
be indispensable. The benefits and harms of the deployment
of troops belonging to the US-led anti-terrorism coalition
in 2001 caused heated debates in the national parliament and
in the public. Opponents argued that collaboration with the
anti-terrorist coalition would endanger Kyrgyzstan’s
relations with Iran, China and Russia and would invite new
terrorist incursions, while supporters noted the considerable
economic and security benefits of cooperating with the US
and its allies. In contrast, the conditions of the border
agreement between Kyrgyzstan and China provoked an outcry
by nearly all segments of the opposition and caused an extended
political scandal. Opposition media outlets and figures charged
that Akayev’s administration was trading Kyrgyzstani
land for political points. Likewise, some opposition leaders,
such as Turgunaliev, say Akayev’s decision to grant Russia
basing rights at Kant airport constitutes a "betrayal
of the state’s interests."
Sources of Support
Regardless of their respective platforms, these groups have
risen to new prominence recently. As noted, among the political
reasons for their resurgence are the growing authoritarianism
and ineffectualness of Akayev’s regime, the radicalization
of politics and the inability of the authorities to address
the threat of Islamic militant groups. No less significant
are the rising rivalries among political clans, the vast patronage
networks determined by ethnicity and geography.
Ties with one of three clan "wings" traditionally
determine Kyrgyz identity in public and private life. The
Ong wing includes seven clans from the North and West (including
the current president’s clan, the Sarybagysh), the Sol
represents a single large clan that has its roots in southern
Kyrgyzstan and the Ichkilik many smaller clans that also have
strong links to the South. Informal power-sharing arrangements
among clans helped maintain stability in Kyrgyzstan during
the early years of independence. However, local observers
say the rising political unrest in 2002 is closely connected
to the northern clans’ reluctance or inability to address
the complaints of southern groups. Many prominent opposition
leaders (such as Beknazarov, Tekebayev, Adahan Madumarov and
Bektur Asanov) are aligned with southern clans, especially
those of the Ichkilik group. There is growing cohesion and
cooperation among southerners in their common aim of loosening
the Ong wing’s grip on power.
While recent events can be partially attributed to clan rivalry,
economic factors also cannot be ignored. As living standards
continue to plummet, new political movements and parties have
formed to exploit growing popular discontent. Groups such
as El, Ata-Meken, the Agrarian-Labor Party, Erkin
Kyrgyzstan and Asaba have competed for popular support
on an economic platform. Meanwhile, the Communist Party has
gradually rebuilt its traditional power base, due largely
to the authorities’ failure to achieve better living
standards. The widespread poverty, growing unemployment among
youth and growing monopolization of opportunity by a small
group of business elites have fostered discontent. This disgruntled
constituency includes an expanding number of grassroots civil
society groups, journalists and human rights activists.
Some of these groups represent the country’s ethnic Uzbeks,
who make up roughly 20 percent of the country’s population
(mostly in the South), and are a substantial element of those
that feel excluded from political and economic participation
in society. Their marginalization has led many to find an
outlet in other areas, such as radical Islam. Ethnic Uzbeks
predominate in the various unsanctioned religious groups that
are active in Kyrgyzstan, including Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the
IMU.
Authorities in Bishkek have long considered Uighurs, another
important ethnic minority, as a potential threat to warming
Kyrgyzstani-Chinese relations. Uighurs have long agitated
for greater autonomy from China, which controls the Uighur
homeland, Xinjiang. Kyrgyzstani law enforcement officials
have linked the June 2002 murders of several Chinese diplomats
and traders in Bishkek to Uighur criminal groups. In their
position on the periphery of Kyrgyzstani society, the Uighurs,
like the Uzbeks, are potential recruits for banned radical
groups.
Sources of funding for opposition parties and groups vary.
Civil society and human rights groups rely heavily on grants
from international NGOs, private donors, and some Western
governments. Because Kyrgyzstani legislation generally forbids
outside funding for political parties, especially prior to
elections, nearly all parties and groups rely predominantly
on the personal resources of their individual leaders and
the vast patronage networks of their clans. Prominent opposition
figures also gain financial support from various fundraising
events in their constituencies and from influential allies
in the business elite or even criminal organizations.
