Back in Total Control
L. Sumati: 8/22/00
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from Transitions Online

ULAN BATOR--With the formation of a government last week, Mongolia's ex-communists completed their triumphant return to power after a four-year hiatus. Elections in July brought the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) a sweeping victory throughout the country, with its opponents winning a mere four seats. They also ushered out a democratic coalition that had refused to recognize the mounting signs in recent months that its reign would end so haplessly.

The one-sided conquest was reminiscent of 1992, a year after Mongolia adopted a new constitution signaling the start of the transition to democracy and a free market. In the first free parliamentary elections, the MPRP won 71 out of 76 seats, assuring the ex-communists of their superiority and creating a model for future Mongolian political behavior: arrogance, ignorance, and excessive self-confidence. The victory also extended the party's iron grip on power, which had begun in 1921 after Mongolia oriented itself toward the Soviet Union to escape Chinese domination.

In the years that followed, the democratically inclined opposition began to concentrate its forces, which resulted in the creation of the Democratic Union Coalition (DUC) in spring 1996. The DUC grouped together four political parties, including two major opposition parties: the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP) and the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP). The formation of the DUC furthered a trend of support for the opposition surpassing that of the government; opinion polls in the capital soon indicated a combined MNDP and MSDP rating of 51 percent, in comparison with 32 percent for the MPRP. Nevertheless, the political establishment on both sides mainly ignored the implications of those numbers, evidently dismissing the possibility that the ex-communists might ever fall from power.

WET BEHIND THE EARS

As elections approached in 1996, the DUC took a page out of the campaign book of former U.S. Congressman Newt Gingrich, whose "contract" with voters brought victory to the Republicans in the mid-1990s. Taking the advice of the International Republican Institute, the DUC offered the electorate several pages of promises signed by DUC leaders. The approach greatly pleased Mongolian voters, who were not used to such attention, and, tired of MPRP rule (because of widespread corruption and a badly performing economy) they gave the DUC victory.

The election results came as a surprise for both winners and losers. The DUC grasped power unprepared, lacking political and economic experience. As the majority of the DUC consisted of young people eager for quick solutions, they selected radical methods for speeding up the transition. That included introducing aggressive economic reforms immediately after the elections, which frightened many DUC supporters. Only three months after its dramatic victory, the DUC lost the local elections, and the MPRP gained control over most local representative bodies.

The next warning that the DUC's political future might not be so rosy came with the presidential elections in 1997. The incumbent and DUC candidate, Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the MPRP chairman, Natsagiin Bagabandi, losing 27.5 percent to 66.1 percent. Bagabandi's election created additional problems for the DUC, introducing a distracting, new power struggle into Mongolian politics: the apparatus of the president versus the parliament. Bagabandi aimed to change the constitution and declare presidential rule, but ran into problems with the government, as well as younger reformers within his own party. (According to Mongolia's constitution, the country is a parliamentary republic, but direct presidential elections and legislative flaws give the head of state a certain level of independence.)

A definitive sway in public opinion in favor of the MPRP started in the middle of 1997 and was strengthened in 1998 with the fall of the first DUC cabinet, which was replaced by a government led by Rinchinnyamiyn Amarjargal Elbegdorj, the MNDP chair. Elbegdorj's amateurish, short-lived rule created a serious crisis not only for the DUC but on a systematic level as well. Public confidence in major institutions—such as parliament, the judicial system, and the government—started to slowly crumble, while people registered growing confidence in the president.

QUICK RECOVERY

The MPRP, meanwhile, had overcome its shock after the 1996 elections and started the long haul back to its former dominance. The ex-communists soon began presenting themselves as a new progressive force, the only one with the potential to lead the country. Starting in early 1997, the MPRP began a massive infusion of young members. N. Enhbayar, the charismatic new party leader—who replaced his orthodox predecessor, Bagabandi, after the presidential elections—played a pivotal role in this process. Realizing the importance of the mass media, the MPRP also signed contracts with some of the leading television and radio stations long before the official election campaign period. It came as an unpleasant surprise to their rivals when they discovered that the MPRP had already secured the best spots for its electoral propaganda. These tactics led to a steady increase in the number of supporters.