Similar to secular groups, outside sympathizers have long
been sources of financial support for the religious branch
of the opposition. Over the past decade, Muslims from Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt have reportedly provided
the means to construct new mosques and educate Islamic clerics.
Many of these groups were later forced to go underground by
governmental pressure.
Government Action Against the Opposition
The government has applied a mixed policy of incentives and
penalties as it seeks to rein in those who oppose it. As incentives,
the authorities have granted tax relief, financial concessions
and state contracts to the businesses of some prominent public
figures friendly to the regime. In one economic move that
appeared targeted to secure the support of local communities,
Akayev issued a decree in 1994 that offered monthly salaries
to some aksakals local elders who have traditionally been
influential in grassroots decision-making processes. Similarly,
some outspoken leaders of civil society have been offered
positions in the President’s cabinet. For instance, Joomart
Otorbayev, chairman of the Moya Strana party and one
of Akayev’s leading economic critics, accepted the post
of Minister for Economic Development in May 2001.
In some cases, authorities have also co-opted well-known
opposition parliament members to alter their positions, especially
during elections. Those moderate opposition figures and dissidents
who were willing to cooperate with the administration have
reportedly enjoyed free vacations, chauffeured government
vehicles, cheap property in sought-after areas and other privileges.
On the other hand, the government has brought a vast array
of bureaucratic weapons to bear on its less-yielding opponents,
including utilization of the judicial system to silence political
critics. Among high-profile cases are those of two-time prisoner
of conscience Turgunaliev, the currently imprisoned Kulov
and prosecution of fellow politicians and civil society figures
Beknazarov and Sydikova. (Sydikova was found guilty of libel
or slander a total of three times: in 1995, 1997 and 2000.)
Meanwhile, others have been continuously harassed, physically
assaulted and forced to flee the country, such as KCHR’s
Dyryldaev (who recently returned). The riots in Ak-Sui were
the last and worst in a series of cases of police violence
against demonstrators.
Additionally, the tax police and other agencies frequently
target opposition leaders and mass media outlets for audits
and inspections. Opposition groups characterize such action
as punitive assaults designed to curtail free speech. Occasionally,
authorities have simply assumed control of an opposition structure,
the most prominent instance being the take-over of the weekly
Vecherniy Bishkek mentioned above. Meanwhile, state-controlled
media frequently seek to discredit prominent opposition leaders,
especially during election campaigns. As an OSCE report on
the last presidential elections noted, the Kyrgyzstani state
media showed an "overwhelming bias in news programming
for the incumbent."
Future Prospects
Splits in the Opposition
Until relatively recently, the Kyrgyzstani opposition has
had little impact on the internal politics of the country.
Shortcomings in the areas of leadership, grassroots appeal,
organizational structure and funding hindered the emergence
of a broad movement with significant national appeal. Over
the past few years, local media outlets have started to distinguish
between "constructive" and "radical" wings
of the opposition. While pro-governmental media such as Vecherniy
Bishkek and the state broadcasting company offer relatively
favorable coverage of more moderate members of the opposition,
independent weeklies tend to align themselves with hard-line
opposition elements. As a result, there are constant clashes
between state-controlled media and private outlets.
This separation of the opposition into moderate and radical
wings has been exacerbated by the events in the South. While
the Bishkek-based opposition has had little success in turning
public protest to its advantage, southern politicians have
grown in influence and done their best to ride the wave of
popular discontent (as seen by the recent activities of the
Movement for the Resignation of President Askar Akayev).
The focus among opposition groups continues to remain on
personalities rather than on organizations, fostering a lack
of cohesion in the movement as a whole. At the same time,
suspicions linger about the democratic credentials of some
opposition leaders. For example, some analysts suggest Kulov,
in the event of gaining the presidency, might follow Akayev’s
example and resort to authoritarian methods to protect his
personal authority. They base their claims on Kulov’s
murky record while holding top government appointments. Observers
add that opposition leaders say that the opposition needs
to become more transparent and collaborative for it to increase
its chances of succeeding in its political aims. As long as
the opposition remains divided, dissent may be channeled into
other forms of activity, such as the work of civil society
groups (both political and apolitical), or the forces of radical
Islam.
Outlook
Despite the opposition’s lack of cohesion, Akayev found
himself in a tenuous position towards the end of 2002. His
handling of the fallout of the Ak-Sui riots prompted withering
criticism not only from the opposition, but also from hardliners
within government, leaving him politically isolated. Indeed,
some analysts believe Akayev sanctioned the establishment
of a Russian air base in Kyrgyzstan in order to secure Moscow’s
political support, thus reinforcing his sagging domestic position.
A few observers suggest that the Russian presence in Kyrgyzstan
may embolden Akayev to attempt a forceful crackdown against
his political opponents. At the same time, they question whether
even with Russian support Akayev has sufficient backing
to carry out a crackdown. Meanwhile, some opposition leaders,
including Turgunaliev, boldly predict that Akayev’s domestic
political position could become untenable in 2003. Turgunaliev
and some others do not exclude the possibility that the president
might possibly resign suddenly before his term ends and flee
the country.
Other experts expect Akayev to serve out his term in spite
of his lack of popularity. Two rounds of elections are scheduled
for 2005: parliamentary races in February, followed by presidential
at the end of the year. The current chances that an opposition
leader would be able to win the presidential elections appears
remote. The imprisoned Kulov is expected to be barred from
being a candidate, and while Beknazarov is likely to win a
seat in parliament, he lacks the backing of the northern clans
and business elite to mount a serious challenge for the presidency.
It is highly likely that Akayev and his allies would prefer
his successor to be determined via the model established during
the Russian presidential elections in 2000. (The early resignation
of Boris Yeltsin and subsequent rise in prominence of Vladimir
Putin ensured that the latter would have favorable media coverage
and the administrative support necessary to secure victory
in general elections.) It is rumored that Akayev is in the
midst of an intensive search for a successor who can first
and foremost guarantee his personal security and that of his
inner circle upon retirement.
Some analysts speculate that the recent attempts to assassinate
the moderate Secretary of the National Security Council, Misir
Ashirkulov, marked the beginning of succession clashes between
hard-line and conciliatory branches of Akayev’s government.
In an attempt to deflect growing criticism, a decree from
Akayev on August 26, 2002 established a Constitutional Council
to recommend changes to the Kyrgyzstani constitution. Since
then, the council’s work has been marked by controversy,
as opposition leaders assert Akayev backtracked from an original
commitment that the body’s composition would be equally
divided among government loyalists and critics. Most opposition
members have disassociated themselves from the council’s
work.
Although largely aimed at increasing the powers of parliament
vis-à-vis the president, the proposed constitutional
changes (on which a referendum is scheduled for January 3,
2003) include a notable provision to grant former presidents
immunity from prosecution for any actions taken during their
presidency.
Meanwhile, in the short-term, Kyrgyzstan faces the prospect
of continued civil unrest and large-scale violence. Tensions
in the South have remains high over court rulings against
Usen Sydykov, an opposition member who was barred from participating
in the second round of a parliamentary by-election in November.
Despite his strong showing in the first round, the Osh City
Court forbade Sydykov, a former vice prime minister and chairman
of the Agrarian-Labor Party, from running on the grounds of
his allegedly flawed candidacy application. Supporters of
Sydykov viewed the ruling as a clear attempt to exclude him
from a seat he likely would have won, and staged several demonstrations
in late October. On November 23, Sydykov’s backers declared
that three southern regions that have been at the center of
the ongoing turmoil Osh, Jalalabad, and Batken could attempt
to seek autonomy if Bishkek continues to avoid addressing
the population’s concerns.
The opposition has done only a partial job of harnessing
the momentum caused by the developments in 2002. Even Beknazarov
and other southern figures may soon find that their lack of
an organizational base and long-term strategy for opposing
Akayev will lead to their marginalization, as protesters get
increasingly dissatisfied and radicalized. There is sufficient
foundation of discontent, mistrust, and vulnerability to make
very real the prospect that a riot, border clash or terrorist
incursion could rapidly transform into broader civil unrest.
The tragic events in Ak-Sui have prompted several influential
parties and informal political networks to exploit such sensitivities
in an attempt to shift the balance of power.
Editors Note: Alisher Khamidov is currently a Muskie
Fellow graduate student at the Joan B. Kroc Institute of Peace
Studies at Notre Dame University.
Daniel Sershen is project editor for this series.
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reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex
and controversial issues.
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily
represent the position of the Open Society Institute and
are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.
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