The pessimistic situation for DUC started to change with the next two coalition governments, but time was running out. Several political scandals, including the imprisonment of three DUC parliamentary deputies that were found guilty of corruption, brought coalition ratings to new lows. In December 1999, only 17 percent of the population was ready to vote for the DUC, against 49 percent for the MPRP. The DUC reacted to the changing political environment in a traditional way: by ignoring the facts and with high arrogance. The DUC officials conducted their own counter-polls, which allowed them to claim that the MSDP would receive 30 seats and the MNDP 40 seats in the upcoming elections.

PERSONALITY OVER PARTY

This spring, internal frictions in the coalition led to its disintegration, as the MSDP officially declared that it would not participate in the elections with the rest of the DUC. The lateness of the decision left all ex-DUC members without a clear election strategy and facing independent May opinion polls predicting a massive defeat.

At that time, the democratic forces had seemed to finally recognize their low level of public support. But instead of uniting against the MPRP, they opted for a novelty in Mongolia: giving candidates' personalities the highest priority in the pre-election campaign. In spite of the previous experiences of 1992 and 1996, when people essentially voted for political parties, the democrats chose to make the 2000 elections a stage for the cult of personality. That approach helped the parties to collect campaign funds but created an interesting side effect: Almost 700 candidates, independent and from 20 political groupings, participated in the elections. All parties were busy making offers to the Mongolian elite, from famous wrestlers to well-known politicians. The cornerstone of most of the campaigning was various types of electoral bribery, from building local roads and children's playgrounds to distributing gifts and false promises.

On 2 July, the MPRP won 72 out of 76 seats in parliament. The strong personality factor played a role only in four electorates, as even popular democrats—either overly self-confident or distracted by needing to campaign for others—rarely visited their home electorates and lost. The results eliminated the MSDP from parliament and relegated the new non-MPRP deputies to insignificant roles for the foreseeable future. Such overwhelming dominance will definitely help the MPRP to win the local elections this autumn, as the democrats deal with post-election shock and the fervent search for scapegoats.

Voting in today's MPRP-dominated parliament has been led by the decisions of the MPRP's governing council—a legacy from socialism, where decisions of the Politburo were unanimously supported by deputies. Recently, the prime minister reminded MPRP members that they were chosen by parliament and expected to respect the party line.

NOT ALL HUGS AND KISSES

The bright future for the MPRP is darkened by interparty conflicts and their related effect on the economy. The party is internally split into an orthodox wing supported by President Bagabandi and a progressive wing of young party members led by party chair Enhbayar. The tensions have grown since the election, as Bagabandi blocked attempts to form a new government with Enhbayar as prime minister —a continuation of Bagabandi's strategy to push for a new presidential system by creating popular discontent with parliament. In the end, Bagabandi relented, but the situation should again heat up next year, when MPRP deputies will need to nominate a candidate to run as the party's nominee for president.

At this moment, the progressive wing is in control of the economy and is determined to continue free-market reforms —though that will still entail increasing the level of state control (an essential attribute of MPRP governance). The cabinet would like to push for a more socially oriented policy than its predecessor, but pre-election promises for free education and medical care cannot be fulfilled until the government can pay for them. In the long run, the success of any one-party faction will be connected to economic development and the amount of social welfare spending that allows. Without any visible improvement, voting could follow a seesaw effect the next time around, with the MPRP returning to the opposition.

After nearly 10 years of democracy in Mongolia, a MPRP-dominated parliament does not represent a new phenomenon or a switch of the electorate's allegiances back to the old system. Opinion polls show that the population is very stable in its overwhelming acceptance of the transition. In May 2000, 87 percent of the population regarded the move to a democratic system as the right step, and 85 percent regarded the shift to a market economy as correct.

Nevertheless, the lack of experience in a new political environment allowed the MPRP to return to total control, partly because the party was the only one to learn from the 1996 results. The surprise victory of the DUC then —mainly a protest vote for change rather than the result of intensive opposition activity —created a feeling that one or two months of hard campaigning before a poll could easily sway public opinion. The last two election results have shown, however, that the population is learning faster than politicians: They cannot be easily manipulated through bribery or easy promises.

Editor’s Note: L. Sumati is the director of the Sant Maral foundation, which has been conducting widely published public opinion research since 1995.

The above story is reposted with permission from Transitions Online (TOL). TOL (http://www.tol.cz) is an Internet magazine covering Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. If you aren't already a member, you can fill out the registration form at <http://www.tol.cz/trialsubscr.html> to receive a free two-month trial membership. If you're a citizen of a post-communist country, FREE annual memberships are available at <http://www.tol.cz/trialsubscr2.html>.

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Posted August 22, 2000 © Eurasianet
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